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Sum m ary
A new artificial intelligence based approach for security assessment of an elec­
trical power system is presented in this thesis. A single processor version of the 
multi-machine power system simulator, developed at the University of Bath, has 
been used as the basis of this research. Traditional techniques for contingency 
analysis, evaluation and system stability assessment are discussed, together with 
applications of artificial intelligence in these areas.
The concept of fuzzy set theory is described and the development of algorithms 
for contingency evaluation and stability analysis is discussed. A demonstration 
is shown, illustrating how such a method could be used to assess the secur­
ity/stability of a number of test networks. These range from 6 network nodes 
and 4 generating groups to 718 nodes and 93 machines. Results are presented for 
these fuzzy methods, with different weighting functions, and compared with two 
numerical approaches. The latter consist of the more traditional techniques for 
contingency analysis and include one which is known to be free from errors, which 
is used as a benchmark for the other methods. Time domain solutions are used to 
verify the stability assessment made by the new fuzzy approaches.
Conclusions are drawn in the light of these results, discussing the effectiveness of 
the fuzzy techniques with respect to computational speed advantages that can be 
obtained and without loss of accuracy when compared to the benchmark. Future 
developments of the basis simulator and the assessor algorithms are also suggested.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 E lectrica l Pow er S y stem  O peration
Since the industrial revolution, the demand for and consumption of electrical en­
ergy has steadily increased. Very complex power systems with an interconnected 
network of transmission lines linking generators to loads have been built in all the 
worldwide developed countries, in order to meet this demand.
Successful operation of such a power system presents many engineering problems 
which provide the engineer with a variety of challenges. These demands include 
planning, construction and operation of such systems and, in order to predict the 
performance of a typical power network, the engineer is forced to rely on ever more 
powerful tools of analysis and synthesis.
ii
The basic objective of an electrical power system is to supply energy to the various 
loads distributed throughout the network [1]. Properly designed and operated, it 
should, therefore, meet the following requirements : -
•  It must supply energy to every customer demanding it.
•  It must be able to cope with time varying load demands for real (MW) and
1
reactive (MVAr) power.
• The “quality” of supply to these loads must meet certain utility specific 
constraints, in terms of frequency, voltage and high reliability.
• It should deliver energy at the lowest economical and ecological costs.
The control of synchronous generators to maintain their parallel operation with 
sufficient capacity to meet load demand is one of the primary objectives for a 
reliable service [2]. The system frequency serves as an indication of any unbalance 
between consumed and generated power and can be used to control the power 
output of the generator via its governing system. If at any time a generator 
loses synchronism with the rest of the system, significant voltage and current 
fluctuations may occur and transmission lines may be automatically tripped by 
their relays. This is, therefore, a potential stability problem. If a generator is
separated from the system, it must be resynchronised and then loaded without
1
detrimental effect to either the rest of the connected network or to the customer.
The second primary objective for a reliable electricity supply is to maintain the 
connectivity of the power network. The high-voltage transmission system con­
nects the generating stations and load centres. Interruptions to this network
will ultimately hamper the flow of power to the load. Also, in attempting to11
transmit electrical energy via a transmission link, a limit will be reached, beyond 
which no more power can be carried by that line. This constraint introduces the 
concept of static transmission capacity. Power flows between neighbouring power 
systems over interconnecting tie-lines often help maintain the continuity of service 
of each network . Therefore, successful operation of the system relies on these lines 
remaining in service, if power is to be exchanged between areas of the system.
2
In addition to maintaining power-load balance, control of network voltage levels 
also needs to be addressed. An unchanged busbar voltage profile represents the 
balance between generated and consumed reactive power, in much the same way as 
frequency is used for the real power case. Whenever the magnitude of a particular 
busbar voltage changes, the implication is that the reactive power or Q balance 
has not been kept at that busbar. Local Q generation can be achieved by shunt 
capacitors and/or series compensators. However, automatic voltage regulators on 
generators or automatic load tap changing transformers are more readily used.
The management and control of power system is thus a very complex process and 
is normally, depending on the utility in question, split into increasing orders of 
“command hierarchy” on differing time scales [3]. These levels include : -
1. System planning - 6 months to 10 years.
2. System maintenance - 1 week to 6 months. ,
3. Unit commitment - 4 hours to  1 week.
4. Economic dispatch - 10 minutes to 4 hours.
5. Frequency and voltage control - 1 second to 10 minutes.
Stages 3 and 4 above are significant features in modern power system operation [4]. 
This is because a great deal of saving can be gained by minimising costs introduced 
by line losses, start-up, shut-down and maintenance costs. These reductions can 
be made by three functions : -
• Short-term forecast or load prediction, where a knowledge of industrial and
3
residential load demand is required (usually from historical recorded data) 
and a prediction of the forth-coming weather conditions.
• Unit commitment or scheduling of generators, where the objective is to have, 
at all times, the optimum number of generators on-line to provide the load 
demand and system reserve. “Spinning reserve” (standby synchronised gen­
eration) is also maintained in case of forecast errors or network disruptions 
due to system faults.
• Economic dispatch, which is the most economic loading of generators, once 
they are either committed or running on-line. In the UK, a calculated merit 
order schedule is used in order to load the cheapest generating sets first to 
their maximum outputs, reserving other, more expensive plant, for sudden 
or unexpected load increases.
One of the main concerns in the operation of a power system is its security. The ul-
I
timate goal is to continuously fulfil the load requirements, i.e. the generation-load 
balance mentioned above, without violating the operational constraints (i.e. to use 
transmission equipment within its associated permissible limits). Predominately, 
the reasons for these violations are usually associated with the forced outages of 
generators and transmission equipment.
•i
The need for power system operational tools for grid control engineers has been 
continually highlighted since the early-1970’s [5,6]. Original control systems, 
dedicated purely to supervisory control or generation control, were found to be 
inadequate for the growing capacity and demands of large high-voltage intercon­
nected transmission networks. A new “wave” of power system control systems 
has emerged with a much broader view of system monitoring and control with the 
addition of a new concept, that of system security.
4
The operation of a power system can, essentially, be broken down into three main 
sets of constraints, namely load, operating and security limits. The concept of 
the first two has already been explained and can be used to define a security 
constraint. Thus the security of the system is the ability or capability of the 
system to withstand a set of contingencies (unplanned outages, which include 
busbar faults, load and generator losses and transmission lines trips), without 
violating the load and operating constraints in the remaining system.
Hence, security assessment of the current operating condition of the network, with 
respect to a set of worst case contingencies, is another important function of power 
system operation. A study of this area can ultimately lead to aiding the operator 
to formulate a set of preventative and/or corrective actions.
1.2 C om p u tin g  A p p lica tion s
All of the operational functions, mentioned in the previous section, axe carried out 
in one form or another by digital computers. These may be stand-alone machines, 
such as personal computers or work stations, or mainframe-based calculation en­
gines linked to the Energy Management System (EMS). The introduction of the 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system collecting information 
throughout the power network, allows the display of that data at the control centre.
•I
It can also have the ability to operate devices at remote locations from the control 
centre. The SCADA function, although not considered a system security device 
itself, is clearly one of the most important components in power system security.
For most power system operation functions a basic load flow, either d.c. or a.c., 
is often used. The power output of all generators (except that connected to the 
slack bus) are specified, together with generator MVAr limits and loads in MWs
5
and MVArs. The load flow program [7,8] calculates the generator MVArs, all bus 
voltages (magnitudes and angles) and all line flows. It is undoubtedly the most 
valued and widely used program available to an operator, either at the on-line or 
planning stage. It is often used with telemetered data from the SCADA system 
to determine either the present state of the system, or in the case of security 
assessment, the future operating conditions during contingency analysis studies.
An optimal load or power flow solution is often used to optimise both real and 
reactive power generation [9]. Here the network equations are solved just as an 
ordinary load flow but, in addition, minimum and maximum ranges for each gen­
erator power are calculated. The optimal power flow can also be used to determine 
the economic allocation of generation with reference to the cost curves for each unit 
and, hence, performs an economic dispatch along with solving the total network. 
If instead of the desired generator terminal voltage, a range of terminal voltages for 
each unit is specified, both MWs and MVArs can be optimised in a P-Q dispatch.
The optimal power flow, with additional logic, could be used to avoid operating 
conditions where either line flows or voltage constraints are violated during normal 
operating conditions or during contingency applications. Corrective strategy logic 
could be incorporated to avoid line limits by, for example, shifting generation 
away from the economic optimum for those units. This, however, has the effect of 
moving the system away from its optimum operating point, and security is thus 
traded for economy.
With the increasing power of processors, new technologies for assessing system 
stability and security and simulating the power network itself are becoming of 
interest to the grid control engineer as an on-line operational aid.
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1.3 A rtificia l In te lligen ce
As previously mentioned in an earlier section, the function of the EMS is to ensure 
that the power system is operated as securely and economically as possible. This 
is in addition to providing some form of interface between itself and the human 
operator to permit routine tasks to be carried out such as security analysis, optimal 
power flows, economic dispatch, unit commitment and load forecasting. These are 
all conducted in the “steady state” operating mode of the power system.
The situation, however, changes radically during disturbed conditions, since the 
above functions are of little use to an operator and the EMS becomes simply a 
data gatherer and reporting device. The quantity of information and the rate at 
which it is collected can often overwhelm the operator in such situations.
Modern power systems are ever increasing in complexity and are being operated 
closer to their limits so that generation and transmission assets are more eco­
nomically utilised. This has a knock on effect on the operator, who, in turn, 
has to make quicker diagnoses and decisions about the system operating state. 
The implication is that with system complexity steadily increasing, the operator’s 
ability to cope with its decreases [10] unless new techniques are designed to enhance 
this capability.
i'
This illustrates the need for a new generation of EMS constituent programs, which 
can deal with the solution of “diagnostic and decision” processes. These are often 
based on the experience of operators (in coping with emergency conditions that can 
arise on the power system) with an ability to associate an existing situation with 
events learnt from the past (heuristics) to solve these problems. New techniques 
have been developed, under the “umbrella” of Artificial Intelligence (Ai), which
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can effectively mimic the operator. They can also provide a guidance about what 
the power system is actually doing and, in some cases, carry out some of the routine 
tasks, allowing the operator to spend more time on jobs of greater importance.
Since the early- 19S0’s, a number of artificial intelligence techniques have been de­
veloped for solving problems in various fields of power systems including planning, 
operation and control [11-17]. System analysis approaches have been applied to 
detect different modes of instability [18-21] in recent years. On the operation side, 
alarm processing [22-25], fault diagnosis [26,27], system restoration [28-31], load 
shedding [32], voltage and reactive power control [33-37] and security analysis in 
the form of contingency screening and evaluation [10,38-42] have all been covered. 
Unit commitment, maintenance scheduling and load forecasting [43-48] have also 
been addressed by AI techniques.
In these applications, a number of AI methods have been used. These consist of 
rule-based expert systems, distributed and general problem solving (frame-based) 
methods, logic modelling and programming, object-oriented programming and a 
variety of search mechanisms, as well as the relatively new introduction of artificial 
neural networks.
Most rule-based systems are, inherently, three stage functions, i.e. a knowledge 
base, an inference engine and an user interface. The inference engine reads data 
from the knowledge base, decides whether to use it and, if so, carries out the 
execution. It has, in this respect, acted as an interpreter. However, traditional 
expert systems have dealt with what was, in effect, a  complex yes-no processing 
mechanism. The concept of Fuzzy Logic [49-51] has evolved which, not only 
provides this facility but, also, adds an extra dimension by which a “maybe” 
statement could be introduced. This, therefore, allows fuzzy expert systems to
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model human operator performance, since rule-bases are, inevitably, filled with 
imprecise data. These rules may contain useful information which would otherwise 
be meaningless to more traditional expert system/logic mechanisms.
W ith the ever increasing complexity of network operation and the growth of com­
puter processing power, the use of AI techniques will become more dominant in 
the EMS functions of future power systems. However it is unlikely that they will 
ever replace the operator in the control room.
1.4 A b ou t th is T h esis
Chapter 2 introduces the concept of power system security assessment. Contin­
gency screening, analysis and evaluation axe discussed together with procedures 
and application techniques that have been previously developed, based on numer­
ical and artificial intelligence approaches.
1
Modes of instability, namely transient, steady state/dynamic and voltage stability 
are described in Chapter 3, with a discussion of the differences between each of 
these. Methods of detecting these modes are also described. Details of alarm 
processing and its approaches axe examined in this chapter, highlighting the im­
portance of such a facility as part of a security assessment algorithm.
i
Chapter 4 presents a type of artificial intelligence known as fuzzy logic. A simplistic 
verbal overview is given together with a more detailed mathematical insight into 
fuzzy set techniques. Applications to power systems and other examples are also 
discussed.
The real-time power system simulator PowSim, developed over a number of years
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at the University of Bath, is briefly described in Chapter 5. Further enhancements 
made to the basic simulator code in order for a more detailed and, hence more 
accurate, contingency analysis to be carried out are also presented.
A number of computing hardware platforms have been used in the course of this 
research, namely a Microway Number Smasher-860 accelerator card based in a 
personal computer and a Silicon Graphics Indigo. Each architecture is described 
with its associated software operating system in Chapter 6.
Chapter 7 presents the software code implementation of the security assessor 
developed during this research, which has been integrated with the simulator 
PowSim. In keeping with Chapters 2 and 3, the code, written in ANSI standard C, 
has been split into contingency analysis, stability assessment and alarm processing.
A discussion of the results obtained from a fuzzy set and a more traditional nu­
merical based security assessor is made in Chapter 8. A number of networks were 
used which include : a reduced system of the UK National Grid consisting of 20 
machines and 100 busbars, a further reduction of this network to 4 machines and 
6 busbars, as well as an IEEE 57-bus test system and a full NGC network.




Security A ssessm ent
2.1 In trod u ction
A definition of security is one of freedom from risk or danger. Power systems, 
however, can never be absolutely secure in this precise sense and the term is 
redefined as the ability of the power system to continue normal operation des­
pite the occurrence of any one of a pre-selected list of credible disturbances or 
“contingencies”, i.e. the level of risk at any time of disruption to the system’s 
steady state operation. The whole concept of security has become increasingly of 
interest to power utilities and research organisations alike, since power networks 
axe being operated ever closer to their stability limits due to cost, efficiency and 
environmental constraints.
Security assessment is becoming a valuable tool in the analysis of power system 
operation. It is, however, probably the most time-consuming function in an En­
ergy Management System (EMS), since on-line contingency analysis is performed 
automatically (typically every ten to twenty minutes) and after any major network 
topology change, as well as on control operator request. For each contingency case, 
system performance and reliability are calculated from post-fault quantities that 
include power flows and busbar voltages.
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For a large power system, hundreds or, in some cases, thousands of credible con­
tingencies would need to be fully analysed within very short time intervals. This 
imposes a considerable computational burden, which is often too much for real­
time applications, even if fast solution methods are used. In order to relieve the 
operator, a systematic approach to automatically select the critical contingencies 
is required, since a complete evaluation of all credible contingencies reveals very 
often that a large number pose no threat to the security of the power system. 
Such a method also ranks these contingencies in their ascending order of severity, 
so that full contingency analysis can be performed starting with the most severe 
at the top and proceeding down the list to the least severe. Theoretically, if a 
contingency no longer produces system violations, the analysis could be stopped, 
since it can be assumed that all the remaining contingencies are also violation free. 
This, in practice, does not always happen due to approximations and inaccuracies 
in the ranking, so that analysis is often continued for several cases down the list 
until no further limit violations axe produced.
I
Brief overviews of security and contingency analysis will now be given, with fol­
lowing sections describing Automatic Contingency Selection (ACS) methods that 
have been developed and how this type of approach may be implemented as part 
of a dynamic security assessor.
2.2 Secu rity  A n alysis
A complete on-line security analysis module is a composite of three basic compon­
ents which are principally monitoring, assessment and control [52]. These can be 
tied together in the following way :
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1. Security Monitoring : from real-time data, an analysis is conducted to as­
certain whether the system is in a stable operating mode. If not, remedial 
actions need to be taken to bring the system back to a normal state, or in 
the case of loss of load, service restoration needs to be performed.
2. Security Assessment : if the system is operating in a stable mode, a set of 
contingencies is applied to determine whether the system is secure post-fault.
3. Security Enhancement : if the system is insecure during or after a contin­
gency, some preventative measures need to be formulated and performed to 
make the system stable.
The main elements of a typical on-line security analysis program implemented 
by a number of power utilities is shown in Figure 2.1. Measurements via the 
computer-based Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system are 
telemetered from around the network to the utility’s EMS computer. There are 
principally three types of real-time measurements :
• Analogue, that include real and reactive power flows through transmission 
lines, real and reactive power injections of generation or demand at busbars 
and busbar voltage magnitudes.
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• Logic, that consist of switch states, transformer Load Tap Changing (LTC) 
positions and the status of circuit breakers.
• Pseudo, that may include forecasted busbar loads and generation
Errors and noise may be contained in these measurements so that these are re­
jected by passing the newly acquired system data through a filter of reasonability
and consistency checks. The filtered measures are then passed to the topology 
processor to determine the system configuration of generator and transmission 
network connections.
The remaining data is processed still further by observability analysis of the net­
work. This needs to be conducted before state estimation is executed, in order to 
determine whether enough of the system is observable for state estimation to be 
performed. If the set of measurements is sufficiently large with a wide distribution 
across the system, the network is deemed to be observable. Unobservability can 
occur when there are unplanned topology changes or telemetering failures.
The state estimation program is a mathematical procedure used for calculating 
the “best” estimate of the remaining unknown state variables of the power system 
based on the available data, i.e. values that can neither be measured or have not 
been measured. These estimates are, however, generally corrupted with errors 
due to delay or noise effects either in data transmission or in the communication 
system respectively. The state estimation process itself may introduce further 
errors from approximate network model parameters such as line impedances (which 
are impossible to measure practically) or state estimation measurements.
The best estimate of the system state is formulated as a weighted least square error
• • 1 * • problem, which is assumed to be small. Occasionally, large errors or corrupted
data occur and it is important to include an extra feature, as part of the state
estimation program, to detect the presence of these, identify which measurements
are bad and to remove all the bad data before it corrupts the results of the state
estimation algorithm.
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To assess whether the system is operating in a stable mode, a set of contingencies 
is needed. For a large power system, the number of possible contingencies is 
enormous and, hence, a selection process is required to reduce this list to a handful 
of important disturbances. To assess the system response to this reduced set, an 
evaluation is carried out using on-line ac load flows. This uses the state estimated 
solution network and an external network model, i.e. the unmonitored system 
of a neighbouring network, since the response of the external system also needs 
to be included. A bus load forecast is also implemented since the concept of a 
contingency is something that is a future event.
State estimation and, hence, observability analysis and bad data processing have 
not been included as part of this research. The main thrust is in the area of 
contingency analysis, so this will now be described in more detail.
2.3 C ontingen cy  A n a lysis
i
Most power utilities use two main methods for operational security assessment [38]. 
These are namely off-line studies, which axe predominantly used at the planning 
stage and give advice for periods of about a day and, on-line studies, which are 
used at the operational stage and give guidance for periods of tens of minutes. 
Both methods use a similar algorithm and perform essentially the same steps : -
• J
1. Select a base case.
2. Select a set of contingencies
3. Evaluate these contingencies
4. Display the simulation results for system operators.
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For on-line contingency analysis, the current operating state of the power system 
is used for the base case in step 1, where data is collected automatically from the 
EMS. In the case of off-line studies, the base case is collated from historical data 
and more up-to-date EMS data is prepared for it.
The contingency set in step 2 is a list of unplanned outages of one or more power 
system components, such as transmission lines, transformers or generators. This 
list is initially chosen off-line by a human expert but amendments to the original set 
may be entered by an operator at the on-line stage to deal with specific conditions 
under which the system may be presently operating. The length of contingency 
lists has grown considerably with time, so that full evaluation of the entire set 
proves practically impossible for most EMS computers to cope with. This growth 
is mainly due to the necessity to include contingencies which deal with all pos­
sible power system operating conditions, which, for the majority of cases, do not 
adversely affect the operating states. Because of this, the most recent area of 
development is that of automatic contingency selection which will be described in 
more detail in the next section.
Contingencies that have been selected for further analysis are evaluated in step 
3 by a full ac load flow. Numerical results from each evaluation are screened to 
detect limit violations and are presented to power system operators. Because of 
the increased length of contingency lists, a corresponding growth in output results 
has meant that for on-line security assessors this data is limited by listing only 
the worst violations. These are usually in terms of percentage limit violations 
(often referred to as alarms) for each evaluated contingency and the mechanism 
by which this reduction is conducted is known as “alarm processing” which will 
be described in greater detail in the next chapter.
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To further reduce the information presented to the operator, severity indices, 
calculated by contingency ranking methods, have been used but this has the 
disadvantage that not enough specific information about the nature of the problem 
is presented and there is no provision of a basis from which corrective actions may 
be formulated.
2 .4  A u tom atic  C on tin gen cy  S election
Many automatic contingency selection methods have been developed which rely on 
the use of a system-wide performance index (PI) to quantify the severity of each 
case in the contingency list. This PI is often subsequently used for contingency 
ranking which is, itself, heavily dependent on the form of the PI selected. The 
general structure of such an index is :
«  =  £ > [ /< (* ) ]"  ' (2-1) 
* = i
where /»(x) is a linear function of xt- which denotes either (P ,/ P/710*), (A K /A  V^max) 
or (AQi/AQj71037), the MVA transmission line flows, changes in load busbar voltage 
magnitudes or generator busbar injections with respect to their corresponding 
ratings. tut- is a real non-negative weighting coefficient and the differences between 
the P i’s is dependent on the choice of this number. In general, the value of this 
coefficient is chosen so that severely violated contingencies have a performance 
index greater than those that are lightly violated. The PI is calculated for all the 
lines and/or busbars in the network and summed to yield the total system severity 
index (SI).
Most of the recent developments use an algorithmic approach based on a quad­
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ratic function of the perfomance index, i.e. the exponent n =  2. This makes 
contingency ranking prone to masking effects, i.e. a contingency with many small 
limit violations can be ranked equally with one with a few large limit violations. 
Methods described by Halpin et al. [53] and Schafer et al. [54] whereby the 
weighting coefficient and the exponent n are maximised to increase the “capture 
rate1” of critical contingencies produce a reduction in masking errors in the final 
contingency ranking. There is, however, a corresponding increase in CPU time, 
so that a trade-off between accuracy and speed of execution has to be made.
2.4.1 Past D evelopm ents o f ACS A lgorithm s
Wollenberg et al. [55] were, in essence, the first researchers to recognise the 
problems of evaluating large contingency lists and produced a selection algorithm 
to reduce the initial set to be applied for full ac analysis. A gradient method 
was developed to describe the system wide performance index to quantify real 
power circuit overloads and jabnormal system voltages using a PI of the form 
in Equation 2.1. First order derivatives of these indices with respect to system 
parameter changes were calculated from Tellegen’s theorem and then used to rank 
each contingency.
The general functional block diagram, as developed by Wollenberg in [55] is shown 
in Figure 2.2 and is still the basis for more modern automatic contingency selec­
tion algorithms. Performance indices axe calculated for each contingency from 
Equation 2.1 and ranked by ordering the greatest severity at the top of the list to 
the least at the bottom. A fast decoupled load flow (FDLF) is carried out to give
1The Capture Rate (CR) is defined as the fraction of the worst N  contingencies appearing in 
the first N  entries in the ranking list. With CR <  1, the ranking will not contain the N  worst 
contingencies.
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busbar voltage or circuit overload problems for each post-contingent system state. 
A full ac load flow still needs to be conducted but only for those cases that produce 
limit violations. The stopping criteria is such that if no problems are indicated, 
the full analysis load flow is terminated. Ranking of those contingencies below the 
stopping point is still preserved, since non-limit violating cases have already been 
ranked. Wollenberg suggested that this was an “adaptive contingency processor” 
since the number of cases to be solved would vary with system conditions.
The concept of “effectiveness profiles” was also introduced [55], which was es­
sentially a graphical representation of the performance index calculated from a dc 
load flow versus contingencies ranked by the algorithm. From the results described, 
various “bumps” were shown to be present in the profile of this graph, which was 
the influence of misrankings by the masking effect, although this was not known 
at the time.
This method was improved by Wollenberg et al. [56] by including all terms of the 
Taylor expansion series for changes in performance indices. The notion of masking 
was introduced, caused by the exponent n  in Equation 2.1. Wollenberg discovered 
that by setting the weighting coefficient in the new ranking algorithm [56] to 
zero, the effects of masking could be greatly reduced. A new effectiveness profile 
was displayed in the results which showed a much smoother decreasing slope.
Using [55] as the basis of their research, Irisarri at al. [57] used dc load flows to 
calculate performance indices for quantifying line overloads. A normalised function 
of the angle across the line was introduced rather than the MW flow which had 
been used previously. Both types of performance indices were tested on real-time 
conditions using an American Electric Power Corporation (AEP) network. The 
behaviour of the new PI was found to be better at non-misclassifications of line
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contingencies than that in [55], The method was further developed to include 
second order effects using elementary differential calculus. Although the results 
of this extended method were better than those obtained from the first order 
approach, the improvement was not vastly significant. Irisarri concluded that a dc 
load flow provided a competitive alternative to ACS methods and that for on-line 
contingency analysis, the possible use of this solution method should be considered 
for selection of serious line contingencies.
In a follow-up to this initial research, Irisarri et al. [58] described an efficient 
computational procedure for the implementation of a dc load flow involving a 
forward-backward substitution mechanism in order to reduce its computational 
demands. Further tests using the AEP system were conducted for this modification 
to measure the accuracy of results and concluded that the new method was at a 
level comparable to those of the sensitivity methods in [57]. The problem of 
masking was also addressed and although attem pts were made to eliminate the 
exponent n (i.e setting it to 1) to solve some of the problems, Irisarri concluded 
that to remove masking errors, a number of different performance indices should 
be used.
To address voltage problem contingencies, which had been ignored by previous 
research activities, Albuyeh et al. [59] examined the automatic contingency selec­
tion of those cases causing unacceptable voltage profiles using the first iteration of 
a full ac load flow, since dc load flows do not indicate voltage violations. Outages 
were ranked using performance indices describing both real and reactive power 
equations, based on their calculated severity. The capture ratios were equivalent 
to those from a full ac load flow but, it was noted that ranking by real and reactive 
power P i’s should be conducted independent of each other.
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Sackett et al. [60] introduced a contingency analysis program that calculated 
changes in linearised post-contingent real power flow. Using the relationship de­
scribed in [60]2, a speed-up was identified by calculating the “explicit inverse” 
(triangular portion) of H  by a back substitution method. It was shown that mul­
tiple outage contingencies required effectively the same time as the same number 
computed individually.
Vemuri et al. [61] presented a unified approach to calculating the sensitivity of 
the PI for single outages, generation/load outages or a combination of both and 
concluded that, although this new method was less accurate than that of the dc 
load flow, it was faster with better storage requirements, making it more applicable 
to on-line requirements. As part of an overall ACS algorithm, Vemuri concluded 
that the inclusion of secondary outages was necessary and the complexity of com­
putation was similar to that for single outages.
The identification and ranking of credible outages in dependent variable space was 
carried out in an algorithm developed by Wasley et al. [62]. Simple computational 
procedures using a single iteration of an approximate load flow were applied for
each contingency case.
Lauby et al. [63] compared three methods of contingency selection of line outages 
causing voltage problems. A performance index and full ac load flow were used 
which, although performed well in detecting widespread severe volt problems, it 
was not suited for local area deviations within the network. Hence a local solution 
method (based on concentric relaxation and Gauss-Seidel solution techniques) was 
introduced which performed faster and better than a single iteration of a decoupled
2A P  =  HA6, where A P  is an n vector describing real power changes, A 6 is an n vector of 
busbar angles and H  is an n by n matrix relating A P  and Ad
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load flow. This approach also highlighted contingency cases which were overlooked 
by the linear load flow method.
A method used for improving the efficiency of ACS algorithms was developed 
by Halpin et al. [53], by maximising the capture rate, whilst minimising the 
“false alarm rate3” and hence masking effect without increasing the computational 
demand. An algorithm for calculating the weighting coefficients of the ranking 
PI was developed and a distinction was made between the use of performance 
indices and the screening approach of the fast decoupled load flow method. It was 
concluded that this PI method with its adaptively altered weighting coefficients 
could match the accuracy of the more conventional approach without sacrificing 
computation speed.
A voltage contingency selection algorithm based at AEP to assess line outages on 
load busbar voltage profiles was described by Irisarri et al. [64]. It was based on 
the real power portion of the FDLF to evaluate post-contingent angles and then 
the reactive power part of the FDLF was used to determine the post-contingent 
voltages. From this, a quadratic performance index for each contingency was 
calculated, and the PI values were sorted in descending order. Chen et al. [65] 
later elaborated this work and, by using a different reactive power model, a method 
was developed which was much faster than [64] using sparse vector and matrix 
techniques. From the results in the literature, approximately the same accuracy 
as the FDLF was obtained but with less computation time.
To compensate for the masking effect in contingency ranking, Schafer et al. [54] 
introduced an adaptive procedure to improve the accuracy in Pi-based techniques.
3The False Alarm Rate is defined as the number of false alarms or limit violations appearing 
in the worst N  contingencies.
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The process was based on the fact that on-line security analysis is carried out 
cyclically, so that comparisons in ranking after each outage allows updating factors 
to be estimated whilst taking into account a sequence of former system states. By 
this straight approximation of the effectiveness profile (see [55]), the procedure 
combines the computational speed of a quadratic PI function (n =  2) with the 
masking free but more CPU expensive PI function with n = 20.
Wollenberg et al. [66] developed a fast method for contingency screening and 
evaluation for voltage security analysis, using [64] for the basis of their research. 
A voltage subnetwork was determined for each contingency case within which 
voltage problems were highlighted. If there were no resultant violations, the 'con­
tingency was deemed to be not harmful to the system state and consequently 
screened out. Fast forward and backward substitutions were then performed for 
voltage deviant cases to determine the busbar voltages within the subnetwork. 
For those contingencies deemed to be important, a full ac loadflow was carried out 
via an “adaptive reduction equivalent network” (based on concentric relaxation 
techniques), so that computational time was kept to a minimum.
Using this as the basis of their research, Lauby et al. [67] developed a method 
using an efficient bounding technique for line flow limit violations and extensions to 
reactive power (MVAr) mismatches at load busbars. This effectively reduced the 
number of consequent power flow calculations as well as the number of busbars 
where MVAr mismatches were to be calculated, with the main advantage tha t 
it was adaptable to any system condition or network topology. More recently 
Hadjsaid et al. [68] described an approach for fast contingency screening for 
voltage-reactive considerations in security analysis. This again was based on a 
bounding approach between busbars nearest to the contingency outage and those 
electrically distant away from the disturbance. The concept of electrical distance
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was introduced in order to identify those busbars which would see the greatest 
voltage deviations. Hence, the number of busbars for MVAr mismatch calcula­
tions were greatly reduced and with the use of sparse vector techniques, faster 
computation speeds were obtained.
Ekwue and Laing [69] investigated methods for improving the accuracy and reliab­
ility of a technique which used a second order load flow method based on rectangu­
lar coordinates and the performance index in [62]. This used the load curtailment 
needed to raise busbar voltages to the pre-contingent level as an indication of the 
severity of the contingency. This is a continuation of the earlier work by Ekwue 
[70] based on a decoupled technique for voltage drop and line overloads using a 
second order load flow and misranking compensation for single line evaluation. 
Ekwue also investigated PFs [71] for contingency ranking of generator reactive 
power violations as well as real power line flow problems.
A contingency selection algorithm for dynamic;stability studies was developed 
by Hsu et al. [72] which used the results from the first iteration of a FDLF to 
estimate the state of the system after a  contingency outage. Eigenvalues from the 
first iteration of an iterative eigenvalue computation were used to approximate 
the system eigenvalues (and hence estimate the worst damped eigenvalues) during 
the disturbance. From the results presented, accurate ranking of the contingency 
list was achieved and the computation tiine was greatly reduced, since only those 
cases at the top of the ranked list required further dynamic stability eigenvalue 
analysis.
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2.4.2 Artificial Intelligence A pplied to  ACS
Recent developments in automatic contingency selection and security analysis have 
encompassed the techniques of artificial intelligence. These are primarily rule- 
based or expert systems and neural network applications.
2.4.2.1 Expert System s
Christie et al. [38] introduced the concept of expert systems (ES) to on-line se­
curity assessment. They discussed that contingency selection and the subsequent 
analysis of the results were essentially data-driven processes, so that expert sys­
tems were well suited to this type of approach provided that the performance is 
comparable to that of a human expert and off-line studies which generate greater 
detailed assessments of the system state.
Sobajic et al. [39] developed a knowledge-based system for screening power system 
contingencies. This rule-base was built up from system operator experience and 
simulation models and was entirely independent of system size and complexity. 
The ES was designed to fulfil two main objectives, that of detecting and removing 
harmless contingencies from further processing and recognising potentially hazard­
ous disturbances, together with the corresponding endangered areas of the system.
*
Both single and multiple line outages were filtered by this mechanism in order to 
carry out a full ac load flow on the selected cases.
In a follow-up to [10], Christie developed the idea that security analysis could not 
be simply defined by a single PI, but required information about a number of other 
quantities, namely quality of supply, the potential loss of supply, the likelihood of 
quality loss as well as some mechanism to help the operator formulate corrective or
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preventative actions. An expert system was introduced that attempted to collate 
and mimic operator knowledge used in off-line studies. However, it was suggested 
that new methods for capturing and adapting this information would have to 
be developed to keep up with future needs of a security assessment algorithm. 
In a later publication [40], Christie resolved many of the problems that were 
mentioned above by generalising the program to deal with security assessment 
information from a number of power utilities which differed only in detail rather 
than in its basic content. Future developments were outlined to implement a 
cooperative structure between expert system and algorithmic approaches (i.e. a 
hybrid approach) and, hence, providing a facility for expressing corrective actions 
as well as security analysis.
Fouad et al. [73] described a method where a Transient Energy Function (TEF) 
approach (which will be explained in the next chapter) could be used in security 
assessment. A rule-based system was used to process the results of the TEF. 
For a given contingency, the TEF method provided a measure of the stability 
margin and system sensitivity to changes in operating parameters. A multi-level 
tree structure for the expert system was implemented to deal with the decision 
making concerning the power system’s security (from the stability margin) and its 
vulnerability (from the sensitivity margin) to external influences.
A fuzzy set approach (described in Chapter 4) was implemented by Hsu et al. [41] 
to efficiently rank contingencies. Post-contingent quantities from a fast decoupled 
load flow were categorised using fuzzy set notation. System operator experience 
and heuristic rules were represented linguistically by a set of fuzzy reasoning rules. 
By using these to analyse the post-contingent quantities, a ranked list of contin­
gencies was produced. Tuning could be performed on these fuzzy representations 
to mimic operator performance in conducting contingency analysis.
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2.4.2.2 Artificial Neural Networks
When examining the contingency selection and ranking problem, many research­
ers have discussed that it is essentially a pattern recognition technique in which 
contingencies that give undesirable network conditions are sought. This type of 
approach would seem well suited for artificial neural networks (ANN).
The interest in ANN applications to power system security started in earnest 
in the late-1980’s, with Sobajic et al. [74] using a neural network to calculate 
fault clearing times (CCT) for post-fault dynamic studies. Various power network 
topologies and system loading conditions were used to train the ANN, so that it 
could be more adaptable in the on-line stage. Results in the literature showed 
that the estimated CCTs were comparable to those from analytical techniques.
Fischl et al. [75] developed a method by which neural networks could be used to 
detect “limiting contingencies” where lack o£ reactive power presents a problem in 
that real power transfers across the system have to be restricted. As with all ANN 
applications, once the network has been exhaustively trained with off-line studies 
(the problem is compounded with an increase in system size), the execution on-line 
is very fast.
El-Sharkawi et al. [76] used a similar technique for on-line static security analysis 
of power systems and trained a neural network on busbar voltages and line loadings 
as well as real and reactive power profiles. At each operating point, a set of optimal 
load flow equations were solved and the system security was determined and added 
to the training set. When running in an on-line mode the ANN displayed a security 
margin graphically showing the current operating point and its proximity to the 
security boundary.
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Continuing the work in [77], Sobajic introduced a combined use of unsupervised 
and supervised learning criteria for the neural network, since it could then handle 
large volumes of data. A new unsupervised learning algorithm was developed for 
grouping large bodies of data on the basis of previously discovered similarities. 
A supervised learning mechanism was then used to calculate accurately the CCT 
from these groups.
Fouad et al. [78] applied an ANN to the concept of power system vulnerability, 
using the results from a TEF as the inputs to the neural network, i.e. stability 
margin and system sensitivity. The ANN was trained to produce outputs of unity 
for a vulnerable system and zero otherwise.
2 .4.2.3 H y b rid  A pproaches
Recent developments [42] have involved combining the relative powers of expert 
systems and neutal networks to a complete security assessment algorithm. An ES 
was used to screen and select potentially severe contingencies, with the resultant 
list corresponding closely to that picked by a human expert. An ANN was applied 
to determine definitely stable and potentially unstable contingencies after fault 
clearing, showing a high level of accuracy and reliability. Also discussed in [42], 
artificial intelligence techniques can be useful for input data management and
■i
interpreting the security assessor results in a linguistic form for system operators.
2.5 C hapter Sum m ary
The subject of power system security assessment has been described in this chapter 
with distinctions made concerning security and contingency analysis. The concept 
of automatic contingency selection has been introduced and its previous develop­
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ments together with applications of artificial intelligence techniques in this area 
have also been discussed.
It is intended that an expert system based approach, namely a fuzzy set method, 
will be implemented, as part of this research, into a real-time power system sim­
ulator in order to carry out contingency analysis. This is together with power 
system stability analysis, which will now be the subject of the next chapter.
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System  Stability and V iolation  
D etection
3.1 In trod u ction
Power systems axe examples of large non-linear systems with a wide range of 
stability problems where the areas of interest are, primarily, the behaviour of 
synchronous generators during a large system disturbance [2,79-82]. In these 
stability studies, both the short-term dynamics of the initiating and subsequent 
(such as cascade tripping) events as well as the longer-term dynamics of the system 
should be simulated and analysed. Conventionally, transient stability programs 
are used to study the fast synchronising oscillations following a large disturbance, 
with a typical simulation duration of one to ten seconds. Dynamic stability al­
gorithms ignore these fast machine oscillations and concentrate on the longer-term 
effects of slow power and voltage swings and frequency deviations, resulting from 
sustained energy imbalances, over a simulation time range of tens of minutes. The 
fundamental differences between each mode of oscillation will be explained in more 
detail in the next section, together with other modes of instability.
With any security analysis program and considering the size and complexity of a 
typical modern power system, an operator cannot expect to detect all abnormal 
conditions. An avalanche of warnings collected from around the system during and
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after a disturbance will occur, such that the operator could not possibly process all 
the information. It is because of this very reason that alarm processors have been 
developed over the last decade to evaluate the importance of each message and 
hence focus the attention of the operator and help him to track the evolution of 
the state of the power system by providing a summary of the abnormal conditions. 
Various alarm handling approaches and their effectiveness to security assessment 
will be discussed in a further section.
3.2 M odes o f In sta b ility  and D e te c tio n  M ech­
anism s
The stability of a system of interconnected dynamic components is defined as its 
ability to return to normal or stable operation after some disturbance has been 
applied [2,79].
There are principally two modes of instability in power systems,: the loss of syn­
chronism between synchronous machines and the stalling of asynchronous loads. 
Synchronous stability can itself be divided into further subgroups, steady state and 
transient.
Steady state, which is often referred to as dynamic stability, can be described 
as the capacity of the power system to retain synchronism, under a given load 
condition, when small disturbances, such as load or generation pattern changes 
and switching out of lines, are applied.
Transient stability, however, is concerned with sudden large changes to the network 
condition, which can be brought about by faults such as short-circuits. Generally, 
due to network topology changes, it can be assumed that the maximum power that
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can be transmitted is less than that for the corresponding steady state condition.
The stability of an asynchronous load is controlled by the voltage across it and 
hence is referred to as voltage stability. An example is that if the voltage becomes 
lower than a critical value, induction motors may stall. In a power system, both 
synchronous and asynchronous instability may occur. Since the former is generally 
more probable, this will be described in greater detail than the latter.
3.2.1 Transient Stability
Present day trends in operating modern interconnected power systems have res­
ulted in heavily loaded transmission networks and hence power transfers across 
critical boundaries, resulting in operation closer to steady state limits. Because 
of this, power networks can reach transient stability limits before steady state 
limits, meaning that operating limits can no longer be predicted in advance. 
This illustrates the need for more real-time analysis with fast transient methods, 
which not only rapidly advise the operator of a dangerous problem but provide 
him with some form of corrective action to restore the system back to a safer 
state. Researchers have investigated a number of possibilities over several years 
to achieve this which are primarily “direct methods” based on energy functions 
and, more recently, “pattern recognition techniques” and “expert systems”. Time 
simulations give accurate results with better machine and network modelling but 
can prove too computationally demanding for real-time operation.
3.2.2 D irect M ethods
These techniques can be split into four main areas : Transient Energy Function 
(TEF), Equal Area Criterion (EAC), Potential Energy Boundary Surface (PEBS)
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method and Hybrid methods [83]. Each will now be discussed in more detail.
3.2.2.1 Transient Energy Function
Fouad et al [73,84-87] used a function to describe the system transient energy 
which is calculated at the end of each disturbance period and compared with 
a critical or threshold value for transient stability. This difference is known as 
the transient energy margin. The transient energy is the energy which causes 
a generator to lose synchronism and separate from the rest of the system. It 
contains kinetic energy and potential energy components. The critical energy is 
the maximum value of potential energy at the predominant unstable equilibrium 
point (UEP) for a particular disturbance. If all the transient kinetic energy is 
converted into potential energy, the system is post-fault stable.
Hence the transient energy margin can be defined as
1 I
“the critical energy (or potential energy a t the UEP) - the kinetic energy at the
end of the disturbance”.
If this value is greater than zero, the system is deemed to be stable but to be
i;
unstable if a negative solution is found. The benefits of this method are that a 
degree of stability can be given together with system vulnerability to a change in 
a system parameter. The main drawback is that, at present, it can only be used 
for first swing stability studies, but it can still provide useful information about 
the network condition after the transient.
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3.2 .2 .2  Equal Area Criterion
Research has been carried out over a number of years into improving Liaponov 
functions and the well known EAC [88-90]. A new technique, the Extended EAC, 
which is a composite of these two methods has recently been developed [91-93]. 
The principle reduces the power network under study into an equivalent single 
machine and infinite busbar system and evaluates its robustness with respect to a 
given fault using the EAC.
Measures can be calculated from simple algebraic expressions to provide a stability 
margin for a particular fault clearance time and the critical clearance time for 
which this margin disappears, i.e. the stability-instability boundary is reached 
when the stability margin becomes zero.
This technique, therefore, is effective for sensitivity analysis and also provides a 
tool for corrective action formulation. From the results presented in [91], the reli­
ability against time simulation is satisfactory but is limited by the use of simplified 
system modelling. Research, however, is continuing to include automatic voltage 
regulators (AVRs) and governors as part of the reduced system.
3.2.2.3 Potential Energy Boundary Surface M ethod
i
The concept of PEBS [94-96] is a theoretical boundary surface that can be defined 
as the potential energy of the system with respect to a stable equilibrium point 
(SEP). From each SEP, a “trajectory” is drawn in every direction in angular space, 
until the potential energy reaches a maximum. A number of these defines a PEBS.
During a fault, if a trajectory does not cross the PEBS, the fault clearance time
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is assumed to be less than the critical clearance time and the system is stable. 
A method using an iterative solution of this technique has been developed [97] 
which narrows the time range from stable to unstable clearance times to yield an 
accurate measure of the critical clearance time for a given fault.
Although simplified models of generators and loads are used, this method provides 
consistent stability predictions. It should be noted that the role of fast methods 
should enhance, rather than replace time simulations, which have always been 
capable of handling detailed system models.
3.2.2.4 Hybrid M odels
Techniques have been developed [98] which combine the direct method approach 
with time simulations. The advantages of this include more complex and detailed 
system models, calculation of critical clearing times and system sensitivities, and 
'the ability to detect instability beyond the first swing. The underlying problem, 
however, is still that the time domain simulation occupies a substantial CPU 
usage. This, in part, can be resolved by parallel processing techniques [99-104] 
and by the use of faster processors which will be described in a later chapter.
3.2.2.5 Pattern R ecognition and E xpert System s
Recent developments have been made in the application of expert system tech­
niques to stability studies and rapid analysis of transients in power networks [18- 
20,73]. Expert systems can be used to provide guidance in conducting stabil­
ity studies and with the formulation of conclusions. The procedure includes a 
knowledge-base identifying key variables and characteristics in the form of logical 
rules (“If A Then B” format) which an inference engine processes. The rule-
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base interfaces to the transient stability program and other application program 
outputs. The analysis of transient stability problems is indicative of an iterative 
solving process. Variations on this theme include decision trees and fuzzy sets. 
The latter will be described in the next chapter, since it is this type of approach 
that will be applied to this research.
Research into pattern recognition techniques or primarily Artificial Neural Net­
works has produced another alternative to solving this problem [78,105-107]. Its 
main objective is to reduce computational requirements to a minimum, at the 
expense of elaborate off-line computations. A pattern vector containing all the 
significant system variables is defined and evaluated for a number of different 
operating conditions in order to generate a “training set”. A process whereby the 
vector is dimensionally reduced to identify the most significant set of variables is 
often referred to as “feature extraction”. The final mechanism is to determine a 
classifier function where any sample of system variables in the pattern vector can 
be classified very rapidly as stable or unstable.
3.2.3 D yn am ic/S tead y  S tate Stability
Steady state or dynamic1 stability violations has caused problems in power systems 
throughout the world. In several cases, the presence of long transmission lines 
connecting separate systems has been a predominant feature. When instability 
occurs, oscillations in the power transferred between regions start to increase which 
can either remain sustained or grow to dangerous levels, due to insufficient system 
damping, thereby causing generator plant and line tripping. This is referred to as 
oscillatory steady state instability. Another cause can be from inappropriate set-
1The definition of steady state or dynamic stability inherently depends on which literature is 
read. The latter is favoured by North American organisations, the former by European.
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tings of generator controllers and, in particular, the gains of the AVRs. These can 
introduce negative damping into a system which would otherwise be stable. The 
condition where system variables are increasing or ramping against one another is 
called aperiodic steady state instability.
The study of steady state stability if often conducted by linear analysis where 
linearised models of the power network and synchronous machines with their as­
sociated controllers are used [108-113] to investigate the effects of small changes in, 
for example, system loading. State-space theory using eigenvalues and eigenvectors 
can provide good indications of instability but, because of the size and complex­
ity of the systems to be analysed, the storage requirements for the state-space 
matrix become enormous and hence the task of finding the eigenvalues becomes 
tedious. Much of the research effort in the last two decades has concentrated on 
the development of more efficient eigenroutines [114-120] to calculate the most 
positive and hence unstable eigenvalues but, the problem still lies with the size of 
the multimachine power system and computation time.
Even though a linear approach is the most appropriate for analysing steady state 
instability, many power utilities still use conventional transient stability time do­
main programs to study this phenomenon. The complexity and size of a typical 
modern power system (and hence the accuracy of results which may be maintained) 
can be handled by time simulation approaches but the problems involved are 
inherently similar to those of transient stability techniques, i.e. CPU usage. W ith 
the ever increasing power of modern processors, however, real-time or faster than 
real-time operation can be achieved permitting several seconds or even minutes of 
simulation time to be run in only a few seconds of real-time.
An interesting new development is that of artificial intelligence applications. Neural
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network [78] and expert systems [21] approaches have been applied to steady state 
stability analysis. The latter encompasses some of the reasoning behind fuzzy logic 
which will be discussed in the next chapter. Both methods attem pt to model the 
human operator in terms of monitoring system loading and generation so that 
deductive reasoning can be performed to evaluate the degree of stability. Since 
results are comparable with those of the more conventional eigenvalue analysis but 
without the laborious computations, a development of this method will be used 
in this research.
3.2.4 Voltage Stability
Often associated with steady state stability, voltage stability is increasingly grow­
ing in importance as power systems axe being operated closer to their stability 
limits. This is, in paxt, due to a growth in load without a corresponding increase 
in transmission capacity.
1
Black-outs caused by voltage instabilities can be influenced by a number of factors 
such as network disturbances consisting of transmission line, transformer or gen­
erator losses. The phenomenon of voltage collapse can similarly result from load 
tap-changers, current limiters of generators, load characteristics at low voltages 
and inadequate reactive power resources.
For voltage security analysis, load modelling is of paramount importance and the 
composite load model characteristics may for low voltages be different from those 
normally used for transient stability studies. For true voltage instability, at least 
part of the load must be of the constant MVA type (known as self-restoring). 
Loads that have a constituent part of static or voltage sensitive types contribute 
much less to instability problems.
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Presently, load flow (static) and transient stability (time domain) programs are the 
most commonly used mechanisms in assessing voltage stability. These approaches 
can be classed as “point-wise”, since they must be rerun for every operating 
condition and contingency [121-126]. Recently, “region-wise” methods have been 
developed which identify regions of voltage secure operating points [127-130]. This 
type of approach is more applicable for on-line voltage stability analysis.
As mentioned previously, time domain solutions are accurate in modelling events 
leading to voltage instability but are time consuming in terms of CPU usage and 
expert assistance is required to interpret results, since there is no measure of system 
sensitivity and stability. However, it is still the benchmark for other approaches 
and research is continuing to develop a hybrid method [131] which encompasses 
the speed and information output of the region-wise procedures with the accuracy 
of time-domain simulations.
3.2.5 Summary .
This section has given an overview of power system stability, the terms used and 
the methods of analysing the different modes. It is proposed as part of a security 
assessment module that transient and steady state stability will be addressed by 
a hybrid combination of a time simulation and artificial intelligence. Voltage 
stability is a complex problem and, due to insufficient load characteristic repres­
entation, load tap changers and excitation limiters on generator models, it will 
not be implemented as part of this research.
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3.3 A larm  P ro cessin g
Since the early-1980’s, considerable interest has been shown in the area of alarm 
processing which is an inherent feature of an Energy Management System or EMS. 
A list of alarms presented to power system control engineers during a disturbance is 
usually difficult to interpret with in the order of hundreds to thousands of messages 
arriving in a short period of time. Engineers are not fully able to understand each 
piece of information as it is presented to them within the time constraints of 
real-time operation and, hence make a judgement as to the original cause of the 
problem. In this type of situation, an important alarm may be ignored, resulting 
in a difficulty in alleviating the fault and compensating other parts of the network.
W ith the emergence of expert system techniques, much research has been applied 
to this area and methods have been implemented which effectively model the 
behaviour of the human operator. By using existing alarm processing software and 
i hardware, the information may be presented id the form of summarised messages 
which are in a more concise and comprehensible form.
3.3.1 Background
Before the onset of the computer based Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) systems in the 1960’s, power (dispatch centres were equiped with one- 
on-one data links which reported major alarms, such as circuit breaker status 
changes.
The following decade saw an increase in the number of status points which would 
be periodically scanned by the SCADA typically every two to ten seconds. In 
present day climates, control centres are typically monitoring of the order of tens
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of thousands of sample points distributed around the power network. As a result 
of this explosion in data availability, new alarm handling functions were developed 
in order for the SCADA and EMS to keep pace with the ever expanding role of 
control centres.
Wollenberg was theoretically the first to conduct a study into alarm processing 
[22]. He outlined a number of areas in which the handling of warning messages 
coming from the EMS could be improved and presented an “intelligent alarm 
processor” or IAP which implemented these modifications. An early form of expert 
system was used with a rule-base containing rules of the form UIF Alarm A AND  
Alarm B THEN issue Alarm C \  Test results were presented displaying a potential 
reduction in output alarms of 75 %. Work in this area substantially increased with 
improvements to the basic rule-base and the inference engine.
Amelink et al. [132] described three methods to alleviate excessive alarms during 
a system incident.;The first was that of “Statically Adaptive Message Processing”. 
This involved message routing (in which the system alarms are distributed across 
a network of operator terminals, hence sharing the load), alarm prioritization, 
acknowledging and segmenting (a process by which the alarms could be grouped 
in summaries). This would run continuously regardless of the state of the system. 
A second method, that of “Dynamically Adaptive Message Processing”, ran to 
resolve the problem of the added message burdens during a system disturbance. 
The final concept was to utilise artificial intelligence techniques in order to improve 
the message presentation to the operator using summaries as mentioned above.
Tesch et al. [133] expanded on Wollenberg’s original work by implementing their 
knowledge-based alarm processor as part of a real-time application to Wisconsin 
Electric’s EMS. The concepts of forward and backward chaining rules (to form
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hypotheses and to attempt to prove each hypothesis, respectively) were developed 
from Wollenberg’s model to provide an efficient selection of rules during the infer­
ence process so that the SCADA alarms could be interpreted into concise linguistic 
messages.
Wollenberg et al. supplemented his earlier paper by developing the original IAP 
to an installation stage at Northern States Power Company [134]. Whilst in op­
eration, a number of problems were highlighted by system operators concerning 
functionality, data-base requirements and communication with the existing EMS. 
The authors describe how these were resolved, together with further extensions to 
include advanced features such as a facility to check control actions before being 
executed by the operator, in order to prevent overloads, low voltages or ultimately 
customer load shedding.
During the last three years, additions to the basic model have been developed to 
deal with transmission and distribution systems (the latter with more protective 
devices) [26] and automatic fault analysis routines to provide the operator with 
either a precise location or the area in which the fault has occurred [27].
An object-orientated approach was applied by Dillon et al. [23] aiding the inter­
face between the knowledge-base and the existing SCADA system. Dillon later 
extended this by implementing a neural network/expert system method [25] using 
decomposition into hierarchical and distributed heterogeneous objects in a parallel 
processing environment to more readily tackle the problems of system scalability 
and real-time response.
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3.3.2 Alarm  Processing A pplied to Security A ssessm ent
As yet, alarm handling techniques have not been applied to a security assessment 
module. However, their application to security assessment has two advantages, 
since not only will the operator receive a list of ranked contingencies but also 
their associated summarised alarms, illustrating areas where there are may be low 
voltage or line overload problems but, in addition, use of this technique would 
provide a facility from which a course of corrective or preventative actions to 
alleviate these problems could be formulated.
Hence, as recommended by Wollenberg [24], during a contingency application, 
there needs to be a mechanism which incorporates a number of important features. 
These can be summarised as : -
1. Alarm Screening - filtering out unimportant or routine alarms that would, 
otherwise, be a nuisance or distraction to the operator.
2. Alarm Combining - composing alarms in one of two forms :
• Summary Message (giving the general area of the problem or possibly 
a trend).
• Synthesis Message (explaining ,an existing problem or warning of a po­
tentially dangerous situation).
3. Temporal Reasoning - a process by which alarms are monitored to ascertain 
whether they have been issued to the operator in the form of summary or 
synthesis messages or, in addition, if any expected alarms for a particular 
event have not appeared or have timed out (i.e. at the end of a contingency 
analysis cycle period).
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4. Alarm Prioritization - ranking alarms according to their individual severity 
during either normal operation of the power system or contingency evalu­
ation.
5. Corrective Actions - identifying problems and recommending ways to allevi­
ate them in the form of simple linguistic instructions acceptable for operator 
interpretation.
6. Alarm Presentation - producing a user-friendly display.
Each of these functions should be performed during the evaluation time period 
allowed per contingency. Function 5 will not be addressed here, since work is 
currently being conducted in this area [135].
In order to carry out any alarm handling procedure, messages coming from the 
power system need to be categorised into groups of increasing severity. A formal 
classification of security levels used by many power utilities is shown in Figure
3.1 [136]. The removal of violations from Level 4, for example, requires the EMS 
to reschedule generation in order to bring the system back to Level 3. Further 
more, the EMS must perform additional rescheduling, which may incur loss of 
load, to return the system to Level 1 or 2. Levels 5 and 6 in this study will be
combined to give a “composite” security level which will normally be initiated
r
by a transient instability problem. These security levels represent normal power 
system operation, that is these are acceptable operational states and the choice of 
preferred level depends on the utility’s overall economy vs. security policy2 and 
its means for applying corrective real-time control.
2The overall aim of economy vs. security control is to operate the system at lowest cost, with 
the guaranteed avoidance or survival of emergency conditions. This, in essence, means operating 
the power system as close as possible to its security limits.
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The alarm processing algorithm to be used is shown in Figure 3.2. This is a 
general model that has been developed over a number of years as described in 
Section 3.3.1. Its operation is as follows : -
1. From the Input Phase, the Fuzzy Rule Database is searched to find all the 
events in which, for example the opening of a circuit breaker might be ex­
pected to occur.
2. These rules then form the “skeleton” for the hypotheses which are created 
(this is known as the “inference engine”) with their associated sets of expec­
ted alarms. Note that one rule may infer more than one hypothesis, hence 
promoting a form of competition.
3. The alarm processor enters the Evaluator Phase, where all of the current 
hypotheses are checked to see if any have reached a full score of expected 
alarm messages.
4. Each group of competing hypotheses is examined to ascertain whether it has 
“timed-out” . Time-out periods for normal EMS functions are specified by 
the power utility and are generally of the order of minutes. In the case of 
a security assessor, this will be the duration of the contingency application. 
Therefore, if a group of competing hypotheses does not reach a full score, 
the whole competing group is removed and a message printed to the memory 
structure (associated with that contingency) showing the most likely hypo­
thesis.
5. The alarm processor returns to its Input Phase to read the next message 
from the stream of alarms and classifies them in terms of security levels and 
area assignment.
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6. The fuzzy rule database is again examined to see if any of the current alarm 
messages is expected for any of the existing hypotheses and a counter is 
incremented if this is true.
7. The process then reaches the evaluator and the whole procedure continues 
until a hypothesis has reached its full score of expected alarm messages. This 
hypothesis and all of its competing hypotheses are removed from the alarm 
list and stored in the memory structure for this contingency and the process 
returns to the input phase ready for the arrival of the next message.
3.3.3 Sum m ary
This section has discussed an artificial intelligence approach to alarm processing in 
a power system EMS, highlighting the need for such a procedure and the research 
that has been conducted in this area.
An alarm processor would seem well suited to a complete security assessment 
module, since it can provide additional information to an operator as well as the 
ranked list of contingencies and, hence, help him to formulate corrective actions. 
Alarm security levels and a basic algorithm have been proposed, which have been 
implemented as part of this research
3 .4  C hapter Sum m ary
This chapter has addressed the two remaining areas of a security assessment al­
gorithm. These are namely power system stability and its modes of operation and 
alarm processing.
A brief literature review of each of these areas has been given and it has been
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proposed that artificial intelligence be used to implement the complete security 
assessor with a real-time power system simulator.
The next chapter will describe the type of artificial intelligence, or more specifically 
expert system to be used, v/ith Chapter 5 describing the time-domain simulator 

















All load su pp lied , b u t o p e ra tin g  lim its  are 
'io la ted . T h e se  can be co rre c te d  by a p p ro p ria te  
co n tro l ac tion  w ith o u t loss of load
All load supp lied . No o p e ra tin g  lim its v io lated . 
In the  event of a con tingency , th e re  will be 
no vio lations
All load supp lied , b u t o p e ra tin g  lim its  are 
vio lated . T hese  c a n n o t be co rrec ted  
w ith o u t loss of load
All load supp lied . No o p e ra tin g  lim its v io lated . 
Som e v io lations caused  by a  con tingency  
can n o t be co rrec ted  w ith o u t of load
All load supp lied . No o p e ra tin g  lim its  v io la ted  
Any v io lations caused  by a con tingency  can  
be c o rrec ted  by a p p ro p r ia te  con tro l ac tio n  
w ith o u t loss of load
Control Actions
No o p e ra tin g  lim its  v io la ted , bu t loss of load 
has been suffered
Figure 3.1: System Alarm Security Level Classification
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4.1 In trod u ction
Since the emergence of computing hardware and software in the late-1940’s, tradi­
tional mathematical based methods applied to control theory have produced many 
quantitive tools and techniques. These have been derived from laws of mechanics, 
electromagnetism and thermodynamics and have been applied to controlling in­
dustrial processes which often rely heavily upon the existence of a mathematical 
model of how the process behaves. However, there are still some common processes 
which axe not amenable to this type of treatment and to which mathematical 
theory cannot be successfully applied - in essence these are “humanistic systems”. 
Within the literature, a number of authors have argued that rule-based systems 
for control differ fundamentally from the more traditional numerical techniques 
because they attem pt to model the skills of the operator and not the process itself.
In this chapter, the problem of knowledge acquisition and how the role of fuzzy 
logic can be used to cope with an incomplete data-base will be discussed together 
with the application of fuzzy sets to deal with a non-linear system (an electrical 
power network) which moves gradually from one operating state to another rather 
than abruptly changing.
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4.2 A  H isto ry  o f  F uzzy  Logic
L.A. Zadeh devised the initial premise of fuzzy set theory [49] in 1965. Since 
then, during nearly the past three decades, the fundamental notion of this field 
has been elaborated and has substantially matured. Most importantly, there has 
been considerable development of applications of fuzzy set theory to a wide range 
of problems.
4.2.1 Early A pplications and D evelopm ents
The first article proposing the application of fuzzy set theory to control problems 
was that by Chang and Zadeh [137]. However it was the article by Zadeh [50] 
in 1973 on a “new approach to the analysis of complex systems and decision 
processes” describing the mechanism by which this type of approach could be 
used in a control environment that really formulated the theory upon which fuzzy 
controllers would be built.
During the mid-1970’s, there was a significant increase in interest in the area 
of fuzzy controllers. The work of this initial period primarily focussed on the 
control of systems that were too difficult to model by more traditional methods. 
Mamdani and Assilian [138] published the first work in applying fuzzy set theory 
to the control of a small laboratory steam engine. Control was achieved with 
the use of linguistic rules to regulate heat and throttle settings in order to adjust 
engine speed and boiler steam setting. King and Mamdani [139], Larsen [140] and 
Tong [141] were among many who applied this early research to more complex 
industrial processes, see [142] for a complete bibliography.
In a non-industrial application of the fuzzy control model, Pappis and Mamdani
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[143] described a fuzzy logic traffic controller for a single junction which, from the 
simulation results, proved more effective than other controller approaches.
4.2.2 E xtensions to  Fuzzy Control Theory
Using the same engine model [138], Mamdani developed a self-organising controller 
which perm itted the learning of fuzzy rules of a process in a operating mode [144]. 
This demonstrated the strength of the self-organising approach even though a 
crude model was used. Procyk and Mamdani [145] later expanded on this same 
system.
Tong also applied fuzzy set theory to a fuzzy feedback system [146] in which he 
closed the loop around a controller to improve the stability of his fuzzy system, 
Cumani [147] further extended this approach.
The major new development in fuzzy set theory is in the move towards expert 
systems [148-153]. In the past, researchers have used the broader artificial intelli­
gence approach of rule-based models rather than the fuzzy logic model. However, 
fuzzy control inference rules are quite similar to the inference rules used by an 
expert system and hence work in combining the two approaches is continuing.
Following on from Zadeh’s initial work, there has been increased activity in the 
application of fuzzy programming techniques to control systems in robots. The 
Japanese/Americans seem to have excelled in this area, even extending this to 
fuzzy semi-conductor devices [154-156] in which the MC143150 Fuzzy Logic and 
Neuron chip has been used to control the flow rate and temperature of a fluid from 
one storage tank to another. Again, although this is a relatively small control 
system, application of a complete fuzzy tool has proved to be more efficient than
54
a more traditional controller of this type.
4.2.3 Sum m ary
In a Siemens review paper [157], Reinfrank explained the current trend in research 
and development throughout the world into fuzzy set theory. Since the conception 
of this technique in the mid-1960’s, work progressed in the US for the next decade. 
The Japanese showed no interest in the subject until the mid-1980’s. Since then 
the explosion of fuzzy products developed in the Far East has been enormous, 
so much so that Reinfrank expressed concern as to whether Europe and the US 
could make up the divide that the Japanese have in both techniques, experience 
and market share.
4 .3  M eth o d o lo g y
The principle behind fuzzy logic is to represent humanistic knowledge in a form 
recognisable to both man and machine. An operator may have a theory about 
what is the best thing to do whilst controlling a process and may express it using 
a rule of the type
“If x is small and x increases slightly Then y will increase slightly ”
This contains several vague terms but it can be represented using fuzzy logic. 
This section will give a brief introduction to some of the terms used and will also 
describe the mathematical theory devised by Zadeh [50].
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4.3.1 O verview
The method of describing a rule such as that above can be split into three distinct 
subgroups, as mentioned by Zadeh. These are principally
•  Linguistic Variables which are used in place of numerical variables and are 
statements which have values described in some natural language, e.g. size 
can be classed as a linguistic variable which has values very large, large, not 
large, etc ...
•  Fuzzy Conditional Statements  which equate simple relations between vari­
ables. These are expressions of the form “I f  A T h e n  B”, where A and B 
have fuzzy meaning or alternatively are labels of fuzzy sets of the type
I f  x is small T h en  y is large
• Fuzzy Algorithms can be used to equate more complex relations. These are a 
sequence of instructions which may contain fuzzy assignment and conditional 
statements. Figure 4.1 shows a typical fuzzy algorithm.
Efstathiou in her review paper [158] describes neatly how fuzzy set theory can 
be explained in “lay-man” terms. If the example of the linguistic variable size is 
used here, terms such as small, medium  and large can be employed to describe the 
variable size on a linear scale, as in Figure 4.2.
For each term there will be a range of sizes which will definitely apply - this 
is known as its grade of membership (//) and will appear in the set of 1. For 
the range over which the term does not apply, its grade of membership is in the 
set of 0. So far this has just mimicked traditional set theory which, in essence,
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abruptly divides the grades of membership, i.e. either 1 or 0, True or False as in 
Figure 4.3. However, fuzzy set theory dictates that there is a region where the 
size variable does not cover the full scale and this will have a grade of membership 
somewhere between 0 and 1. Researchers, as in Figure 4.2, have terms describing 
their linguistic variables overlapping, so that there will be some cases where there 
will be more than one term at any time that will have a non-zero membership 
function.
Rules, such as that used at the start of this section, contain both a proportional 
(P) and a derivative (D) term, upon which most fuzzy logic controllers are based. 
To ease computation, the scales are often quantised and the resultant PD plane 
is made up of a finite number of grid squares, as in Figure 4.4.
Efstathiou remarks that to cover each square with a rule may be impossible for 
the operator and, for more complex systems, a very large number of rules would 
be required. It is also pointed out that fuzzy logic helps in the area of filling 
the knowledge base and dealing with the imprecision of the operator, so that 
“the fuzziness in the definitions means that any fuzzy rule will have a region of  
influence”. In other words, due to the overlap between linguistic variable terms, 
there will be squares where more than one rule applies. A combination of these 
will fill in the blanks and when modified by the “degree of fulfillment” of each 
rule, the controller action should vary smoothly across the PD plane.
4.3.2 M athem atical Theory
As mentioned in Section 4.3.1, Zadeh defined three main subgroups. The meth­
odology is based, in essence, around set theory and a brief explanation of the 
notation, operations and how linguistic variables, fuzzy conditional statements
57
and fuzzy algorithms are manipulated will be given.
4.3.2.1 N otation
A fuzzy subset A of a universal discourse U  is characterised by a membership 
function
PA : U  —* [0,1] (4.1)
This relates each member x  in U  to a number p x  in the interval 0 to 1 (denoted 
[0,1]), i.e. 0 <  A*A < 1- This, therefore, represents the grade of membership of 
x  in the subset A. It should be noted that the term fuzzy subset is used, A is a 
subset of B , when pa (x ) < A*bM f°r all elements of x  in the universe U.
Zadeh defines the su p p o r to i  A as a set of points in U where p a {x ) 1S positive and 
it follows that the crossover po in t  in A is where Pa {x ) is 0-5. A f u z z y  singleton  
can be defined as a fuzzy set whose support is a single point in U. Thus if A is a 
fuzzy singleton whose support is a point x
A =  p / x  (4.2)
where p  is the grade of membership of x  in A. A fuzzy set is, therefore, the “union” 
of its fuzzy singletons
A -  fv ^ a ( z ) / i  (4.3)
so that for a finite number of singletons
A =  ^  Pi/xi (4.4)
1 =  1
Note an arbitrary fuzzy subset of the universe U over the con tinuum  is written 
in the form of an integral in Equation 4.3, where the term continuum refers to a 
set of real numbers. As an example, from Zadeh’s paper [50], if the fuzzy set A is
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labelled L a r g e
[10
Large = I HLarge(x)/x
■ sy^v» i>
For example, if A is the fuzzy set Viscosity in the universal discourse U, such that 
U  =  W ater +  Oil +  Ink +  Tar,
low m edium  low high
Vlscoslty s  w w  + - d a -  + h k + T ^
where low , m ed ium  and high are grades of membership acting as fuzzy sets in 
the universe U.
4.3.2.2 Fuzzy R elations
A fuzzy relation R  from a set X  to a set Y is a fuzzy subset of the Cartesian 
product X  x Y, where X  x Y  is a collection of ordered pairs or binary variables 
(x , y ) ,  x € X , y  £ Y. Hence, R  is described by a “double” membership function 
FR( x , y )  and can be expressed in a similar way to Equation 4.3, i.e.
R s  L (4-5)J jL x Y
As an example, if X  =  {Black, Golden} and Y  =  {Dog, Fish, Bird}, the Cartesian 
product of X  x Y  is given by
X  x Y  =  {(Black,Dog), (Black,Fish), (Black,Bird),
(Golden,Dog), (Golden,Fish), (Golden,Bird)}
If the fuzzy relation R is defined as R  =  Likes Four-Legged Animals
R  =  {0.8/(Black,Dog), 0.8/(Golden,Dog)}
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where 0.8 and 0.3 are some arbitrarily chosen grades of membership of the set Likes 
Four-Legged Animals, indicating that the person prefers black dogs to golden dogs.
Similarly for R  =  Likes Legged Animals
R  =  {0.8/(Black,Dog), 0 .3 /{Golden,Dog),
0.2/{Black,Bird), 0.7/ (Golden,Bird)}
This relationship is usually expressed as a relation matrix in which the (i^j)111 







The composition of two fuzzy relations R  (X to Y) and S (Y to Z) can be defined 
as
R ° S  =  /  V(pR (x,y)  A ps {y, z) ) / (x, z )  (4.6)
J X x Z
from which the max (V) - min (A) rules are derived, thus : -
* / ,v | fl, i f a > b  /,a V b = max(a, b) =  < (4-7)
( o ,  it a <C b
i . / n  ( a, if a < b ,.a A b = minia, b) = < , , (4.8)
v '  ( 6, if a > b
4.3 .2 .3  Fuzzy S et O p era tio n s
As with any set theory, there are a number of operations that can be carried out. 
The negation not, connectives and and or and other terms such as the linguistic
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hedges very , more or less, etc ... can be described by these operations in fuzzy set 
notation.
• Complement of A is indicated as -» A where
^  =  Jv  ( J - m a (sO )  /  y
• Union of A and B is indicated as A +  B where
A +  B = (p a (v) V /ifi(y)) /  2/
This is equivalent to the use of the connective or such that 
A  +  B e  A or B
• Intersection of A and B is indicated as A fl B where
A n B ^  Jv A vniy)) /  y
This is equivalent to the use of the connective and such that 
A f l B  =  A and B
• Product of A and B is indicated as AB where
A B  =  J  ( ^ A ( y )  /^B(y))  /  y
from which the relations can be calculated
A “ =  Jv  ( m a ( » ) ) “  /  y  
a A = Jv a 0*A(y)) / v
• Concentration of A is indicated by CON (A) where
CON (A) =  A 2
This has the effect of reducing the magnitude of the grades of membership 
of a: in A, slightly for high ^ ’s and greatly for low /z’s.
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•  Dilation  of A is indicated by DIL (A) where 
DIL  (A) =  A 1/2
This has the opposite effect to the Concentration operation above
•  Contrast Intensification is indicated by IN T  (A) where
I N T  (A)  =  {  2A2’ if 0 *  " a ( *> *  ° '5 
\  -i2(-»A)2, if 0.5 <  [i&{x) <  1.0
Again, this is similar to the operation of Concentration in that it increases 
the values of /j>a{x ) which are above 0.5 and reduces those below this point. 
This has the effect of reducing the fuzziness of A.
Other operations are described in more detail in [50,51,159-161].
4 .3 .2 .4  H edges an d  L inguistic  V ariable In te rp re ta tio n s
An im portant application of fuzzy sets is in “computational linguistics” whose 
aim is to calculate with natural language statements in a similar way as logic 
calculates with logical statements. Fuzzy sets and Linguistic Variables can be used 
to determine the meaning of this natural language, which can then be manipulated. 
A linguistic variable is assigned values which are expressions such as words, phrases 
or sentences. For example, from Section 4.3.1, the linguistic variable size has values 
small, medium  and large. Although it is possible to define values for the size small, 
these will be very subjective in nature.
Zadeh suggests that a value of a linguistic variable is a composite term which can 
be divided into four groups : -
1. Primary terms, i.e. labels of fuzzy subsets of the universal discourse.
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2. The negation not and the connectives and and or.
3. Hedges, such as very, more or less, etc ...
4. Markers, such as parentheses.
Hedges are another definition of a fuzzy set and serve to modify the meaning of 
this set. Thus, a larger set of values will be generated for any particular linguistic 
variable. For example, the size fuzzy set could be defined as : -
size =  very small +  very very small +  more or less small +  
not very small +  ...
The hedges mentioned above, i.e. very, more or less, etc ..., are usually defined in 
terms of fuzzy set operations, so that
very small 
very very small 
more or less small 
not small 
not very small
CON  (smalt) =  small2 
CON[CON(smaH)\ — smalP 
DIL (smalt) =  small1/ 2 
1 - small 
1 - CON(small)
4.3 .2 .5  Fuzzy C ond itional S ta tem en ts
Using the expression “If  x is small Then y is large” as an example of a Fuzzy 
Conditional Statement, the term “x is smaW  is the antecedent and “y is large” is 
the consequent. Zadeh suggests that a statement of this kind describes a relation 
between two fuzzy variables and that a fuzzy conditional statement can be defined 
as a fuzzy relation as in Equation 4.5. Hence the Cartesian product of two fuzzy 
subsets A and B in the universes of U  and V  respectively is : -
A x B  =  L  A /*B («))/(«, v) (4.9)
J  U x V
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where U  x V is  the Cartesian product of the non fuzzy sets U  and V. Therefore, 
A x B is a fuzzy relation from U to V, so that, in general form : -
If  A Then B =  (A x B)
In cases where the operand “Else” and a third fuzzy subset C are introduced, the 
Cartesian product is : -
If  A Then B Else C =  (A x B) +  (-.A x C)
where is the union of the fuzzy relations (A x B) and (->A x C).
The Compositional Rule of Inference is based on the composite rule, as in Equation 
4.6, so that if R  is a fuzzy relation from A to B and x is a fuzzy subset of A, the 
fuzzy subset of y of B which is “induced” by x is given by the composition of R  
and x , i.e.
y =  x o R  (4-10)
so that y  is given by the max-min product of x and R. In the example used by 
Zadeh
a) x is very small
b) I f x  is small Then y is large Else y is not very large
a question arose as what would the value of y be when x is very small. Substituting 
the values of small for A, large for B and not very large for C in the conditional 
statement (A x B) +  ( -A  x C), the relation matrix R  describing this fuzzy 
conditional statement could be built up. The result of the composition of R  and 
substituting the value of x =  very small yielded the value of y for this condition.
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4.3 .2 .6  Fuzzy A lgorithm s
As mentioned previously, a Fuzzy Algorithm is a sequence of ordered instructions 
which a controller may use to operate a process. It is, in essence, an example of how 
humans behave either consciously or subconsciously in every day life. Combining 
the concepts of linguistic variables and fuzzy set operations to yield fuzzy condi­
tional statements, fuzzy algorithms can be seen to approximate analysis systems 
or decision processes much as a human would but, at a level too complex for a 
purely mathematical technique to cope with.
Zadeh suggested that these ordered instructions (fuzzy or not) would fall into one 
of three categories : -
1. Assignment statements, such as x is small, x is not large and not very small, 
etc ...
2. Fuzzy conditional statements, such as If x is small Then y is large Else y is 
not large, If  x is small Then go to 7, etc ...
3. Unconditional action statements, such as decrease x slightly, print x, etc ...
where a combination of each of these is executed by the compositional rule in 
Equation 4.9. Cases where two conflicting alternatives arise from the execution 
of the algorithm, a Rule of Preponderant Alternative is used to decide which of 
the courses of action should be taken based on which is more true than the other. 
If both alternatives have more or less equal truth values, the choice can be made 
arbitrarily.
A number of algorithm classifications are described in [50,51], each corresponding
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to a particular type of application and briefly include : -
•  Definitional and Identificational Algorithms. The former is a finite set of 
fuzzy instructions which define a fuzzy set in terms of other fuzzy sets. The 
latter calculates the grade of membership of any element of the universal 
discourse in the set under definition, i.e. decides whether an element belongs 
to a particular set or not.
•  Generational Algorithms. These serve to generate rather than define fuzzy 
sets.
• Relational and Behavioural Algorithms. The former describes relations between 
fuzzy variables, whereas the latter describes the approximate behaviour of a 
process or system.
• Decisional Algorithms. These provide an approximate description of a de­
cision rule.
It should also be noted that algorithms, of the form mentioned above, may contain 
a number of other types of algorithm which are often referred to as sub-algorithms.
4.3.3 Sum m ary
This section has shown that by using Zadeh’s linguistic variable and fuzzy al­
gorithm definitions, a method can be developed for describing a system that is 
either too complex or too ill-defined, as expected from a humanistic function 
(which is not governed by crisp boundaries), to be controlled by a mathematical 
algorithm. The approach may only be approximate but it has proved its efficiency 
in dealing with animate rather than inanimate behaviour.
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4 .4  A p p lica tio n s  to  P ow er S ystem s
A power system consisting of a number of generating plants, busbars and trans­
mission lines exhibits a high order of non-linearity. Because of its very nature, 
fuzzy set theory would seem to be directly applicable to the analysis and control 
of power systems.
Until recently, however, work in this area has been rather limited but, because of 
the constraints now imposed upon most power utilities throughout the world due 
to economic and environmental reasons, there is increased interest in the subject 
of expert systems (and also fuzzy logic) in running power networks more efficiently, 
even though this may entail on-line operation near to stability limits.
The fuzzy set theory approach has been applied in one form or another to a range 
of power system problems which control staff deal with on a day to day basis. 
This is in part due to the lack of any procedure in human decision making such 
that a mathematical mechanism could simply not cope.
4.4.1 P revious A pplications o f Fuzzy Set Theory
4.4.1.1 D em an d  an d  G en e ra tio n  C ontro l
The first real work conducted into solving power system problems was in the 
late-1970’s, in which Dhar [162] applied fuzzy concepts to the decision making 
process in planning a long-term generation and transmission schedule. The fuzzy 
environment was created from the unknown or imprecise system states such as 
demand patterns and generation and fuel resources. It was argued that this was 
a valid approach, since traditional statistical methods would inheritantly lead to
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inaccurate results due to the unpredictable objectives and constraints used in 
this time frame. Fuzzy sets together with linguistic variables were employed to 
represent different criteria of merits (for example capital expenditure), resulting 
in optimal alternatives for these different criteria which were effectively ranked 
against one another.
Economakos limited his research to power demand forecasting and loading of a 
power system [163]. He used fuzzy techniques to study situations where, although 
statistical data was available, there were certain load patterns which were not pre­
cisely defined or rather vague and were based purely on either operator experience 
or common sense. Three load components or fuzzy sets were used, principally 
domestic, industrial and street lighting demand, which were divided into ten 
linguistic variables over a twenty four hour period. These yielded membership 
functions for each load component per hour time span. Given the maximum 
forecasted demands in MW and MVAr from historical data, all possible loading 
conditions for each component and hence the total system load could be predicted 
in the same way as an experienced operator. The advantage that this technique 
has over a human expert is that the composition of each load component allows 
for the judgement of how likely the scenario is to occur. Hsu later expanded on 
this idea, extending it to provide a guide for service restoration in the case of load 
shedding [164].
4.4 .1 .2  S tab ility  A nalysis
A number of researchers have applied fuzzy techniques to predicting power system 
instability. The concepts of stability have already been described in Chapter 3, so 
only the application will be discussed.
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Souflis et al. [165] produced a transient stability index that provided an evaluation 
of the system security level by taking into account generator acceleration and 
kinetic energy during a large disturbance. Six fuzzy sets were used with five lin­
guistic variable terms describing these quantities. Relation matrix manipulations 
were carried out to yield a stability decision which is presented to an operator 
in a linguistic manner. A conclusion was drawn stating that this fuzzy approach 
could be made in a fast manner and by merely adjusting the “weights” of the 
linguistic variables, the derivation of the stability index was sufficiently flexible 
and adaptable to analyse any system.
A fuzzy set approach was applied by Hsu et al. [21] to provide an operational aid to 
steady state stability. Five fuzzy sets were used to describe inter-area line flow and 
generator output upon which a set of fuzzy-expert rules were applied. Membership 
functions were calculated from these to give a measure of the system stability and 
categorised in one of four regions. Hence the pseudo fuzzy-expert system would 
perform deductive reasoning on the degree of steady-state stability. The authors 
concluded that this was indeed much faster than a conventional method which 
would otherwise require complex eigenvalue computations.
4.4 .1 .3  C o n tin g en cy  R ank ing
Hsu went on to apply fuzzy set theory to contingency ranking [41]. Here operator 
experience and “heuristic” knowledge were used to represent post-fault line flows 
and busbar voltage magnitudes with the aid of fuzzy sets. A loadflow was used to 
calculate the post-contingent quantities which were classified in one of the fuzzy 
sets. Again manipulating relation matrices yielded an overall system severity index 
per contingency which could then be ranked. Hsu concluded that by conducting 
fuzzy reasoning on these sets and with input from the expert to tune the fuzzy
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parameters, the approach could mimic an experienced operator in conducting 
contingency ranking.
4.4.2 Proposal for th e use o f Fuzzy Sets in D ynam ic Se­
curity A ssessm ent o f th e B ritish  N ational Grid
The National Grid Company pic operates a large integrated transmission system, 
covering England and Wales. This comprises of at least 500 circuits of overhead 
lines and cables at 400 and 275 kV, connecting 250 generators to 170 supergrid 
supply points.
The system is planned to be operated economically and securely at all times. 
Economy in this case means running the cheapest generators first according to a 
merit order table. However, security will over-rule this and is interpreted to mean 
that no circuit flow may exceed its thermal rating following any credible fault.
Therefore, it is proposed that fuzzy set theory will be applied to a real-time sim­
ulation of the National Grid system to provide on-line advice to an operator in 
areas of contingency ranking and analysis, alarm processing and system stability 
assessment. The effect of economy will effectively be ignored in this thesis as all 
generators will be assumed to be “in-merit”.
4.5  C h ap ter Sum m ary
This chapter has addressed three main areas - a brief review of the work that 
has been conducted and the developments made to the basic fuzzy set theory, 
an introduction to the methodology in verbal and mathematical nomenclature 
and an insight into the way in which researchers have tackled power system based
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problems. A proposal has also been made to apply these techniques to give security 
assessment advice on a real-time simulation of the National Grid system.
The next chapters will describe the need for simulation in the study of these 
proposals and how the simulator has been developed for this work.
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Figure 4.2: Plot of Fuzzy Membership Function // against Linguistic Variable Size
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Figure 4.4: PD Control Plane for a Simple Fuzzy Rule-Based Controller
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C hapter 5
Power System  Sim ulation
5.1 In trod u ction
Simulators designed to evaluate the performance of power systems have been avail­
able for many years. They first existed in the form of analogue computers and, 
more recently, simulations have been run on digital computers in both the batch 
and interactive modes.
The modern power system plannihg engineer finds the 'design task is simplified 
by the presence of an appropriate simulation of the existing and proposed system 
being modelled, which rims accurately on a workstation available in the office. 
However, the availability of good interaction does not require that the simulation 
runs in real-time nor that the workstation provides advanced animated graphics.
!>
In the case of the power system operator, the requirements will be somewhat 
different. A simplified network model can be used in many cases but animated 
graphics displaying both the steady-state and the transient behaviour of the sys­
tem  in real-time has rapidly become a preferred analytical tool. An important 
aspect of the use of this form of simulator is as a training tool where the trainee 
operator can subject the model power system to a range of disturbances and 
potential remedies in a manner which would be totally unacceptable on the real
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system due to constraints such as time, cost and safety.
This leads to two concepts : hard real-time, where the solution time will be equal 
to the model time step under all conditions without losing synchronism with the 
real (clock) time and, soft real-time, where the solution time will be generally less 
than the model time step but, occasionally, may be greater. This implies that 
when the solution time is large, the model will fall behind clock time but will 
catch up when the solution time is small.
Simulations of this type will depend on speed, accuracy, cost of hardware and 
complexity of the system to be analysed. Models used for energy management 
systems might have time scales of tens of minutes to several hours, with system 
states calculated at intervals of one or more seconds [166,167]. Transient stability 
studies, on the other hand, will need system states to be evaluated at intervals of 
the order of tens of milliseconds over time scales of several seconds [168-170].
I  I
5.2 S im ulations o f  th e  B r itish  N a tio n a l G rid at  
th e  U n iversity  o f  B a th
Since the late-1970’s, a number of real-time simulations of the National Grid 
system have been developed at the University of Bath. Hardware and software 
platforms were generated to allow real-time or faster than real-time simulations 
to be carried out on single or multiprocessor networks.
Much of the material included here was developed by Dale [168], Berry [169] and 
Chan [170]. Further additions to this material for mid- and long-term dynamic 
stability studies involving detailed prime mover and boiler models and voltage 
dependent loads was introduced by Stagg [171] investigating automatic generation
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control. A brief description of the main constituents of the power system simulator 
(or PowSim) will be given in the next section.
5.3 P ow er S y stem  M od ellin g
A power network model consists of a loaded transmission system and a set of gen­
erators. The general functional block diagram in Figure 5.1 shows the interaction 
between the models, which will now be described.
5.3.1 Transm ission Network
The network is a set of nodes or busbars, teed-circuits or other intermediate points 
in the system, connected together by branches in the form of transmission lines, 
cables or transformers.
>A single phase network representation is used to model the three phase electrical 
power transmission network with balanced phase sequence components under 
steady state conditions. A transmission line or cable is modelled by an equivalent 
pi-network with half of the total capacitance lumped at each end of the line as an 
admittance to ground, with the effect of electro-magnetic mutual coupling between 
double circuit lines ignored. Lines and transformers are lumped together as in 
Figure 5.2a with transformer taps fixed at their nominal position. Shunt reactors 
and static capacitors are represented as shunt admittances connected to ground 
as shown in Figure 5.2b and Figure 5.2c. Busbar loads and fault impedances are 
modelled as fixed impedances to ground as in Figure 5.3.
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5.3.2 Synchronous M achine R epresentation
The model that has been used is based on Park’s transformation of the 3-phase 
machine into components along the direct and quadratic axis, shown in Figure 
5.4. This model only simulates these 3-phase quantities, where damping winding 
and eddy current effects are represented as a single lumped short circuit winding 
on each axis shown in Figure 5.5. A set of equations relating the flux linkages 
can be used to describe the machine, which have been transformed to a voltage 
behind sub-transient reactance representation to yield easily observable states. 
The complete derivation of these equations is given in [169,170].
Air-gap torque equation





s  — -------------------
Uo
V =  1 —  s
and s  is constrained to less than 1 PU and v  is assumed to be unity. A number 
of other approximations are made with pEd =  pEq =  0 and for solid round rotor 
machines E'd =  0, X q — X'q and X q =  X d.
This results in the industry recommended fifth order model for transient stability 
studies assuming the machine operates near synchronous speed such that
=  ± ( T m -  T. -  T„)
=  L J  —  2 t t / o
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Vd = E d" +  X ”l q -  R aId 
Vq = Eq" +  X 'tId - R aIq
and
pK  = X { { X q - X ' ' ) I q - E l )  
q°
PE'q =  ± ( V f - ( X d - X ' d)Id - E 'q)
do
_ / /  1 , _/ .
=  7 p r ( E q ~  ( % d  ~  % d  ) h  — E q )
do
Figure 5.6 shows the phasor diagram equivalent.
5.3.3 M agnetic Saturation
The saturation factors Sqi Sd are used to model machine saturation and are cal­
culated from the machine open circuit terminal voltage against field current curve
as in Figure 5.7. The simulator modifies equations 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 with assuming
that equal saturation occurs at both mutual and leakage paths of the rotor circuits.
This gives the following equations
pK  =  ^ r ( ( X q -  X q )Iq -  S X )  (5.4)
q°
p K  =  X { V ,  -  (X d -  X'd)Id -  Sdtft ) (5.5)
do
pK  = A r (K E 'q - ( X ' d - X ' ; ) I d - S dEq) (5.6)
do
The saturation factor can be defined as





and by introducing new non-integrable variables which are less dependent on the 
integrable ones, such that
aE'q = <*iE'q
aEq = a iEq
aE" =
Equations 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 can be re-written in a pseudo-linear form which is more 
applicable to direct solutions
„// 1 , , „  „ it tt.
pEd ~  7pr((Xq — X q )Iq — E d — aE d)
1 qo
pE'q = ± ( V / -  (Xd -  X d)Jd -  Eq -  aEq)
do
PE" = ' ( E ,  +  aE'q -  (X'd -  X';)Id -  Eq -  aE")
do
Similarly, the integrable variables I d  and I q are replaced by the less dependent 
non-integrable states Vd and Vq respectively, due to the weaker coupling to E d 
and E q .
Id = Yre(Ed -  Vd) -  Y^(Eq -  Vq)
I, =  Yre{E'q - V q) - Y q (E'd - V d)
where
(Ra - R a + X ' ; -X ^ )
- K
(Ra ■ R a + X ’J ■ X q )
- K
{Ra -R a + X d - X “)
Y„ =
y ;  =
K  =
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5.3.4 Control System s
To study a power system running either dynamically or transiently after a dis­
turbance, the influences of the machine Automatic Voltage Regulator or AVR and 
governor systems have been included in PowSim. Several general purpose methods 
for modelling excitation and mechanical power control that have been published 
in the IEEE Committee reports [172,173] have been implemented.
5.3.4.1 E xcitation  System s
Dale [168] incorporated a simplified AVR model into PowSim. A stabilising feed­
back signal was introduced by Berry [169] so that the effects of a high forward path 
gain could be used without a detrimental reduction in system damping, shown in
Figure 5.8. The differential equations used have linear state variables and control
inputs, so that
pV, =  J p t y .  -  J L v /+  (5.7)
1 9 ± 9 1 9
PV. =  +  j h V ,  (5.8)
Krr = Vre f- V ,
Rearranging and combining equations 5.7 and 5.8 gives a first order equation of
the form
Ta +  K sK a\  T, K s Tr . I<sK g
If the stabilising feedback gain K s is set to zero, the AVR reverts to a simple first 
order lag.
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Chan [170] expanded on this by developing a “composite” model AVR by combin­
ing IEEE Type 1 and Type 2 models. This allowed for different AVR types to be 
selected by altering the settings of the time constants as in Figure 5.9.
5.3.4.2 Speed G overning M odel
The governor model implemented by Berry, shown in Figure 5.10, assumes the 
high pressure cylinder governor valve has an infinite steam source. This valve is 
controlled by machine speed and steam flow through the high pressure pipework 
and the reheater are represented by two time constants. This gives
p Y  —  —V  4 . (^ mo ~  ^ tUJ
F V P 0 S  —  r p  v PO S  T  r p
pTm l — TpT k p o a
pTm2 =  pT^ml — — Tm2
1 t
Chan used the same method with the addition of an interceptor, shown in Figure 
5.11.
5.3.5 Sim ulation Solution  M ethod
To obtain a set of initial conditions to runPowSim, a complex power flow solution is
required. This is calculated by National Grid Company’s program OPFL02 [174]
and given the specified power generation and system loading, initial operating 
states are obtained by solving the differential-algebraic problem of the form
PV =  F (y ,x )  (5-9)
0 =  G(y,x) (5.10)
81
where y is a vector or integrable variables, such as control system and machine 
states, x  is the vector of non-integrable variables and T  and Q are non-linear 
vector functions. Equation 5.9 has a pseudo-linear structure that in state space 
form can be arranged as
py =  Ay +  B it(y,z)
where u is a vector of non-integrable variables, which are some non-linear function 
of y and x, such that A  and B are constant matrices. Equation 5.10 can be 
rewritten in two parts, such that
I ( E ,V )  = Y - V  (5.11)
and
u =  u(E, V )
where 7 is a vector of current injections and is calculated from the machine internal 
voltage E  and busbar voltage V  for voltage dependent loads if these are present. 
Y  is the network nodal admittance matrix which is sparse for most large power 
systems. For a given switching condition, the elements of this matrix are fixed 
with respect to time.
From this, the main simulation loop is entered :-
i
1. Calculate the non-integrable variables Uk from the integrable machine and 
control system states yk and the integrable voltage states v*.
2. Calculate the past step quantities c* (from the integration technique men­
tioned in [169,170]).
3. Extrapolate v*+i and itjfe+i.
4. Calculate yjt+i (from the integration technique mentioned in [169,170]) by 
forward and backward substitution.
5. Apply limits to the control loop variables.
6. Calculate the machine current injection from E " and E j.
7. Calculate the busbar injection by summing all machine current injections.
8. Solve the network equation 5.11 to get a better estimate of Vfc+i.
9. Compare with the extrapolated value from step 3.
10. If Vfc+i is converged, advance a time step and go to step 1.
11. Calculate a new estimate of ujt+i from Vk+i and go back to step 4.
Steps 1 to 6 and 11 are machine group specific and have been implemented as part 
of a parallel processor version of PowSim by Berry. Steps 7 to 10 deal with the 
network solution and this has been parallelised by Chan.
5.3.6 U ser Interface
5.3.6.1 Textual Interface
The initial steady state conditions of the power system model (from OPFL02), 
together with machine and network parameters, are defined by the user in text 
files. Most of these parameters can be changed on-line to simulate events such as 
balanced three phase faults and line outages and can be applied either interactively 
or as timed sequences of individual events.
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Simulator commands can also be stored in files as simple sequences or combined 
in other commands to create user-defined menus. Each menu can echo some text 
to the screen and then prompt for a user option, which may then be used to select 
a number of different command blocks.
5.3.6.2 Graphical Interface
Most of the versions of PowSim that have been developed have supported two 
displays. A monochrome screen is used to provide textual information (as men­
tioned above), whilst a colour monitor provides graphics output. The data-logging 
facility, as developed by Dale and Berry, stores machine and network states for a 
user-specified duration in memory. These states can then be either transferred to 
files or plotted to the colour monitor.
In addition to these static screens, animated displays were developed to follow the 
current state of the simulation, which is continuously updated to run in real-time.
Recently, work has progressed in the area of graphical user interfaces. Ng de­
veloped an X-Windows application running on Transputer based hardware [175]. 
This allows multiple applications to use the same screen and for each application 
to use several windows. A set of low level graphics routines have been written to
t1
provide two display pages with flicker-free dynamic pictures.
5.3.7 M odifications carried out on PowSim
A number of modifications have been made to the simulator program to allow a 
more realistic view of the power system being modelled
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5.3.7.1 Line Protection
A very simple scheme has been added to the simulator code. It uses the principle 
that if the power through a particular line is greater that its rated MVA, the line 
is then taken out of the system. This is done by using the relationship : -
P  =  VI cos#
There are two modes of operation, namely “manual” and “auto”. The latter is for 
protection to be included in the simulation, the former to exclude it to allow the 
user to outage lines manually with no interference by the protection module.
However, whilst running the simulator after a large system disturbance, it became 
evident that this protection scheme was too simplistic. The problem that arose 
was a line could trip out and be reconnected an infinite number of times, which is 
naturally an inaccurate model to use.
Therefore, a more realistic system has been implemented, which uses a similar prin­
ciple to that of modern day “DAR” (Delayed Auto Reclose) protection schemes. 
Hence, once a line has been tripped and reclosed twice (after 200ms), the next 
event that it is outaged leaves it permanently disconnected from the network.
5.3.7.2 A ddition o f A cceleration Feedback Signal to  the AVR M odel
Calculations of kinetic energy and rotor acceleration have been added to the ma­
chine code within PowSim to allow the addition of a further stabilising feedback 
signal to the generator excitation system. The equations used are
Ke =  i(M w2) (5.12)
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and
Acc = ^ ( ( T ^ K , )  + (Tm2K 2)) (5.13)
These are calculated along with the machine equations every time step and are 
used for transient stability assessment and braking resistors.
5.3.7.3 Braking Resistors
The practice of installing braking resistors on generator terminals has been in­
troduced to PowSim. However, the principle of adding a resistor of Megawatt 
capability to ground was found not to be suitable and, instead, various methods 
were devised to simulate the same effect. The final decision was to connect a load 
to the generator busbar which directly mimic the generator output. The signal 
used to switch this load on to the generator terminals was eliminated down to 
two inputs, namely that of machine kinetic energy and rotor acceleration from 
equations 5.12 and 5.13 above. The former was found to be less accurate than the 
latter. Hence, an acceleration signal is used, which, when above a suitable limit, 
switches the load in but takes the load off the busbar when the rotor has slowed 
down, again between specified limits.
5.3.7.4 Area Recognition
i
An additional element has been added to the power system components, such as 
lines, busbars and generator groups, by specifying a geographical area in which 
they are located. This is of principle use in alarm processing, where it was thought 
that an alarm warning would be more easily identified by an operator than the 
present system set up allows.
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5.4  Sum m ary
The power system models and techniques that were used in the real-time simu­
lator PowSim have been described. Many developments have matured during its 
evolution from six MC6800 microprocessors (Dale) to twelve processors (Berry) 
enabling an increase in power network study size from four generators and six 
busbars to twenty machines and sixty nodes. Final extensions to this by Chan 
allow an eighty machine and eight hundred node system to be run in real-time 
making use of sixteen INMOS T800 transputers via parallel processing techniques. 
Work has also progressed into providing an enhanced user interface.
Serial versions of the simulator have been ported to run on other hardware such as 
PCs, SUN and APOLLO workstations and an Intel i860 processor plug-in board 
hosted by a PC.
Extensions have been added to the basic PowSim model in preparation for the main 
thrust of the security assessment algorithms which will be described in Chapter
7. A serial version of the simulator running on an i860-based PC will be used 
together with the latest addition to the available computer hardware, a Silicon 
Graphics Indigo R4000. The hardware and associated operating systems will be 

























Figure 5.1: Model Structure
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Figure 5.5: Synchronous Machine Winding Arrangement
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Figure 5.7: Generator Open Circuit Saturation Characteristic
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Figure 5.11: Speed Governor and Valves Model Including Interceptor
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C hapter 6
C om puting Hardware
6.1 In trod u ction
The power system simulator described in the previous chapter has been ported 
to a number of hardware platforms for both serial and parallel architectures. In 
this research, a serial or single processor version has been used to run PowSim 
and security assessment software on a Micro way Number Smasher-860 hosted by 
a personal computer (PC) and a Silicon Graphics INDIGO. A mention will also 
be made of how the latter architecture has been used in a distributed parallel 
processing approach for an on-going research programme.
Each hardware base and its associated operating system, will be described in the 
following sections. More emphasis is placed on the Number Smasher-860, since 
the majority of the development was been carried out on this architecture.
i’
6.2  M icrow ay N u m b er  Sm asher-860
6.2.1 Board Specifications
Microway’s Number Smasher-860> NS-860, [176,177] is an accelerator card that 
can provide personal computers with supercomputer throughput at microcom­
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puter prices. The board is powered by a 40 MHz Intel 80860XR or i860 micropro­
cessor with 32 megabytes of 64-bit four-way interleaved dynamic RAM (DRAM) 
and is hardware compatible with both ISA and EISA architecture in any existing 
IBM PC/AT 80286, 80386 or 80486 acting as the host. In this research, a math 
co-processor equipped 33 MHz IBM PC/AT-386 clone with 4 megabytes of DRAM 
running the MS-DOS (Version 5.0) operating system has been used as the host 
for the NS-860 board. This combination has been shown to run three to ten times 
faster than the standard 386 system using the Whetstone benchmark. The PC 
is equipped with a colour VGA monitor and a mono monitor in order to operate 
in a two-screen mode, the former for graphics and the latter for interactive user 
textual input.
The NS-860 delivers up to 80 million single precision floating point operations 
per second at 40 MHz and produces 12 double precision Linpack megaflops as 
compared to the standard 386 system which typically produces between 0.2 and
1.4 Linpack megaflops. Hand-coded versions of the dot product routines, SDOT 
and DDOT, process 20 and 40 million multiply accumulate pairs per second in 
conditions when one of the vectors is in the i860’s data cache. The Intel claim of 
40 to 80 million operations per second is based on these hand-coded dot product 
routines.
The number smasher includes an AT link adaptor interface that allows the board 
to communicate with the host 386 over its ISA bus. The transfer rate of these 
link adaptors on the board used for this research was 0.8 megabytes per second, 
although an ISA FIFO interface has been developed by Microway to take advant­
age of the full throughput of the bus and increases the data transfer rate to 2.5 
megabytes per second. The EISA FIFO interface allows the parallel operation of 
several NS-860 cards and achieves throughput rates that approach 33 megabytes
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per second transfer rate.
The board includes a boot EPROM which contains power-on code and a monitor 
which initialises the i860 and supports communications with the 386 host via the 
two built-in link adaptors and the ISA bus.
6.2.2 Advantages of a Standalone Board
The NS-860 offers several advantages over i860 cards that share memory with their 
host :
•  Memory interface design : the 386 and i860 each achieve peak performance 
using different memory management strategies. The memory design that is 
optimal for the i860’s interleaved memory is not necessarily optimal for the 
386 bus.
I
•  Neither the i860 nor the 386 can deliver peak performance operating under 
a shared memory environment which must serve between the two processors 
as well as using the non-optimal memory interfaces. This becomes appar­
ent and, in some cases, severe when the 386 manages I/O  while the i860 
simultaneously loads bytes from memory every other cycle.
i
• The flexible interface of the NS-860 boards makes it ideal for either stan­
dalone, as is the case for this research, or for massively parallel problems 
and can be run in any existing micro PC system without the need to buy a 
new motherboard.
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6.2.3 Com piler Structure
The NDP-860 compilers incorporate a Common Object File Format or COFF 
based tool set, an i860 assembler, linker, librarian and loader which run under 
MS-DOS, the PC’s operating system, and contain a library of device-independent 
graphics routines with enhanced features that support VGA and Hercules ad­
aptors.
The compiler is distributed as a native compiler which consists of i860 binaries that 
are loaded from an 80x86, but execute on the i860 resulting in enhanced compila­
tion speed. Code can be interfaced with assembly language and between Fortran, 
C, C++and Pascal NDP compilers, since they use the same calling conventions for 
procedures.
The NDP-860 compilers run on Microway’s XTEND-860 environment [178], which 
is similar to an alien file server developed for the transputers that Microway have 
marketed. It is composed of two parts : RUN860, an alien file server that resides 




RUN860 is a C application that runs on 286, 386 or 486 platforms under MS-DOS. 
Two versions ex ist: RUN860.EXE which is a real mode loader and RUN860P.EXE 
which is a protected mode loader used for graphics applications, using the Micro­
way GREX  library.
Both variants use device drivers to control I/O  between the NS-860 board and the
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386 host and contain features which help in debugging and timing code. As an 
example, the -v or “verbose” switch prints out the addresses used to load OS860 
and the application, as well as the time spent in various parts of the load/run 
process. A complete lower level debugger is also contained in both versions that 
enables the user to print and use symbolic information, debug pipelined code and 
display and work with numerical data in memory, registers or the pipeline using 
conventional floating point formats.
Microway is currently undergoing a development program to create interfaces 
between the i860 and the real and the protected mode devices needed to simplify 
the ports of some DOS-based products.
6.2.3.2 OS860
The OS860 kernel is loaded into low memory by RUN860 and performs the fol­
lowing tasks : '
1. Boots itself from the 386 host.
2. Sets up the paging tables needed to manage memory.
3. Installs a general purpose exception handler.
4. Loads and runs applications.
5. Handles communications with the host including :
(a) i860 exception messages including :
i. numeric exceptions
ii. page faults
(b) 386 based debugger requests for information on
i. register and memory contents.
ii. the setting of traps for break points and single stepping.
(c) Runtime communications between the 386 and the i860 runtime system 
using traps to the kernel that manage the 386-i860 communications.
6. Manages the applications memory space making it possible to implement 
protection between tasks and the kernel in addition to providing a consistent 
mechanism for allocating memory.
7. Provided a user interface to the numeric exception handler.
6.2.3.3 N D P  C /C + + -8 6 0  Com piler
The power system simulator PowSim and all code developed during the period of 
this research has been written in the C programming language so that the NDP 
C / C++-860 compiler could be used. This supports Kemighan and Ritchie C, 
Ansi C and the AT&T Version 2.1 C++specifications in a UNIX-like environment 
(BSD 4.2 and AT&T Version 3).
The compiler also includes an on-line assembly language interface that simplifies 
the development of embedded code, device and screen drivers and operating sys­
tems by allowing the programmer to specify register values and generate interrupts. 
This facility can permit the programmer to subsequently design software in an 
Object-Oriented approach.
The compilation process involves compiling, assembling, linking and running a 
program. After compiling, the assembler creates an object file with extensions
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of the form . o directly from the assembly code. The linker takes the object file 
together with other specified files and libraries and produces a NS-860 specific 
executable.
In order to compile the power system simulator to facilitate animated displays, the 
NS-860 executable is linked with a Microsoft graphics routine to provide graphics 
and I/O  extensions for the i860. This results in an executable that can be run 
from the 386 host on the NS-860 board.
6.3 S ilicon  G raphics IN D IG O
6.3.1 Hardware Specifications
The INDIGO [179] is a culmination of many computing technologies that have 
been developed over a number of years by Silicon Graphics. It is based on the 
product of the third generation MIPS RISC architecture built around a R4000 
processor running at 100 MHz offering 85 MIPS, 16 MFlops and 70 SPEC 89 
marks performance. The CPU and memory bus can achieve 400 MB/sec with 
a throughput from the 64-bit system I/O  bus of 267 MB/sec. The INDIGO, in 
addition to its 16 KBytes of primary cache (8 KBytes each of data and instruction 
cache), also has a 1 MB secondary cache, which enables very fast performance by 
providing the largest cache on a desktop* workstation at the time of writing.
The architecture itself allows a huge memory expansion (up to 384 MB RAM), 
although, only 32 MB of main memory are supported in this set-up. Four industry 
standard EISA slots (or two EISA slots with high performance GIO-64 slots) are 
also available for further hardware expansion. The 1.2 gigabyte hard disk and 
peripheral configurations to external PCs are accommodated by a fast independ­
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ent SCSI-2 controller and an integral 10 Base T Ethernet connection. Together 
with two serial RS422 (38.4K baud) ports, a bidirectional parallel port and five 
audio I/O  connections, this set-up, therefore, makes the INDIGO suitable for both 
standalone functions and a networked environment.
X Windows and 2D graphics are supported by the INDIGO’s graphics card. This 
also supports 3D image processing through a software Z buffer and host-based 
geometry calculations. The REX3 Raster Engine ASIC converts geometric data 
processed by the CPU into pixel and line data that it then writes into the frame 
buffer. This is supported by a 17” monitor with 1024 x 768 resolution, 4096 
colours and a 76 Hz screen refresh rate. This enables a pixel fill rate of up to 
437 million pixels and 1.4 million X Window (X I1) lines per second. Additional 
standard graphics features include texture mapping, depth cueing, stereo graphics 
and pan and zoom facilities.
6.3.2 T he U N IX  O perating System
Underlying any applications or tools that can be used on the INDIGO is the Irix 
operating system (Version 4.0.5F) which is an adaption of the well known UNIX 
operating system [180]. Irix is much more flexible and powerful than traditional 
personal computer operating systems, such as MS-DOS, highlighting a number of 
features which are inherited from the ba!sic UNIX :
• It is a multi-user operating system, which means several users can work on 
the system simultaneously and maintain private files.
• The INDIGO is made into a multi-tasking system, permitting the INDIGO 
to run several applications, print files and update files at the same time.
101
• The INDIGO can be connected to a network, where files can be transferred 
to and from another workstation, in this case, via the ethernet connections 
to a number of peripheral PCs.
• Irix allows a number of hardware bases to be added such as printers, ter­
minals and disk drives without the need for additional software.
6.3.2.1 Basic U N IX  Structure
The operating system, often referred to as the system kernel interacts directly with 
the INDIGO hardware, providing common services to programs and “insulating” 
them from any hardware quirks. In this way, programs become independent of 
the hardware base and can be easily moved between UNIX systems running on 
different architectures.
The kernel performs various operations on behalf of those processes that are used 
to support the user interface. These services provided by the kernel may control 
the execution of processes by allowing their creation, termination or suspension, as 
well as communication between them. Secondly the execution of these processes 
can be scheduled fairly on the CPU, i.e. in a time-shared manner, by executing a 
process and suspending it (if its operation time has elapsed), scheduling the next 
process and later returning to any previously suspended actions.
The kernel also allows processes to share portions of the main memory during 
program execution. If the system runs low on memory, the kernel frees memory 
by writing a process temporarily to disk secondary memory, which is called a swap 
device. This secondary memory can be allocated by the kernel for efficient storage 
and subsequent retrieval of user data and, hence, in this function, it constitutes a
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file system. The kernel can allocate secondary storage for user files, reclaim unused 
storage, structures the file system and protects user files from illegal access.
Finally, the kernel provides these services “transparently”. It supports the services, 
for example, that the “shell” needs to act as a command line interpreter by allowing 
the shell to read terminal input, synchronise process execution and redirect I/O .
6.3.3 X  W indows
The X  Window system [181], or X  as it is often referred to, is a network-based 
graphics windowing system that was developed by Massachusetts Institution of 
Technology in 1984. Several versions of X have been developed, the most recent 
of which is version 11 (XI I ) ,  first released in 1987 and it is this that is used on 
the INDIGO.
The X system architecture can be split into two main components : display servers, 
which provide display functions and keep track of user input and, clients, which 
are application programs that perform specific tasks. This partition allows clients 
and display servers to either work together on the same system or be separated 
over a network running on isolated machines.
*
6.3.3.1 X  D isplay Server
The X display server is a program that keeps track of all inputs coming from the 
keyboard or mouse or from any other clients that are concurrently running. As the 
display server receives data from a client, it updates the appropriate window on 
the display and may run on the same computer as a client or an entirely different 
machine.
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6 .3 .3 .2  C lien ts
X allows a number of clients to be run at the same time. Even though these 
programs may display their results and take input from a single display server, 
they may each be running on a different computer on the network. Other examples 
of client programs used on the INDIGO include :
• 4Dwm, the Silicon Graphics window manager. This allows windows to be 
moved around the screen, as well as changing the size of these windows. 
Windows can also be raised or lowered (brought in front of others or sent be­
hind them, respectively) and converted to icons or vice versa within 4Dwm. 
Another important feature of the window manager is to create additional 
shell windows.
• winterm, the Silicon Graphics equivalent to the X I1 xterm , which provides 
a terminal emulation within a window. Anything that can be done pn a 
standard terminal (such as a DEC VT102 or Tektronix 4015) can be con­
ducted in this shell window and can be used to run other clients. This has 
many additional features, compared to a traditional terminal, which include 
scrollbars and a cop}' and paste facility between windows.
i
In order to run PowSim, two windows are created : a graphics display and a text 
window which are equivalent to the colour and mono monitor respectively as for 
the PC-based version
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6.4 D istr ib u ted  P ara lle l P ro cessin g  A rch itectu re
A research programme, cofunded by SERC and National Grid Company, was set 
up in mid-1992 to investigate and develop a dynamic security assessor for on-line 
use in a grid control room [182].
Even for a medium sized power network, the required computational power would 
exceed the limit for real-time operation in typically a 10-15 minute time interval. 
It was suggested that a fair amount of parallelism exists among the assessment 
modules, described in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, so that the use of distributed 
processing became a practical solution.
6.4.1 System  Software and Hardware
The preliminary computer system hardware used for the “On-Line Algorithm for 
System Instability Studies” or OASIS consists of the Silicon Graphics INDIGO, a 
number of IBM PC/AT compatible 80386 and 80486. computers and a DEC AL­
PHA Series 3600. Figure 6.1 shows how these components axe networked together 
with ethernet connections in a heterogeneous computing system.
In this configuration, the INDIGO workstation works as a network server for the 
rest of the system, with a local disc exported as the network drive via the network 
filing system, NFS. An additional ethernet card has been recently installed so that 
the local ethernet can be isolated from the main university network.
All IBM PC/AT compatible 386 and 486 computers are identical with 8 megabytes 
of memory, ethernet card, math co-processor and dual monitors. Local processing 
power is boosted by either an i860 or T800 accelerator card. A dual operating
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system is used consisting of MS-DOS version 5.0 and Linux. The latter is a freely 
available UNIX compatible operating system with complete networking and X 
Windows facilities for developing the graphics interface for OASIS.
The ALPHA workstation has been recently acquired and, in this network setup, 
is used in a similar way to the PCs, i.e. where jobs are allocated to it in a parallel 
tasking manner. It, however, like the INDIGO, has superior processing power over 
the IBM PC/AT compatibles.
6.4*2 OASIS Software A rchitecture
The software architecture of OASIS is founded on the use of Open Systems stand­
ards or POSIX. ANSI C and C++are used as the principle programming languages 
to ensure the portability for all major pieces of code, with UNIX compatibility 
maintained for all of the computing subsystems mentioned above.
l
As mentioned in previous chapters, a complete dynamic security assessment sys­
tem  comprises of a number of functional blocks which can be sub-divided into a 
set of co-operating processes running on a distributed or multitasking system as 
in Figure 6.2. Interfaces between these modules have been designed so that each 
block can operate independently with I/O  redirected to the common database 
system. 'i
A software backplane based on Oak National Laboratory’s Parallel Virtual Machine 
(PVM) has been built over the individual computer architectures so that the 
network can work as a single virtual machine. PVM is composed of a daemon 
and a library of interface routines and supplies functions to automatically start up 
processes on the virtual machine and allow these to communicate and synchronise
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with each other.
6.5 C hapter Sum m ary
This chapter has described the hardware facilities and programming and operating 
system environments used for the development and testing of the security assessor 
as part of the power system simulator PowSim.
The majority of the development work was performed on a Micro way Number 
Smasher-860 hosted by a IBM PC/AT-386. Testing of the algorithm modules was 
carried out using this architecture and a Silicon Graphics INDIGO.
An additional computing system, that of a heterogeneous network, has been briefly 
described, which was set up for a further research programme into the area of 
dynamic security assessment and illustrates how system analysis could be carried 
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Figure 6.2: Security Assessment Software Structure
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Chapter 7
Software Im plem entation
7.1 In trod u ction
The power system simulator PowSim described in Chapter 5 of this thesis has 
been used as the basis for the dynamic security assessor. All computing code 
was written in ANSI standard C programming language [183-185], so, in order 
to retain compatibility and portability between different hardware platforms, the 
system analysis software was also written in this language.
I
In keeping with how this thesis has been structured, the security assessor im­
plementation was split into three distinct divisions namely, contingency analysis, 
stability assessment and alarm processing. Each division will now be explained in 
the following sections.
7.2 C ontingen cy  A n a lysis
As mentioned in Section 5.3.6, PowSim has been developed to include a textual or 
interactive interface between man and machine and allows a number of parameters 
to be changed on-line by the user, which include : -
• Switch busbar faults on or off.
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• Switch transmission lines in or out of service.
• List or change busbar loads.
• List or change line impedances and/or transformer tap ratios.
• List or change generator group power output and group disconnections.
• List or change generator set transformer tap ratios.
• List or change AVR parameters and set points.
• List or change governor parameters and set points.
A data logging facility is also available which stores machine and network states 
for a user-specified duration in memory and can be either transferred to files under 
user control or plotted to the colour monitor or window immediately (depending 
on which computing platform is being used).
1
7.2.1 O verview  of M ain Loop
The source code that allows this interaction was used as the basis for applying 
contingencies, i.e. busbar faults, line outages, etc ... The operations listed in 
Section 7.2 above are split into “command modules” which are called by the user 
via the man-machine interface to carry .out the modifications to the operating 
point of the simulator. An additional module has been written called “Cmd_Contg” 
which reads all the credible disturbances in a user-specified database and calls 
the appropriate routines to conduct contingency application and analysis. The 
procedure involved is summarised by Figure 7.1.
The database contains single and multiple circuit transmission line outages, busbar 
faults, load losses and generator trips and the user specified time periods for
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contingency screening, analysis and any further stability assessment that may be 
required for dynamic instability cases. Fault duration for busbar contingencies are 
also specified in this database.
For each contingency read in by CmdjContg, a check is carried out by the code 
to see whether it is a valid proposal, i.e. if a particular busbar specified in the 
database is in fact in the network model. If it passes this check, all performance 
indices and network/stability alarm flags are set to initial nominal values in the 
relevant contingency structures before the contingency is applied. In the particular 
case of line outages, a local or remote end flag is also set to specify which end of 
the transmission line is to be tripped first. If a contingency contains the keyword 
“and” in the database, a multiple outage has been specified.
Before any contingencies are applied, the pre-contingent system state is remembered, 
so that the network can be restored to its original operating condition at the end of 
t each contingency analysis period. The outages listed in the database can then be 
passed to the application code, the data transferred includes contingency type and 
name together with the screening, analysis, fault duration and dynamic stability 
assessment time periods specified in the database.
7.2.2 A pplication R outines
i?
From the main loop in Figure 7.1, the appropriate function calls are made to the 
relevant Contingency Application Routines. If the example of a line outage is used, 
it can be seen from Figure 7.2 that there are a number of objects passed to the 
function. Alarm logging for both network and transient stability violations (which 
will be described in a later section of this chapter) and contingency screening 
are started simultaneously and call routines from the main simulator loop which
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invokes the network and machine calculations discussed in Section 5.3.5. The 
SCREEN flag is set to TRUE whilst the simulator is screening the contingencies for 
subsequent processing. The time period for this screening interval is specified by 
the user in the database and for this research it was found that 1 second proved 
to be adequate.
During this interval, the fuzzy Contingency Analysis Routines are called and starts 
processing the data coming from the simulator immediately after the fault has been 
applied. Thesewill continue in their operation until terminated by the contingency.
In the case of line contingencies, in addition to the line name (or names, for 
multiple outages), the side which is to have primary tripping is also passed. In 
early studies, lines were simply taken out of service, which, although this was 
acceptable initially, consultation with National Grid Company revealed that a 
more accurate line contingency application was needed. The local end busbar of 
the line is tripped with a 3-phase fault jof 80ms duration and the fault impedance 
to ground from that busbar is set to zero, i.e. disconnecting the line from that 
busbar. The remote end is tripped at the same time as the sending end but with 
a longer 120ms 3-phase fault and a fault impedance to ground equivalent to the 
impedance of that line, i.e. the remote end still “sees” the line in service. Once 
the fault at the remote end has been cleared (40ms after the sending end), the 
line is completely removed from the network. This is an example of a single line 
contingency with the local end tripped first. The procedure is similar for primary 
remote end tripping and can be easily adapted for multiple circuit outages.
This procedure is similar for other types of contingency, i.e.
• Busbar faults; the analysis is carried out once the busbar has been subjected
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to a 3-phase fault of duration specified in the database.
• Busbar load losses; the pre-contingent busbar load is stored and set to zero 
during the contingency application whilst analysis is being carried out.
• Generator group trips; the generator is tripped or disconnected from the rest 
of the system during the contingency analysis period.
If after the screening interval, i.e. when the screening period has elapsed and 
the SCREEN flag is set to FALSE, no network violations have been received by the 
alarm processor, this contingency is deemed to be not harmful to the system and 
no further analysis takes place. A similar logic is used for transiently unstable 
situations. However, since this is a worst case scenario, it is given a maximum 
rating by the contingency analysis software and stored with its associated network 
and stability violations for subsequent ranking.
If any contingencies pass through this first filter, the ANALYSIS flag is set to TRUE, 
which is similar in its effect to the screening operation by calling the transient 
stability assessment code, as well as alarm handling and contingency analysis 
routines. However, this time it also calls a dynamic/steady state stability analysis 
algorithm. Again, if any transient instability is detected during this period, further 
analysis of the contingency is stopped. When this analysis time has elapsed, which
I!
is again specified by the user in the contingency database (for this research a 10 
second interval was used), all performance index calculations are terminated, i.e. 
the ANALYSIS flag is set to FALSE.
An additional time period for dynamic stability analysis is utilised only when the 
magnitude of power oscillations in the network exceeds a threshold value. This will 
be described in more detail in a later section. If during this time, these oscillations
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die out or are below the specified level, any further stability analysis is stopped.
The line, busbar/load or generator is then put back into service and the power 
system is restored to its original pre-contingent operating condition ready for the 
next contingency with all of its performance indices and alarms stored in memory 
for subsequent ordering and presentation of the final results.
7.3 A n a lysis  A lgorith m
During both the screening and further analysis periods discussed above, the degree 
of severity of the contingency and its impact on the system is measured. The 
approach used is based on fuzzy-set theory as described in Chapter 4 of this 
thesis. Four contingent quantities are monitored : -
1. Line power flows in MVA.
2. Busbar voltage magnitudes in p.u.
3. Generator group power outputs in MVA.
4. Reactive power injections in MVAr.
Figure 7.3 outlines the basic procedure. |£ach quantity is normalised with respect 
to its operating limits, i.e.
MV A floyj
1. for each line, x, =  M V
2. for each busbar1, xv =
1This is based around a Wasley and Daneshdoost algorithm [62] and is modified by Ekwue 




„ r , MVA„en3. for each group, xs =  M V A TaUi
4. for each group MVAr injection, xq
where x/, xv, xg and x q are the normalised line MVA flow, busbar voltage mag­
nitude, group MVA power output and group MVAr injections respectively.
Each normalised quantity is divided into five categories by fuzzy set notation. 
Experiments using three or ten divisions show that, for the former, less accuracy 
but greater computational speed can be achieved. For the latter, on the other 
hand, the accuracy was comparable to using half the number of categories (but 
with more computational overhead) and, hence, five classifications have been used. 
These categories are principally Very Small ( ViS), Small (5), Medium (A/), Large 
(L) and Very Large ( VL). The relationship between these fuzzy linguistic variables 
and the normalised quantities needs to be defined. As an example, for the case 
of busbar voltage magnitudes, those normalised deviations from the nominal 1.0 
p.u. that axe of the order of 0.1 or 0.2 (equivalent to a 1% step change) may be 
classified in the Very Small category, whereas those that have deviations of more 
than 0.6 (or 5% change) are deemed to be Large or even Very Large.
The membership functions // of these linguistic variables have been represented by
i
triangles, which have been used for computational speed as compared to the more 
commonly used polygon approach, with no decrease in accuracy. The triangular 
membership function can, therefore, be described by its centre ((7), width (W) 
and peak (P). As discussed by Hsu et al. [41], the definitions of these are : -
• The centre of each triangle gives a measure of the most possible or likely 
relative severity for each linguistic variable, so that for a plot of membership
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function against system performance index (PI) for a particular contingent 
quantity, as in Figure 7.4, it can be seen that the VS linguistic variable has 
a lower PI than that for the VL category, for severely violated conditions.
• The width of each triangle represents the degree of uncertainty about the 
performance index. As in Figure 7.4, the Medium linguistic variable has a 
greater uncertainty compared to Very Small or Very Large. This is typical 
of a humanistic view of line flows. For example, an operator may say that 
20% loading of a transmission line is Very Small and 120 % is Very Large, 
but he/she cannot precisely define what the limits are for the Medium range, 
other than to say “somewhere in between”.
• The peak value gives the measure of the relative strength of the linguistic 
variable. It can be seen in Figure 7.4, the variables have been initially 
weighted by a “sigmoid function” so that more emphasis can be placed on 
the Medium to Very Large range, since this is ultimately of greater interest 
than the region below this in performance index terms.I
Various other weighting functions for the initial peak values of the triangles have 
been used such as a constant approach (g. =  1 for all linguistic variables), a linear 
fj, =  P I  method and an exponential curve. These are described in Table 7.1 and 
Figures 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8. Results from each of these will be discussed in the next
i t
chapter.
The relative severity of each contingent quantity, as it is calculated by the main 
simulator loop, is evaluated from its normalised value and the classification triangle 




where Cs and Ws are the centre and width of the Small triangle respectively and
0.2 and 0.3 are the lower and upper normalised deviation ranges for that variable. 
From this the membership function for this example can be calculated so that
«  =  (P s -  ( p s  x (7.2)
where Ps is the initial peak value of the membership function triangle. If a number 
of contingent quantities fall into a particular linguistic variable, the membership 
function of that variable is modified or enhanced by the use of fuzzy-set notation 
operations, i.e. the peak value of the triangle increases illustrating the dominance
of that linguistic variable. For example, for a post-contingent condition, the shape
1
of Figure 7.4 can resemble something similar to that of Figure 7.5 if more Small 
violations are present compared to say Large or Very Large.
From Figure 7.5, it is not apparent what the total system performance index is for 
this particular contingent quantity. In order to calculate this, a process known as 
“defuzzification” is used. There are two main methods for achieving this, namely 
max-min and sum-product. The former is excellent for interpreting the consequent 
of an “If - Then” rule but loses accuracy in this application. Therefore, the sum- 
product approach has been used, which, although computationally slower than 
the other method, does retain the level of accuracy required for this application. 
A “centre-of-gravity” via a binary search procedure has been employed for this 
purpose. Put simply, the region under all of the modified triangles in Figure 7.5 
is calculated to yield the total area. A starting point of \{C vl +  Wv l ) or 500, i.e
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the centre of the performance index axis (from 0 (low) to Cvl +  Wvl (high) or 
1000) is used and the area to the left of this point is calculated. If half of the total 
area is greater than this, the centre is moved to the mid to high region, i.e. from 
0 to 1000 to 500 to 1000. The converse happens if the calculated area is greater 
than half of the total area. This process continues until the two regions are equal 
to an accuracy of 0.01, where the midpoint that has been calculated is equivalent 
to the pivot or fulcrum of the total area and it is this that is the total system 
performance index for that contingent quantity. In Figure 7.5, it can be seen that 
the total system performance index at this point will be more biased towards the 
left hand side of the plot, since it is dominated by the Small linguistic variable.
An average value of the total system performance index for each contingent quant­
ity after every contingency analysis period is summed together with the other 
quantities to give the total system severity index, so that
1
SlTotal =  P I  Line + PlBusbar + P I  Group + P I  M V A r (7.3)
where PlLine> P I  Busbar ■> P Igtoup and P I  MVAr are the final total system perform­
ance indices for line flow, busbar voltage magnitude, group output power and 
MVAr injections into the network respectively. This number is then passed back 
to the Application Routine to be stored with its associated system and stability 
alarms for ordering and printing.
7,3.1 Ranking and R esults Processing
Once all of the contingencies have been applied from the database, the processing 
of the stored results begins. The first two contingencies stored are accessed, releas­
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ing that portion of memory that these contingencies occupied. Ordering between 
these results is achieved by comparing the total system severity index for each. 
A reverse ordering procedure has been used, so that if the first result has a total 
system SI less than the second, it is placed above the latter in a pseudo ranked list 
in memory. This process continues until all of the contingencies that have been 
stored have been “downloaded”, so that the most severe is placed at the bottom 
of the ranked list in a stack type structure in memory.
When the results are ready to be presented, the bottom of this stack is accessed 
first and printed either to screen or to file on the hard disk of the computing system 
being used. Since for larger systems, many contingencies may be present in the 
final output, the latter form of results presentation has been preferred, although 
development of an X Windows interface may prove a satisfactory solution.
Each contingency is printed together with its associated network violations and 
stability alarms in one of thr^e formats, namely a full alarm list, a reduced set 
of warnings grouped in geographical areas where the violations occur and a gen­
eral summation of the alarms tha t appeared during the contingency. This alarm 
processing will be described in more detail in a following section. At the top 
of each results file is a measure of the number of line, busbar, load and group 
contingencies together with an indication of the solution time for the complete 
security assessment cycle of the whole database. These formats will be discussed 
in more detail in the next chapter.
7.4  S ta b ility  A ssessm en t
An evaluation of power system stability is an essential function of a security assess­
ment tool during contingency analysis. Because of this, a transient and dynamic
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instability identification algorithm has been developed based on the concept of 
fuzzy-set techniques used in the previous section. Each mode of instability has 
been treated as a separate issue, i.e. during both the contingency screening and 
analysis periods, transient stability assessment is carried out and, if after this time, 
power oscillations are still above a threshold value, the contingency simulation is 
extended to ascertain whether these oscillations damp out, remain at the same 
level or grow in amplitude.
7.4.1 Transient Stability
During each contingency application, the function used for transient stability as­
sessment is called from the the main calculation loop of the simulator by the 
contingency Application Routine. Three objects are passed to this function and 
include the machine rotor angle £, machine rotor acceleration Acc and machine 
kinetic energy K{n.
I
Each group in the model network is checked every simulation time step and, as 
for contingency analysis, each of these parameters are calculated and classified in 





Each of these categories is represented by operator-specified “limits”. For example,
120
in the case of machine rotor angle, 8 is classified according to its angle swing from 
its initial pre-contingent position, so that
• Stable - angle swing of 20 to 40 degrees.
• Critically_Stable_Low - angle swing of 40 to 70 degrees.
• Critically_Stable_High - angle swing of 70 to 100 degrees.
• Unstable - angle swing greater than 100 degrees.
This, in itself, can be used as a measurement of transient stability but, there are 
some cases, in particular pump-storage machines, where the rotor angle swing 
exceeds 100 degrees and still returns to its original position without pole-slipping. 
Because of this, two additional measurements are made on rotor acceleration and 
machine kinetic energy which are classified in a similar way to that for rotor angles.
Once these classifications have been made, a set of “hard-wired” fuzzy reasoning 
rules are used to make a decision on the group stability. These rules are of the form 
“If  A A nd  B O r C T h en  D”. If transient instability occurs, a warning message 
is sent to the contingency structure and printed with the rest of the results when 
all the contingencies in the database have been applied.
i
This method has proved to be accurate and efficient in terms of computational 
demand, since the calculation of the contingent quantities is carried out by the 
simulator main loop every time step and, hence, only rule processing needs to 
be conducted. In the test described in the next chapter, those cases that were 
transiently unstable were run off-line and proved 100% accurate. Unlike the direct 
methods described in section 3.2.2, no approximation has been made of the power
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system model, since a time domain solution has been used and, although a direct 
measurement of the degree of stability is not immediately available, enhancements 
could be made by introducing more machine parameters and modifying the rule- 
base to accommodate these changes.
7.4.2 D ynam ic Stability
Two modes of dynamic or steady state instability are possible in an electrical 
power system. As described in Section 3.2.3 of this thesis, these are : -
• Oscillatory instability, where power transferred between two regions con­
nected by long transmission lines can start to oscillate and can increase to 
dangerous levels for generator plant and other equipment.
• Aperiodic instability, where system variables increase or ramp against one 
another. I
Both of these modes can be detected using the simulator PowSim during con­
tingency analysis. As mentioned previously, if after this analysis period power 
oscillations or parameter ramping are detected, a further user-specified time in­
terval is used to assess whether the system will ultimately go unstable.
»
For oscillatory instability, a single parameter is used, that of machine rotor angle, 
although generated power could be utilised just as effectively. A threshold value 
is set, below which the system is deemed to be stable. If after the full contingency 
analysis period, rotor oscillations are still present and above this threshold level, 
further simulation is carried out. If these oscillations die out during this additional 
time period, the simulation is halted, or if they remain sustained or start to
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increase, the simulation continues until the interval has elapsed and a message 
is printed to the contingency structure indicating the instability.
A similar approach to that for transient instability detection is carried out, so that 
the amplitude of the rotor angle oscillation with respect to the threshold level2 
is categorised in one of three classifications, i.e. Damped (D), Sustained (S) or 
Increasing (I). The amplitude stored in the previous call to this function (made 
every 5 simulation time steps) and its classification are compared with that of the 
present conditions. Again rules of the type “I f  A A nd B T h en  C” are used to 
yield a decision on the system stability. During testing of this algorithm, it was 
interesting to notice that the frequency of these oscillations is very low, typically
0.2 to 1.3 Hz, which has been confirmed by National Grid Company in some of 
their off-line studies. This extra parameter could be used at a later stage as an 
additional variable in the rule-base.
For aperiodic instability, all the “integrabie” machine states calculated in the main 
simulator loop are stored every time this function is called. These include direct 
and quadrature axis voltages (behind sub-transient reactance), field and AVR 
excitation stabilising voltages, mechanical and electrical torques and governor 
steam control valve position. A comparison is made between the stored values 
from the previous iteration and those of the present operating conditions. If a 
set of parameters are continuing to ramp*'against one another over the additional 
time period allocated for dynamic stability studies, a message is flagged to the 
contingency structure and subsequently printed out with the rest of the results.
2The threshold value used is 2 degrees rotor angle swing from its last peak to its present 
trough
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7.5 A larm  H an dling
In order to aid the operator in the task of producing a set of corrective actions for 
problem contingencies that are flagged by the security assessor, an alarm processor 
should be present to indicate the affected areas of the power network. A method 
loosely based on fuzzy set notations has been developed (as in Figure 3.2) to 
handle and process system violations. It can be split into two groups, namely 
data acquisition and information processing.
7.5.1 D ata A cquisition
As described in Section 3.3.2 of this thesis, messages coming from the power system 
need to be categorised into groups of increasing severity as shown in Figure 3.1.
A number of quantities are measured around the network model every simulation 
time step during the application of a contingency and include : - ;
1. Busbar voltage magnitudes.
2. Power system frequency.
3. Generator group real power (MW) limits.
i
4. Generator group reactive power (MVAr) limits.
5. Transmission line MVA power flows.
6. Network topology.
7. Transmission line and group transformer taps.
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The procedure for all of these variables is very similar in that directly measurable 
quantities are normalised, as in Section 7.3, and classified in one of the security 
levels illustrated by Figure 3.1, i.e.
1. Busbar voltage magnitude deviations are categorised by the difference between 
the voltage magnitude at the busbar and the nominal magnitude of 1.0 p.u.
2. System frequency is the network frequency. National Grid Company dir­
ectives specify that the frequency should not change by 2% during steady 
state operation and by 5% under fault conditions. The latter is used for 
contingency analysis. ;
3. Group power generation is classified according to the group’s MW and MVAr 
rated limits.
4. Line power flows in MVA are categorised by the percentage overload with 
respect to their associated thermal MVA limits.
I
5. Transformers are present on all lines and generator sets and their tap devi­
ation from the nominal tap position of 1.0 p.u. is monitored.
For network topology checking, a more detailed analysis is required. The procedure 
is that a busbar is picked as a starting point and all the transmission lines and/or 
supergrid transformers attached to this node are tested for their connectivity. The 
process continues recursively for all busbars in the network connected to this first 
one, until all have been checked. If the system is fully connected, a flag “Islanded” 
is set to FALSE, otherwise, if a node is found to be detached from the network, the 
flag is set to TRUE and the security level is assigned to LEVEL 5
For those cases that fall into security LEVEL  5, i.e. a non-correctable emergency
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where all load is supplied but the system cannot be restored without loss of some 
of this load, a message is sent directly to the main alarm processor routine and 
stored for subsequent evaluation once the contingency application has elapsed. 
Other security levels are processed locally by the relevant data acquisition func­
tions, where “hypotheses” are generated, i.e. to ascertain whether the severity 
of a particular alarm will increase with respect to its surroundings and present 
operating conditions.
7.5.2 Inform ation Processing
At the end of each contingency analysis period, the unresolved alarms, i.e. those 
that have not reached security LEVEL 5 are processed and queued in memory in 
the structure associated with that contingency.
Once all the contingencies have been applied from the database, this queued list 
of alarms is printed • together with any stability violations associated with that 
contingency in the ranked order of final results.
As previously mentioned in Section 7.3.1, the alarms that are printed can be in 
one of three forms. A full list of violations, together with the percentage deviation 
from the plant’s respective limits is available. This is a very thorough examin-
ii .
ation of the system state during each contingency and is perhaps too detailed 
for on-line use. Hence, two alternatives have been developed which progressively 
summarise the information content. One of the modifications made to PowSim was 
the introduction of geographical area recognition of the network, e.g. Scotland, 
North Wales, South West, etc ... From NGC’s “National Control” prospective, 
these areas have been enhanced to include the “Area Control Centre” regions, e.g. 
London, Bristol, Birmingham and Leeds. Thus a number of voltage alarms that
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occur during a contingency in a particular area can be summarised by “X v o ltag e  
v io la t io n s  in  th e  London a rea” . The other result presentation ignores the 
geographical regions and simplifies the alarm messages to “Y l in e  overloads”. 
This is perhaps too concise for on-line control room use but, more effort will have 
to be made to determine the extent of information that would be needed by an 
operator in formulating a set of corrective actions.
7.6 C hapter Sum m ary
This chapter has described the software implementation of a dynamic security 
assessment algorithm. The development has been split into three main parts, 
namely security analysis, stability assessment and alarm processing.
The security analysis software has been described in some detail illustrating the 
influence of fuzzy-set techniques in contingency screening and subsequent analysis 
based on a number of contingent quantities such as busbar voltage magnitudes, line 
flows, generator power outputs and MVAr injections into the network from these 
generating groups and axe classified into five linguistic variables. With the aid of 
fuzzy set notation, the membership functions of these sets can be manipulated in 
such a way as to yield the total system severity index for each contingency.
ii
Stability assessment has been developed for both transient and dynamic/steady 
state analysis. Again, an adaption of the fuzzy-set techniques has been used to 
make decisions about the system’s stability based on rotor angle, rotor acceleration 
and machine kinetic energy for the former and rotor angle amplitude of oscillation 
and interaction between machine parameters for the latter.
An essential part of a security assessment program is an alarm processor which
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handles vast quantities of system violations during contingency analysis. Three 
versions of alarm output have been developed which are printed to files together 
with the associated ranked contingency on the hard disk of the computing system 
being used.
The next chapter will describe the network modelled and the results that have 
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Figure 7.5: Membership Function (/x) vs Performance Index (PI) post-contingency
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Membership Function Description Weighting Approach for Membership Function
Linguistic Variable Parameters Constant
/ i = l
Linear 
/i =  P /
Exponential 
/i =  e5PI
Sigmoid
U -  1^ -  .L+t-pi
C  (centre) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Very Small W  (width) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
P  (peak) 1.0 0.20 0.018 0.02
C  (centre) 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0
Small W  (width) 150.0 150.0 150.0 150.0
P  (peak) 1.0 0.40 0.049 0.12
C  (centre) 500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0
Medium W  (width) 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0
P  (peak) 1.0 0.60 0.134 0.50
C  (centre) 700.0 700.0 700.0 700.0
Large W  (width) 150.0 150.0 150.0 150.0
P  (peak) 1.0 0.80 0.360 0.88
C  (centre) 900.0 900.0 900.0 900.0
Very Large W  (width) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
P  (peak) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Table 7.1: Membership Function Descriptions and Weighting Methods
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D iscussion o f R esults
8.1 In trod u ction
A number of test network models that could be run by the power system simulator 
PowSim were used to examine the performance of the fuzzy security assessor. 
These systems are : -
• A 4 machine and 6 busbar reduced model of the National Grid system.
i '
• A 20 machine and 100 busbar reduced model of the National Grid system.
• An IEEE 57 busbar test network.
• A full “reduced” National Grid system as used in loadflow and stability 
studies at the NGC.
Contingency databases for each of these networks were constructed to include all 
single and double transmission circuit outages, a combination of these, all busbar 
faults, load losses and generator group trips. Results from each of these systems 
will be described in the following sections. Comparisons are made between the 
four fuzzy-set approaches, i.e. constant, linear, exponential and sigmoid weighting 
functions and a numerical method. Two versions of this latter approach have been
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used. The exponent “n ” from Equation 2.1 has been set to 2 and 20 respectively. 
The former is to illustrate the masking effects, discussed in Section 2.4, that occur 
with a low value of n.
It should be noted at this point that there have been very few publications on 
fuzzy sets applied to contingency ranking. Of these, comparisons between the 
new methods and more traditional numerical techniques have been rather “thin” 
and, in some cases, non-existent. Therefore, in this research, the higher order 
exponent numerical algorithm has been used as the “benchmark” for the fuzzy-set 
approaches. This, as discussed previously, has been proved to be free from any 
errors.
Results are quoted with timing measurements for each security assessment ap­
proach. This measurement is taken as the time required to read in the contingency 
database, apply all the contingencies and finally print out the results to a file on 
the hard disk. These timing measurements' are for the version of the simulator 
PowSim running on the Microway Number Smasher-860 accelerator card based in 
a 386 PC. The Silicon Graphics Indigo version, produced exactly the same results 
but, with an inherent speed up of execution of approximately 2.5 times.
8.2 4 M achine and  6 B u sbar S tu d ies
1
The 4 machine and 6 busbar model was used principally as a test bed for the 
research. It is a reduction of the UK National Grid system used by Dale [168] 
and displays all the dynamic characteristics of an fully interconnected electrical 
power system. Figure 8.1 shows the schematic diagram of this network. Three 
“conventional” thermal generating groups are connected, equipped with governors 
and fast automatic voltage regulators. A “pump-storage” machine, that named as
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DINORWIG, is also included, since this shows considerably different characteristics 
to the thermal plant named as CEGB, SCOTLAND and NWALES respectively.
A contingency database was built up to include all the elements mentioned in the 
Section 8.1. Initially, prior to discussion with staff of National Grid Company 
(NGC), there were only 19 line contingencies present in the database. With the 
introduction of the approach used by the NGC in their transient stability studies, 
as described in Section 7.2.2, the number of line contingencies effectively doubled. 
This is because both local end and remote end primary tripping cases need to be 
considered. The final database shows a total of 38 line, 6 busbar, 6 load and 4 
generating group contingencies.
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 show a comparison of the results obtained from this network 
and contingency database for two scenarios. The first is a “summer night-time” 
loading condition or base case and the second is an operating state where more 
power is being transferred from the SCOTLAND generator to meet an increase in 
demand from the rest of the system (essentially England and Wales).
8.2.1 Base Case Condition
All the contingencies in the database for this study were applied using the code 
developed and described in the previous 'chapter. Results were produced in one of 
the three formats mentioned earlier, depending on the alarm processing specifica­
tions. These were written to files on hard disk for each of the security assessment 
algorithms, with the results summarised in Table 8.1.
As mentioned previously, the numerical approach (“n =  20”) is used as the bench­
mark for the other methods, which is why there are no entries in the misranking
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columns. A number of comparisons can be made from Table 8.1.
It can be seen the solution times for each of the fuzzy-set approaches are approx­
imately the same and are effectively 41% quicker than that of the benchmark. The
“n =  2” numerical method is also faster (32%) which is due to the decrease in
computation.
There were no dynamic/steady state instability violations caused by the applica­
tion of these contingencies, in this base case condition. However, 15 contingencies 
did cause transient instability. Using the geographical area specific alarm pro­
cessing output as an example, a transiently unstable contingency appears in the 
final output as : -
C o n tin g e itcy  L im it  V io la t io n s /A la r m s  S y stem  S t a b i l i t y
L in e  DEES4-CEGB4:L1 1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  ( f o r t h  W ales) T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
(Rem ote End T r ip p e d )  5 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( f o r t h  W ales)
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  (E n g la n d )
4  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( f o r t h  W ales)
1 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n  (E n g la n d )
2 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V i o l a t i o n
1 G roup HW L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( f o r t h  V a le s )
The generating group that pole-slipped in this case was DINORWIG as in Figure 
8.2. In some cases NWALES also lost synchronism with the rest of the system.
i
Compared to the benchmark, there are a number of misrankings in the “n =  2” 
approach. In the first ten ranked contingencies, three were misplaced, two of which 
were not even in this interval. This consequently affected the ranking of the first 
twenty contingencies in the final list and can be explained by the masking effect.
The fuzzy-set algorithm based on the constant weighting function, as in Figure 7.6, 
was equally as bad as this lower order numerical approach. The accuracy, as com­
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pared with the benchmark, increased with the introduction of the linear weighting 
factor. The best results were obtained from the sigmoid function, although the 
exponential approach used by Hsu et al. [41] was also reasonably valid.
It should be noted that the misrankings involved in these latter two algorithms 
were purely cases where the ranked contingencies were graded in the wrong or­
der by one place, i.e. a contingency that was ordered no. 6 in the list by the 
benchmark, was ranked no. 7 by the fuzzy-set sigmoid approach and vice versa.
8*2.2 N ew  Stressed C ondition
This additional operating condition was set up by gradually increasing the load 
on the CEGB4, NWAL4, PENT4 and DEES4 busbars. The generation from the group 
SCOTLAND was subsequently increased until an equilibrium was reached, i.e. the 
system frequency was between the NGC steady state limits of 50.2 and 49.8 Hz 
and there were no self-induced power oscillations between the largest machines in 
the network.
Table 8.2 summarises the results obtained for each security assessment algorithm, 
corresponding to this condition.
i!
W ith the increase in demand and generation, it can be seen from the table that, 
in addition to the 15 transient instability cases of the base case condition, there 
were an extra 7 contingencies that caused pole-slipping. This study was set up 
primarily to test the dynamic stability detection algorithm. The table shows that 
there were 10 cases of sustained oscillations caused by the contingencies at the 
end of the evaluation period. Some of these actually caused the system to go 
unstable, if the time domain simulation was left sufficiently long enough. Figures
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8.3 and 8.4 show two examples of oscillatory instability. The top plot is for the 
“Group NWALES” contingency which causes undamped and sustained oscillations 
for group SCOTLAND. The lower plot shows hows the oscillations build up from 
NWALES which ultimately sent the system unstable for the line contingency “Line 
CEGB4-NWAL4:L1”. Again, if the summarising alarm processing output is used, 
the presentation looks similar to the transient instability cases, i.e.
C o n tin g e n c y  L im it  V io la t io n s /A la r m s  S ystem  S t a b i l i t y
B u sb a r  CEGB4 2 G roups u i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  ( l o r t h  V a le s )  Dynamic I n s t a b i l i t y  
6 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( f o r t h  V a le s )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  (E n g la n d )
4 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( f o r t h  V a le s )
1 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n  (E n g la n d )
2 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V i o l a t i o n
2 G roup HV L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  ( f o r t h  V a le s )
2 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  ( f o r t h  V a le s )
The speed up produced by the fuzzy-set approaches shows a 38% increase com­
pared to the benchmark. The “n =  2” numerical method was also quicker by 31%, 
for the same reasons mentioned in the base case study.
As before, the lower order numerical algorithm also fell down on the contingency 
rankings for this condition. A total of 13 misrankings was observed, compared 
with that of the benchmark, 7 of which were in the first ten places. Again the ac­
curacy of the fuzzy-set approaches increases moving down Table 8.2. The sigmoid 
weighting function method, in particular, displays only three rankings that were 
out by one place in the list.
Dynamic instability cases were ranked by the “sigmoid fuzzy-set” method and “n =  
20” algorithms in Table 8.2 directly below the transiently unstable contingencies. 
Most of the misrankings from the other fuzzy-set approaches and the “n =  2” 
method were, in part, due to the fact that conditions where sustained or increasing
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oscillations were present, were not always highlighted with as much importance. 
This is mainly because of the lack of a suitable weighting function for the first 
fuzzy set approaches, in Table 8.2, and the masking effect for the lower order 
numerical method.
8.3 20 M achine and 100 B usbar S tu d ies
The 100 busbar network shown in Figure 8.5 is an enlargement of the 60 busbar 
model used by Berry [169] which was reduced from a much larger scale system 
study. This full system consisted of 686 nodes, 30 of which were connected with 
active generation and 5 pumped-storage sites, and 1642 lines, of which 644 were 
shunt reactors. A static reduction program RACE01 [186] was used to reduce this 
system to 60 nodes, with 20 of these as active generation and/or motoring loads, 
and 182 lines with 9 shunts. This reduction was later modified to incorporate more 
interconnecting nodes in the south east of England and the south of Scotland, as in 
the real UK high voltage transmission system. The same’ number of machines have 
been used which include two pump-storage machines in North Wales, Dinorwig 
and Ffestiniog, as well as hydro-electric generators in Scotland.
The contingency database for this study was, again, built up to include all single,
double and triple circuit line outages, busbar faults, load and generation losses.
.1
NGC also gave advice on additional combinations of contingencies which could 
cause transient, dynamic and/or voltage problems in this reduced network. These 
include major tie-lines between Scotland and England, the main transmission 
routes from the generation rich north and the load affluent south, as well as inter- 
area tie-lies in the south. This results in a database that contains 634 line, 100 
busbar, 100 load and 20 generator group contingencies.
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As for the 4 machine and 6 busbar study, two scenarios were set up for a base 
case condition (summer night-time loading) with a power transfer from Scotland 
to England of 500 MW and an increased power transfer of approximately 920 MW 
from the Scottish network to meet demand in the south east of England.
8.3.1 Base Case C ondition
Table 8.3 shows the comparison of results between the different security assessment 
algorithms corresponding to this operating condition.
Out of the total 854 contingencies, 721 passed through the system alarm and 
stability violation detection filter and ranked according to their relative severities. 
It can be seen from Table 8.3 that there is an increase in computational speed for 
both the numerical “n =  2” method (28%) and fuzzy-set approaches (44%). The 
increases for both of these axe approximately the same as those recorded for the 4 
machine and 6 busbax study. The “n =  2” method has decreased slightly, whilst 
the fuzzy-set algorithms have actually increased. This is possibly due to the fact 
that with the extra data coming from the simulator, the processing power needed 
for numerical calculation would be much greater than the fuzzy-set classification 
method.
22 contingencies were highlighted by all tlie algorithms to be transiently unstable, 
with no dynamic stability problems detected. All the cases that were unstable 
were run off-line on the simulator to verify the results.
Again misrankings are evident, when compaxing the two numerical approaches. 
As for the smaller study, not all transiently unstable cases are ranked at the top of 
the list by the lower order algorithm. This is also true for the fuzzy-set approaches
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high in Table 8.3. Those methods, i.e. exponential and sigmoid functions, that are 
heavily weighted to the Medium/Large to Very Large regions very closely resemble 
the results produced by the benchmark.
As mentioned previously, the only misrankings that are present between the sig­
moid fuzzy-set method and the benchmark are out by one place in the final ranked 
list of contingencies.
8.3.2 N ew  Stressed Condition
As for the 4 machine and 6 busbar study, an additional scenario was set up to de­
tect any dynamic instabilities that may occur during the analysis of a contingency. 
Again the load was increased in the southern half of the English network, with the 
demand met by the Scottish generators. This was facilitated by decreasing the 
load on the hydro-electric machines, i.e. effectively taking them out of “motoring” 
'mode. A stable condition was finally met where any further increase in power 
transfer from Scotland to England would set up oscillatory instability in both 
interconnected areas.
Table 8.4 shows a comparison of the results for each of the security assessment 
algorithms. As for the smaller reduced model, a number of contingencies that 
caused dynamic instability were highlighted. Most of these were, in fact, the 
cases suggested by the NGC, that for a suitable loading condition, could result 
in dynamic instability. There was also a corresponding increase in the number of 
transiently unstable contingencies. This is due to this new operating condition 
which stresses the power network far more than the base case study. Generating 
groups are naturally nearer to their respective stability limits and, hence, the 
tendency for them to pole-slip is correspondingly higher. A large percentage
143
of these transiently unstable cases showed dynamic instability properties. This 
means that power oscillations that built up, from the start of the contingency, 
sent the system unstable shortly after the analysis time period had elapsed. It 
was considered that this was more of a transient problem than a dynamic one and, 
hence these contingencies were classified as transiently unstable.
Again, as for the previous study, the pump storage machines, Dinorwig and Ffest­
iniog, were the predominant groups to go transiently unstable. This was also true 
for the hydro-electric machines in Scotland. The reason for this can be explained 
by the presence of fast automatic voltage regulators (for those in North Wales) and 
slower a.v.r.’s (for those in Scotland) which try to effectively control the terminal 
voltages of machines with approximately half the inertia of conventional thermal 
generation plant. Even though the pump-storage machines were most prone to 
transient instability, it was the thermal generation plant that was the most liable to 
display oscillatory instability during certain contingencies. A comparison between 
the tWo operating conditions, i.e. the base case and this more stressed operating 
condition for a group contingency, where group HINKLEY is tripped, is shown in 
Figures 8.6 and 8.7 respectively. The lower plot shows power oscillations building 
up over the 60 second evaluation period, which would eventually send the system 
transiently unstable.
The solution times for the fuzzy-set approaches were approximately the same, 
displaying a 40% computational speed increase compared to the benchmark. As 
mentioned previously, the accuracy of these methods increases with a “heavier” 
weighting function, with only a few misrankings between the sigmoid approach and 
the “n =  20” numerical algorithm. The “n =  2” method was the least accurate, 
with a number of cases highlighted by the benchmark in the first ten of the final 
ranked list which did not appear in the corresponding interval for the lower order
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algorithm. This happens for the same reasons mentioned before in Section 8.2.2.
Appendix A shows a typical contingency database used for security analysis on 
the 20 machine and 100 busbar model network. This database contains 8 line 
(4 single and 4 double circuit outages), 6 busbar, 6 load and 6 generator group 
contingencies.
Tables A.l and A.2, in Appendix A, show comparisons between the results ob­
tained for the two scenarios described in this section, i.e. the base case and the 
new stressed condition. These tables axe a summary of the results themselves 
and a illustration of the differences that were observed in the final ranked list of 
contingencies for the two scenarios, respectively.
Typical outputs for these two scenaxios are shown in Appendices B and C respect­
ively. These show the format for the three alaxm processing files for this example 
contingency database.
8.4  IEEE 57 B u sb ar S tu d ies
A network was set up based on an IEEE standard test system which is used 
primarily for load flow studies [187]. This was modified, to effectively remove the 
slack busbar and to include seven machines, four of which were treated as thermal 
generation plant, with the rest acting as synchronous compensators. Figure 8.8 
shows the schematic layout of this network. The model was also modified to 
include a number of double transmission circuits as in the AEP 57 busbar test 
system, so that a more realistic contingency analysis could be carried out. The 
database was constructed for this study and included 194 line, 57 busbar, 57 load 
and 7 generator group contingencies.
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Table 8.5 shows the results obtained for each security assessment algorithm. As for 
the two previous study cases, it can be seen that there is a considerable speed up 
advantage that can be gained from using the fuzzy-set methods (approximately 
50%). An equally high speed up was also achieved by the “n =  2” numerical 
method (43%) as compared to the benchmark. However, a corresponding loss in 
accuracy was suffered, as mentioned earlier. This speed up is greater than either 
of those of the previous studies, since the operating condition for this network is 
relatively unstressed compared to the base case conditions of the 4 machine and 
6 busbar and 20 machine and 100 busbar models. This has the effect of reducing 
the computational demand required for machine and network calculations, i.e. less 
time is needed to reach convergence for each of the equation calculations.
Interestingly, the fuzzy-set approach with a constant weighting factor, i.e. // =  1 
for all linguistic variables, is actually worse that the lower order numerical method. 
It shows four misrankings out of the first ten contingencies in the ordered list. Once 
again, the accuracy of the fuzzy-set algorithms increases moving down Table 8.5.
8.5 N G C  N etw ork  S tu d ies
A copy of the network parameters used by NGC in their loadflow (OPFL02) and
stability (RASM06) studies was modified so that PowSim could run. This full
‘1
system consists of : -
1. 718 busbars
(a) 588 load nodes (England and Wales)
(b) 37 load nodes (Scotland)
(c) 93 generator nodes
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2. 1464 lines
(a) 1141 transmission lines and transformers
(b) 323 shunt reactors
3. 93 generating groups
(a) 88 (England and Wales) including 2 pump-storage schemes
(b) 5 (Scotland)
The study was based around predicted conditions for the late summer/early au­
tumn period of this year (1994). Figure 8.9 shows the connection diagram of this 
system. Those lines and boxes (busbars) that axe blue correspond to 400KV and 
those that axe black are rated at 275KV. The lines and transformers that have 
been crossed out in red axe items of plant that have been taken out for maintenance 
and axe, hence, pre-contingency outages.
f
In off-line studies at National Grid House (NGH), Coventry, the load flow program 
OPFL02 [174] was used to determine the final operating state of this system for 
a number of double transmission circuit outages. Fifty of these were chosen by 
experienced staff and the load flow run. From this, for each case, the stability
program RASM06 [188] was used to calculate and print the final output plot for a
/
set of user defined variables. In this studies, machine rotor angle (in degrees) and 
real power generated (in MW) for four machines distributed around the system 
were used. A “look-up” table is required by RASM06 to determine the switching 
sequence and protection operation times to remove each of the fifty double cir­
cuit outages from the network. This is, in essence, very similar to the switching 
sequences used for line contingency analysis, as explained in Section 7.2.2. Plots 
for both local end and remote end primary tripping for each of the double circuit
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outages were obtained. These were then visually ranked according to their relative 
degrees of severity.
This full system, as mentioned earlier, was modified to a format which PowSim 
could use as its initial start-up file. The contingency database that was built up, 
consisted purely of these 50 double circuit outages for both local and remote end 
tripping, giving a total of 100 line contingencies. Table 8.6 shows the comparison 
of the results for each of the security assessment algorithms. During contingency 
analysis, as for the off-line studies carried out at NGH, there were no cases high­
lighted which were transiently unstable. The performance of the benchmark, “n =  
20” numerical algorithm, corresponded almost exactly to the “visual” ranking. 
The trend shown by the previous study cases indicates, again, that the accuracy 
of the fuzzy-set approaches increase as one moves down Table 8.6.
8.6 C hapter Sum m ary
t i
In this chapter, results have been presented for a number of test systems, displaying 
the errors that become apparent for different security assessment algorithms.
A numerical approach, with an exponent equal to 20, has been used as the bench­
mark for the other methods. The main “error producer” was that of the lower
.  J
order numerical algorithm (un =  2”) with a number of misrankings occurring in 
the top twenty of the final ordered list of contingencies for each study case. This 
problem was due to the “masking effect” that has been described in Chapter 2.
The fuzzy-set approach with no weighting factor (fj, =  1 for all linguistic variables) 
showed that the number of misrankings that were obtained when compared with 
the benchmark, made it an impractical method for on-line use. This accuracy,
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however, increased with more “severe” weighting factors, with the sigmoid function 
as the best.
The advantages of using such a fuzzy-set based approach are apparent, since the 
accuracy of results is comparable to a high order numerical algorithm but with a 
considerable speed-up in execution times.
The parameters listed in Table 7.1 still need to be fine tuned by an operator or 
other experienced staff to obtain the exact results required. Although, initial “trial 
and error” values have been used, the final output, particularly for the full NGC 
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Figure 8.2: Plot of Group DINORWIG Rotor Angle during WDEES4-CEGB4:L1” con­
tingency (Base Case Condition)
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Security Assessment No. of Misrankings No. of Stability Cases Solution Time
Algorithm 1st Ten Ist Twenty Transient Dynamic in minutes
Numerical
( n =  2)
3 9 11 0 0.68
Numerical 
(n = 20)
- - 11 0 0.82
Fuzzy-Set
(Constant)
2 8 11 0 0.62
Fuzzy-Set
(Linear)
1 7 11 0 0.61
Fuzzy-Set
(Exponential)
1 4 11 0 0.61
Fuzzy-Set 
(Sigmoid)
0 2 11 0 0.60
Table 8.1: Results for 4 Machine - 6 Busbar Network (Base Case Condition)
Security Assessment No. of Misrankings No. of Stability Cases Solution Time
Algorithm Ist Ten Ist Twenty Transient Dynamic in minutes
Numerical 
(n =  2)
7 13 17 11 2.33
Numerical 
(n =  20)








4 8 17 11 2.13
Fuzzy-Set 
(Exponential)
3 7 17 11 2.12
Fuzzy-Set 
(Sigmoid)
1 3 17 11 2.11
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Figure 8.5: 20 machine and 100 busbar reduced study model of the NGC system
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Security Assessment No. of Misrankings No. of Stability Cases Solution Time
Algorithm Ist Ten 1st Twenty Transient Dynamic in minutes
Numerical 
(n =  2)
7 13 22 . o 92.68
Numerical 
(n =  20)
- - 22 0 128.26
Fuzzy-Set
(Constant)
5 11 22 0 72.16
Fuzzy-Set 
(Linear)
5 9 22 0 72.15
Fuzzy-Set
(Exponential)
2 6 22 0 72.17
Fuzzy-Set 
(Sigmoid)
2 3 22 0 72.13
Table 8.3: Results for 20 Machine - 100 Busbar Network (Base Case Condition)
Security Assessment No. of Misrankings No. of Stability Cases Solution Time
Algorithm 1“  Ten 1st Twenty Transient Dynaipic in minutes
Numerical 
(n =  2)
8 15 563 9 193.4
Numerical 
(n =  20)
- - 563 9 270.48
Fuzzy-Set 
(Constant)
7 12 563 9 153.37
Fuzzy-Set
(Linear)
5 11 563 9 153.35
Fuzzy-Set
(Exponential)
4 8 563 9 153.33
Fuzzy-Set
(Sigmoid)
3 5 563 9 153.33
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Figure 8.6: Plot of Group COTTAM Rotor Angle during “Group HINKLEY” contin­
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Figure 8.7: Plot of Group COTTAM Rotor Angle during “Group HINKLEY” contin­
gency (Stressed Condition)
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Figure 8.8: IEEE 57 busbar test network
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Security Assessment No. of Misrankings No. of Stability Cases Solution Time
Algorithm 1st Ten l 5t Twenty Transient Dynamic in minutes
Numerical
( n = 2 )
2 7 0 0 10.93
Numerical 
(n =  20)
- - 0 0 19.06
Fuzzy-Set
(Constant)
4 7 0 0 9.6
Fuzzy-Setl
(Linear)
2 6 0 0 9.5
Fuzzy-Set 
(Exponential)
1 4 0 0 9.5
Fuzzy-Set
(Sigmoid)
1 3 0 0 9.6
Table 8.5: Results for IEEE 57 Bus Network
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Figure 8.9: NGC system used for OPFL02 and RASM06 studies
Security Assessment No. of Misrankings No. of Stability Cases Solution Time
Algorithm 1st Ten 1st Twenty Transient Dynamic in minutes
Numerical 
(« =  2)
7 15 0 0 57.85
Numerical 
(n =  20)
- - 0 0 72.36
Fuzzy-Set
(Constant)
4 9 0 0 42.89
Fuzzy-Set 
(Linear)
3 6 0 0 42.90
Fuzzy-Set
(Exponential)
1 3 0 0 42.86
Fuzzy-Set
(Sigmoid)
0 2 0 0 42.81




A new security assessment algorithm has been applied to a pre-existing real-time 
electro-mechanical power system simulator at the University of Bath. This has 
required a number of modifications to be made to this simulator in order to ac­
curately model the impact of credible disturbances on several test networks. An 
artificial intelligence technique has been used for contingency analysis, stability 
assessment and any alarm processing that may be required during these disturb­
ances. The results of this research axe now being used with a subsequent research 
project into dynamic security assessment.
An expert system approach based on fuzzy set notation has been employed for 
this research. This has the distinct advantage of allowing a “pseudo” operator 
to make judgemental decisions on the operating condition of the power system 
during each contingency analysis period.
: |
Two different computer hardware platforms have been used for the development 
of this research. These are namely a Microway Number Smasher-860 accelerator 
card based in a 33MHz IBM PC/AT-386 clone and a Silicon Graphics INDIGO 
with a 100MHz R4000 RISC processor. Results for both of these architectures 
are the same, although, as expected, the former was, on average, 2.5 times slower 
than the latter per contingency evaluation.
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A number of different sized study networks were used to test the algorithms de­
veloped during the period of this research. A 4 machine and 6 busbar model was 
used as the development base for this work, since this is a reduction of a full NGC 
network study and includes a pump-storage generation site, as well as the more 
conventional thermal plant. A “larger” reduced model containing 20 machines 
and 100 network nodes was also used as a test bed. Naturally, the number of 
possible contingencies increased which showed a variety of stability problems. 
Two scenarios were set up for both of these studies, involving a base case and 
a more stressed condition, which led to more transient and dynamic/steady state 
stability violations. These will be described further in this chapter in a later 
section. The algorithm was also applied to the internationally recognised IEEE 
57 busbar test network. This contains 7 generating groups, 3 of which act as 
synchronous compensators. This network was modified slightly to the American 
Electric Power Corporation (AEP) standard to include a number of double trans­
mission circuits. The last system model to be used, was that employed by National 
Grid Company (NGC) in their load flow and stability assessment studies. This I 
contains 93 generators and 718 network nodes, ranging from 400KV to 66KV. A 
number of double transmission circuit outages were highlighted by off-line studies 
at NGC. These were tested by the fuzzy security assessor at the University of Bath 
and ranked effectively equal to the NGC results.
9.1 C on tin gen cy  A n alysis
Code was developed and incorporated into the main body of the simulator PowSim 
in order to read a contingency database and apply and evaluate each of the dis­
turbances in this database.
The contingency database for each of the networks, mentioned above, included
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single, double and triple transmission circuit outages, 3-phase busbar faults, net­
work load and group generation losses for all lines, busbars and groups in the 
system model. Each database defines the screening and analysis periods for con­
tingency evaluation, as well as an additional time interval for dynamic stability 
assessment. The fault duration for the 3-phase busbar loss is also included and 
can be specified by the user in the database. Loss of load and generation were 
handled by simply removing the sink or source, respectively, from the network. 
Line contingencies were more complicated and involved applying faults of different 
durations to the sending and receiving ends of the line (depending on which end 
is to tripped first) and manipulating the fault impedances to ground on each end 
node during these durations to mimic, in essence, a form of distance protection.
Once all the contingencies have been applied, additional code was used to order 
each of them in a ranked list according to their relative severities, i.e. with the 
most severe at the top. Performance indices were produced by fuzzy set based 
evaluations on busbar voltage magnitudes, line MVA flows, generator group MVA 
outputs and reactive power injections from these groups into the network. Each 
of these quantities calculated by the main loop of PowSim, was normalised with 
respect to its appropriate rating, for all the lines, busbars and groups in the model 
network, and categorised into one of a number of fuzzy sets or linguistic variables, 
according to user-defined limits, for each contingency.
i
During the development of this contingency analysis algorithm, numerous fuzzy 
set classifications were used, ranging from three to ten. The former proved to be 
computationally less demanding than the latter, although a significant decrease 
in accuracy was observed. In previous work [20,21,41], five fuzzy linguistic de­
scriptions have been used, which, for this research, also proved adequate. This was 
because the accuracy was comparable to the higher order fuzzy set method without
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the calculation overhead required to consequently evaluate ten linguistic variables. 
As in [41], a triangular membership function representation of these fuzzy sets 
was used. Although other representations have been previously devised, such as 
normal distribution curves and trapezium approaches, the triangular method is a 
good approximation to these and has the added advantage of less computational 
demand for the final defuzzification procedure.
Several weighting functions were implemented which bias this representation of the 
membership function. Results have been presented for four weighting functions. 
These are namely constant, linear, exponential [41] and sigmoid. More emphasis 
is, hence, placed on the middle to high range of the linguistic variables. This 
was because the effect of contingent quantities falling into this region is of more 
significant interest than that of the low to middle range.
At the end of each simulation time step, fuzzy set manipulations were used, namely 
the sum-product rule, in order to calculate the overall system performance index 
per contingency for each of the quantities mentioned above. This means that when 
more than one contingent quantity fell into a particular fuzzy set, the membership 
function of that set would be modified to illustrate this. At the end of each time 
step the profile of the membership functions were no longer defined by their initial 
weighting functions and looked more hap-hazard. The area under each of the 
linguistic variables was calculated to give the total area under all of the triangles. 
Via a binary search method, the centre of gravity of this area was determined 
which yielded the total system performance index for that contingent quantity. 
These were summed together for all quantities analysed to give the total system 
severity index for that particular contingency.
Two numerical approaches were also used, again with different “weightings” to
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show the effect of masking errors. A high order numerical performance index 
algorithm was employed as the “benchmark” for the other approaches, since this 
has been proved to be effectively 100% accurate. As the weighting function of 
the fuzzy set methods became more pronounced, so the accuracy of the solution 
increased, until a level was reached, as with the sigmoid function, where very few 
differences were observed between it and the benchmark. Although the solution 
times per contingency evaluation for the fuzzy set methods and the lower order 
numerical algorithm were comparable for small systems, the speed-up advantage 
that can be achieved for larger networks as compared to the benchmark was con­
siderable and, was, on average, approximately 40% for the fuzzy set approaches. 
This was due to the relative lack of mathematical calculation needed to evaluate 
each contingency when compared to the benchmark.
9.2 S tab ility  A ssessm en t
'During the application of the contingency database for the network models, men­
tioned previously, the simulator showed a number of stability violations. These 
included both transient and dynamic/steady state effects.
Transient instabilities were detected by a fuzzy algorithm which, as for the con­
tingency analysis code, categorised a number of quantities during a contingency
it
application into one of four fuzzy sets. The quantities, in this case, were machine 
rotor angle, kinetic energy and rotor acceleration.
A numerical approach was also employed which simply monitored the time domain 
solution. This latter method was used as a benchmark for the new fuzzy algorithm.
There were no misclassifications by the new approach when compared to this
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benchmark, which showed a 25% computational speed-up advantage. This was 
because, once potential instability had been detected by the fuzzy algorithm, 
subsequent contingency analysis was stopped for any further evaluation. This 
was also true for the time domain solution method but, since this approach is 
not very good at predicting instability, the solution had to wait for a pole-slip to 
actually occur.
From the results obtained for the two reduced study networks, i.e. the 4 machine 
and 6 busbax and the 20 machine and 100 busbar models respectively, it was 
observed that the number of transiently unstable contingencies increased signific­
antly from the base case to the new stressed condition. This is, of course, quite 
understandable. However, in these circumstances, the time domain solution took 
appreciably longer to detect transient instability. This was because, for most of 
these cases, oscillations built up over a few seconds in a “dynamic stability” mode. 
The fuzzy algorithm detected these within a second, displaying a 52% speed-up 
advantage over the benchmark.
During these stressed conditions, a number of dynamic instability cases were 
highlighted. Again a fuzzy algorithm was used, which categorised machine rotor 
oscillations according to their amplitude against a threshold value into one of 
three fuzzy sets. A time domain solution was used as the benchmark for this new 
approach.
As before, there were no misclassifications by the fuzzy method with an approx­
imate 10% computational speed-up calculated. It was interesting to observe that 
some of these dynamically unstable contingencies were either sustained rotor os­
cillations or the amplitude of these oscillations grew over the steady state stability 
analysis period specified by the user in the contingency database. The latter
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conditions either reached a level and remained sustained at this consistent position 
or continued to increase until synchronism was lost from the rest of the system. 
This type of solution was preferred over the more traditional eigenvalue analysis, 
since for larger systems, the fuzzy approach has proved to be computationally less 
demanding.
9.3 A larm  P ro cessin g
Although there was no computational speed-up advantages that could be gained 
from the addition of an alarm processor, it was thought that a list of network 
alarms for each contingency would be useful for an operator to track the system 
state during the disturbance period. Hence an alarm handling algorithm was 
developed to help reduce the amount of information that the user would otherwise 
have to process.
It can be seen from Appendices B and C at the end of this thesis that the full 
alarm list for a single stable contingency can flow onto a number of pages. This 
is just emphasised by a  contingency which is transiently or dynamically unstable.
Two reductions were, therefore, introduced. The first is a general summary listing
the number of alarms that were detected around the network and grouped into
• ?
categories for each contingency. The second is, essentially, very similar, except that 
the number of alarms are grouped in the particular geographical area in which they 
occurred. These summaries, however, ultimately depend on what information the 
operator would need to formulate a set of corrective and/or preventative actions 
to alleviate some of the more serious problems.
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Future developments of this research include modifications to network load repres­
entations, protection modelling and a more detailed and refined dynamic stability 
detection algorithm. Coupled to these, a monitor for voltage stability and prox­
imity to voltage collapse indicator could be developed, as well as a user friendly 
man-machine interface. The speed-up advantages have been highlighted for a 
fuzzy-set method over a numerical based algorithm, without a detrimental effect 
on accuracy (or the simulator PowSim falling out of real-time). However, with 
the introduction of the distributed parallel processing architecture, mentioned in 
Section 6.4, analysis of the database for the 20 machine and 100 busbar model, for 
example, should take considerably less time. The next chapter will discuss these 




Suggestions for Further Work
10.1 P ro tec tio n  M od ellin g
Although a protection scheme has been added to the simulator PowSim,' it is 
very simplistic in its approach. The way in which the relay and circuit breaker 
operations have been modelled is, in essence, crude and involves simply removing 
the line from the network topology. Overcurrent protection systems are widely 
used in distribution networks and as a back-up in transmission systems, even 
though the latter is gradually being phased out. This basic approach is;often 
applied to generators, transformers and feeders. Theoretically, the fundamental 
drawback of this type of scheme is that for correct fault discrimination to be 
obtained, the times of operation close to a supply point can become large.
The short-comings of graded overcurrent relay protection has led, in reality, to
ti
the widespread use of distance protection [189]. With the rapid development of 
interconnected high voltage power systems to ensure continuity of supply and 
good voltage regulation, the problems of combining fast fault clearance times with 
power system control have been the areas of many years of research. The final 
solution is based on the distance between any point on the line and the fault is 
proportional to the ratio of voltage and current at that point. The protection 
relays that axe responsive to impedance, reactance or admittance (based on the
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widely published mho characteristics) are often used. Distance protection, when 
considered as a non-unit scheme (effectively standalone) is of the' high speed class 
and provides both primary and back-up facilities in a single system. It can be 
modified to a unit scheme (with the use of a signalling channel) and is suited for 
high speed auto-reclosing for the protection of important transmission lines.
Much of the ground work has been established with the introduction of the “new” 
line contingency application routine. Modelling the mho circle characteristic for 
the protection relays will require additional research. It can, hence, be used to 
establish the new operating state and topology of the system model after critical 
contingencies.
10.2 Load M od ellin g
As discussed in Chapter 3, voltage stability is becoming of increasing importance 
and can be influenced by a number of factors such as Aetwork disturbances, the 
effect of load tap changing transformers and load characteristics at low voltages.
At present, substation loads are modelled by PowSim as constant impedances, 
which are effectively a composite load consisting of industrial and domestic con­
sumers. In reality, this composition includes induction and synchronous motors, 
lighting and heating [79]. Lighting and heating can be labelled as static, since the 
former is independent of frequency and consumes no reactive power, whilst the 
latter maintains constant resistance with respect to voltage change. The power 
consumed by synchronous motors is approximately constant, where for a given 
excitation, VArs change in a leading direction with a reduction in voltage. Mod­
elling of P-V and Q-V characteristics for both synchronous and induction motors 
were developed by Stagg [171].
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The real world P-V and Q-V characteristics of these complete composite loads are 
of primary interest and very few results have been published. This is, of course, 
due to consumer objection to such tests being carried out and the difficulty in 
determining the degree to which motors are loaded. This, in essence, affects the 
shape of the resultant P-V and Q-V characteristics. It has been suggested that a 
good approximation is to represent the load as a constant current device for voltage 
stability studies. It should also be noted that voltage changes often occur with 
a change in system frequency, so that frequency dependent load characteristics 
should also be modelled in the future.
10.3 T ransform ers and  FA C TS D ev ices
In addition to the modifications to the modelling of loads, the effect of load tap 
changing transformers, LTC’s, could also be taken into account. PowSim repres­
ents both generator and line transformers as devices which typically are set at the 
nominal tap position of 1 p.u. These haVe to be altered manually on-line by the 
user before any change takes place.
Most of the transformers on the U.K. National Grid system have automatic tap 
changers. These incremently tap up or down with respect to voltage and frequency 
within a specified set of limits. A typical range is from 0.8 to 1.2 p.u. with 20 
taps existing within these limits. For an accurate simulation of how a power 
system would theoretically behave during network disturbance conditions, these 
load tap changing transformers should be modelled and incorporated as part of 
the simulator PowSim.
Once these transformers have reached their respective upper or lower tap limits, 
naturally no further change can take place. This, as discussed by the literature
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in Section 3.2.4, is another of the important introductions that would need to 
be made for voltage stability studies. Of course, this naturally has a beneficial 
knock-on effect for transient and dynamic/steady state stability analyses during 
contingency evaluation.
The National Grid system also incorporates a number of voltage control devices. 
These include quadrature boosters and complex static voltage compensators or 
SVC’s. The area of flexible a.c. transmission semi-conductor schemes (FACTS) 
is also becoming of increasing interest which may, in future, be used to control 
the devices mentioned above. Therefore, in order to keep up with these new 
techniques, models may have to be developed.
10.4 S tab ility  D e tec tio n  A lgorith m s
Coupled with the two previous sections are the extensions to dynamic and voltage 
' stability analysis algorithms. At present, a crude fuzzy set approach based on a 
time domain solution has been used for the former. Eigenvalue analysis has been 
found to be time consuming for large systems. There is an added disadvantage that 
some networks, particularly the reduced systems, have complex eigenvalues very 
near to the “imaginary” axis in the steady state operating condition. This can, of
course, give a false, albeit conservative, estimate of the system stability. The fuzzy
, )
set method has proved to be less computationally expensive, although a quicker 
solution should be sought. Work is already progressing using an enhancement to 
the NGC’s time constant method [190].
With the introduction of voltage and frequency dependent loads and automatic 
tap changing transformers, a new avenue is opened for voltage stability studies. 
Cascaded tripping during a network disturbance, using the improved protection
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algorithm, could lead to system islanding or even total system collapse. Hence 
a voltage stability monitor could be developed, which estimates the proximity 
to voltage collapse. This could be incorporated as part of the on-line security 
assessor.
10.5 Fuzzy Set E n h an cem en ts
As discussed in Chapter 7, the fuzzy set membership function representation of 
the five linguistic variables Very Small, Small, Medium, Large and Very Large 
was based around a triangular form. Although this is a good approximation to 
a normal distribution curve, obvious assumptions have been made. Parameters 
describing a curve such as this, could be determined to ascertain whether the 
triangular form is too approximate.
In Chapter 8, results were presented for four different weighting functions of these 
membership function representations. The sigmoid approach proved to be the 
most accurate when compared to the benchmark. Fine tuning of the parameters 
for these representations could be made to enhance the results from the con­
tingency ranking to either directly mimic the benchmark or the operator’s in­
tuition/experience. Although the width parameter of the medium triangle, for 
example, was enlarged, the noticeable differences were negligible. However, by
■ i
moving the peak values up or down the sigmoid profile could yield more prominent 
results.
A more efficient algorithm could be developed for the defuzzification procedure 
to give the over all system performance index for each contingent quantity. The 
binary search method to determine the centre of gravity is accurate, even though it 
can be computationally expensive, depending on the size and operating condition
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of the network.
Static quantities based on busbar voltage magnitudes, line MVA flows, generator 
group MVA outputs and MVAr injections have been used as the input variables 
to the contingency analysis routines. Rates of change of these quantities could 
be used as additional inputs, although this would ultimately be memory intensive 
(storage of previous values with respect to time). Other variables could also be 
used such as the MVA flows across critical boundaries. For example, National 
Grid Company have a set of import and export interface flows, such as the north 
to south flow limits. These are, however, specific to the particular network being 
modelled.
10.6 P aralle l V ersions
This research has been carried out a single processor. This was fine as a de­
velopment tool but, for large system models and hence contingency databases, 
obvious drawbacks were observed. A new computing architecture has recently 
been developed and installed in the laboratory at the University of Bath which 
acts as a distributed processing network, as described in Section 6.4.
Work has already started on research into a dynamic security assessor, where 
analytical and numeric techniques have been used to assess the security of the 
20 machine and 100 busbar system model when subjected to 854 contingencies. 
These were transiently analysed in a period of approximately 5 minutes. The 
Silicon Graphics INDIGO acted as a network server with two IBM PC/AT 486 
clones as additional “workers”. This cannot really be compared to the timing 
results obtained for this research, since dynamic instability was not catered for.
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It would be interesting to modify the code so that the fuzzy set approaches to 
contingency analysis and stability assessment could be implemented to ascertain 
how quickly the results could be produced.
10.7 M an-M achine Interface
Although previous research has been conducted into providing a user-friendly 
graphics interface between the operator and the simulator [175], no further work 
has been done in this area. The results from the fuzzy set work has revealed 
that the output of the security assessor would certainly benefit from such a man- 
machine interface. X Windows has the capability to display, through a mouse- 
driven menu system, all three of the alarm specific output files. These are, at 
present, written to the hardware’s hard disk.
An extension to the interface set up by Ng [175] would be useful when applying 
specific contingencies which are relevant to the particular system operating con­
dition. At present, a number of command lines would need to be typed at the 
simulator’s interactive prompt. This would be a little time consuming depending 
on whether the operator was under pressure or how many contingencies were to 
be analysed.
As with all graphics interfaces, a mouse driven method would have to be kept 
clear, concise and almost simplistic in its design. A trade-off would otherwise be 
needed, since the operator may in fact spend more time setting up the specific 
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A ppendix A  
20 M achine and 100 Busbar 
R esults
A .l  C on tingen cy  D atab ase
* Exam ple C o n tin g e n c y  L i s t  f o r  m 20bl00  s tu d y
*
* 4  d o u b le  t r a n s m is s io n  l i n e  c i r c u i t  o u ta g e s
* 4  s i n g l e  t r a n s m is s io n  l i n e  c i r c u i t  o u ta g e s
* 6 3 -p h a s e  b u s b a r  f a u l t s
* 6 n e tu o r k  lo a d  l o s s e s
* 6 g e n e r a to r  g ro u p  t r i p s
* 26 c o n t in g e n c ie s  i n  t o t a l
*  i
c o n tg  s t a r t
* D ouble L in e  O u tag es
c o n tg  l i n e  STEW2J-ECCL2Q:L1 s i d e  l o c a l  
c o n tg  and  l i n e  C0CK2-STEW2J:L1 s i d e  l o c a l
. I
c o n tg  l i n e  DEES4-PEIT4: L2 s i d e  re m o te  
c o n tg  and  l i n e  DEES4-PEIT4:L1 s i d e  re m o te
c o n tg  l i n e  I0RT4R-0SBA4Q:L1 s i d e  rem o te  
c o n tg  and  l i n e  ■0RT4R-HAUP2: LI s i d e  re m o te
c o n tg  l i n e  KIBY2-HEYS4:L1 s i d e  rem o te  
c o n tg  and l i n e  FIDF2J-HEYS4:L1 s i d e  re m o te
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* Single Line Outages
c o n tg  line_CRUA2Q-WIYH2:L1 s i d e  l o c a l  
c o n tg  l i n e  BRLE4-UUEY2K:L1 s i d e  l o c a l  
c o n tg  l i n e  IIDQ4-TAUI4Q:L1 s i d e  re m o te  
c o n tg  l i n e  EGGB4J-PEW04:L1 s i d e  re m o te
* B u sb a r  F a u l t s
c o n tg  b b a r  EGGB4J 
c o n tg  b b a r  UBUR4 
c o n tg  b b a r  DRAK4 
c o n tg  b b a r  SUID4 
c o n tg  b b a r  MELK4 
c o n tg  b b a r  KIVC2
* Load L o sse s
c o n tg  lo a d  DRAX4J 
c o n tg  lo a d  FIDF2J 
c o n tg  lo a d  HUER4 
c o n tg  lo a d  PELH4 
c o n tg  l o a d  VALH4 
c o n tg  l o a d  IR 0I4
* G roup T r ip s
c o n tg  g ro u p  VYLFA 
c o n tg  g ro u p  HIIKLEY 
c o n tg  g ro u p  DRAX.B 
c o n tg  g ro u p  DUIGERESS
c o n tg  g ro u p  LOKGAIIET I
c o n tg  g ro u p  RATCLIFFE
c o n tg  end  s c r e e n  1.0  d u r a t i o n  8 0 .0  a n a l y s i s  10.0  s t a b i l i t y  6 0 .0
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A .2 R esu lts  Sum m ary
System Operating Condition




Transfer =  500 MW)
Stressed Case 
(S cot land- Engl and 
Transfer =  920 MW)








Total no. of Transiently 
Unstable Contingencies
2 13
Total no. of Dynamically 
Unstable Contingencies
0 6
Table A .l: Results summary for two 20 machine and 100 busbar model scenarios
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A .3 R anking Sum m ary
System Operating Condition
Contingency Name Base Case Stressed Case
Ranking Stability Ranking Stability
Line STEW2J-ECCL2Q:L1 
Line C0CK2-STEW2J:L1
15 Stable 3 Transient
Line DEES4-PENT4:L2 
Line DEES4-PENT4:L1
1 Transient 9 Transient
Line NORT4R-OSBA4Q:Ll 
Line N0RT4R-HAWP2:L1
3 Stable 11 Transient
Line KIBY2-HEYS4:L1 
Line FIDF2J-HEYS4:L1
9 Stable 17 Dynamic
Line CRUA2Q-WIYH2:L1 2 Transient 13 Transient
Line BRLE4-WWEY2K:L1 10 Stable 7 Transient
Line INDQ4-TAUN4Q:L1 16 Stable 19 Dynamic
Line EGGB4J-PEW04:L1 6 Stable 18 Dynamic
Busbar EGGB4J 4 Stable 8 Transient
Busbar WBUR4 5 Stable 4 Transient
Busbar DRAK4 8 Stable 10 Transient
Busbar SUND4 11 Stable 2 Transient
Busbar MELK4 12 Stable 6 Transient
Busbar KINC2 13 Stable 12 Transient
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
System Operating Condition
Contingency Name Base Case Stressed Case
Ranking Stability Ranking Stability
Load Busbar DRAX4J 18 Stable 23 Stable
Load Busbar FIDF2J 21 Stable 24 Stable
Load Busbar HUER4 - - 16 Dynamic
Load Busbar PELH4 - - 25 Stable
Load Busbar WALH4 - - 20 Stable
Load Busbar IRON4 - - 22 Stable
Group WYLFA 20 Stable 14 Dynamic
Group HINKLEY 14 Stable 15 Dynamic
Group DRAX.B 7 Stable 1 Transient
Group DUNGENESS 17 Stable 21 Stable
Group LONGANNET 22 Stable 26 Stable
Group RATCLIFFE 19 Stable 5 Transient
Table A.3: Summary of Contingency Rankings and Stabilities for two 20 machine 
and 100 busbar model scenarios
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A ppendix B 
20 M achine and 100 Busbar 
O utputs (Base Case Condition)
B . l  G eneral A larm  Sum m ary Form at
F uzzy  L o g ic  C o n tin g e n c y  R a n k in g  and  A larm  P r o c e s s in g  Summary F i l e
Sum rank S c r e e n in g  I n t e r v a l  1 .0 0  s e c s
F a u l t  D u r a t io n  0 .0 8  s e c s
S h o r t  Term D ynam ics 1 0 .0 0  s e c s
L o n g er Term  D ynam ics 6 0 .0 0  s e c s
l o .  o f  L in e  C o n t in g e n c ie s  8
l o .  o f  B u s b a r  C o n t in g e n c ie s  6
Ko. o f  L oad C o n t in g e n c ie s  6
l o .  o f  G roup C o n t in g e n c ie s  6
T o ta l  Vo. o f  C o n t in g e n c ie s  26
C o n tin g e n c y  L i s t i n g  S ystem  S e c u r i t y  A ssessm en t C y c le  c o m p le te d  i n  6 :5 4  m ins
C o n tin g e n c y
L in e  DEES4-PEIT4: LI 
L in e  DEES4-PEIT4:L2 
(R em ote End T r ip p e d )
L im it  V io la t io n s /A la r m s
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d
7 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
100 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s
1 S y stem  F re q u e n c y  V i o l a t i o n
8 G roup HW L im it  V i o l a t i o n s
3 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s
S y stem  S t a b i l i t y  
T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
L in e  CRUA2Q-VIYH2:L1 
(L o c a l  End T r ip p e d )
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d
1 B u sb a r  i s l a n d e d
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  
35 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s
1 G roup MW L im it  V i o l a t i o n
T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
L in e  I0RT4R-HAVP2: LI 
L in e  V0RT4R-0SBA4Q:L1 
(R em ote End T r ip p e d )
1 B u sb a r  i s l a n d e d  
3  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  
99  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  
8 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s
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B u sb a r EGGB4J
B u sb a r UBUR4
L in e  EGGB4J-PEW04:L1 
(R em ote End T r ip p e d )
G roup DRAX.B
B u sb a r DRAK4
L in e  FIDF2J-HEYS4:L1 
L in e  KIBY2-HEYS4:L1 
(R em ote End T r ip p e d )
L in e  BRLE4-WEY2K: LI 
(L o c a l  End T r ip p e d )
B u sb a r  SUID4
B u sb a r HELK4
B u sb a r KIVC2
G roup HIIKLEY
1 G roup MVAr L im it V io l a t i o n
6 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
100 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s
8 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s
4  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
100 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s
10 G roup MU L im it  V io l a t i o n s
7 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
100 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s
10 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
100 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s
12 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s
9 G roup MVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n s
5 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
100 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s
6 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s
2 Group MVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n s
6 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
100 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s
7  G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s
4  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s
95 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s
4  G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s
1 G roup MVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n
2 L in e  O v e rlo a d  V io l a t i o n s
96  V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s
4  G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  
2 G roup HVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n s
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
90 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s
3  G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s
1 G roup HVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n
2 L in e  O v e rlo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
78 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s
3 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  
1 G roup HVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n  
14 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s  
3 Group HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  
1 G roup HVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n
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L in e  C0CK2-STEU2J:L1 
L in e  STEW2J-ECCL2Q:L1 
(L o c a l  End T r ip p e d )
L in e  IIDq4-TAUV4q:L1 




G roup UYLFA 
Load FID F2J 
G roup LOVGAIIET
3 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
40 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s  
3 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  
2 G roup HVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n s
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n  
43 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s
2 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n
3 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s
4 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s
1 G roup HVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  
1 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n  
1 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n
1 S y stem  F re q u e n c y  V i o l a t i o n
2 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  
,3 G roup HVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n s
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B .2  G eographical Specific A larm  Sum m ary Form at
F uzzy  L o g ic  C o n tin g e n c y  R a n k in g  and A larm  P r o c e s s in g  Summary F i l e
Sum rank S c r e e n in g  I n t e r v a l 1.00 s e c s
F a u l t  D u ra t io n 0 .0 8 s e c s
S h o r t  Term D ynam ics 10.00 s e c s
L o n g er Term D ynam ics 6 0 .0 0 s e c s
Vo. o f  L in e  C o n t in g e n c ie s 8
Vo. o f  B u sb a r C o n t in g e n c ie s 6
Vo. o f  Load C o n t in g e n c ie s 6
Vo. o f  G roup C o n t in g e n c ie s 6
T o ta l  Vo. o f  C o n t in g e n c ie s 26
C o n tin g e n c y  L i s t i n g  S ystem  S e c u r i t y  A ssessm en t C y c le  c o m p le te d  in  6 :5 4  m ins
C o n tin g e n c y L im it  V io la t io n s /A la r m s S ystem  S t a b i l i t y
L in e  DEES4-PEIT4: LI 
L in e  DEES4-PEVT4:L2 
(R em ote End T r ip p e d )
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  (L e e d s )
7  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V i o l a t i o n
1 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
5 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 G roup MU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
3 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
L in e  CRUA2Q-UIYH2:L1 
(L o c a l  End T r ip p e d )
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  ( S c o t la n d )
1 B u sb a r  i s l a n d e d  ( S c o t la n d )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )  
16 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
7  V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
1 G roup MU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
L in e  I0RT4R-HAUP2:L1 1 B u sb a r i s l a n d e d  (L e e d s )
L in e  V0RT4R-0SBA4Q:L1 3  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )  
(Rem ote End T r ip p e d )  17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
32 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
5 G roup MU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham ) 
1 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
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B u sb ar EGGB4J
B u sb a r UBUR4
L in e  EGGB4J-PEU04:L1 
(R em ote End T r ip p e d )
G roup DRAX.B
B u sb a r DRAK4
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
4 L in e  O v e rlo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  (B irm ingham )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
2 G roup HW L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
4 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  (S c o t la n d )
3 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
2 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
5 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3  G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
6 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  (B irm ingham )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
2 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
7 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
1 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  (B irm ingham )
i
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb an s)
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
8 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
6 G roup HVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
1
4  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  (B irm ingham )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 G roup HU L im i t  V i o l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
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L in e  FIDF2J-HEYS4: LI 
L in e  KIBY2-HEYS4:L1 
(R em ote End T r ip p e d )
L in e  BRLE4-UUEY2K: LI 
(L o c a l  End T r ip p e d )
B u sb a r  SUVD4
B u sb a r  MELK4
B u sb a r KIVC2
5 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
1 G roup MVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
1 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n  (B irm ingham )
6 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
6 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e rlo a d  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
13 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
16 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
3 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
1 G roup MVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
14 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
16 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
3  G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
1 G roup HVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
1 G roup HVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n  (B irm ingham )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 G roup MU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
2 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
1 G roup MVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
32 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
11 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
15 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb an s)
3 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
2 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
1 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
1 G roup HVAr L im i t  V i o l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
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G roup HIIKLEY
L in e  CQCK2-STEW2J: LI 
L in e  STEW2J-ECCL2Q:L1 
(L o c a l  End T r ip p e d )
L in e  IMDQ4-TAUH4Q:L1 




G roup UYLFA 
Load FID F2J 
G roup LOIGAIBET
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
2 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
3 G roup MW L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
1 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( S t  A lb a n s )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
14 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
9 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
2 G roup MW L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
1 G roup MW L im it  V i o l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
2 G roup MVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
5 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
23 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
I  V o l ta g e  V i o l a t i o n  (B irm ingham )
I I  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
3  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 G roup MW L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
1 G roup MW L im it  V i o l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
3  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 G roup MW L im it  V i o l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
3 G roup MW L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
1 G roup MVAr L im i t  V i o l a t i o n  ( B r i s t o l )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
1 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n  ( B r i s t o l )  i
1 G roup MW L im it  V i o l a t i o n  (B irm ingham )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
1 S y stem  F re q u e n c y  V i o l a t i o n
2 G roup MW L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
3 G roup MVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
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B .3  Full A larm  List Form at
B.3.1 Top Transiently U nstable C ontingency
F uzzy  L o g ic  C o n tin g e n c y  R a n k in g  and  A larm  P r o c e s s in g  Summary F i l e
Sum rank : ~ S c re e n in g  I n t e r v a l 1.00 s e c s
F a u l t  D u ra t io n 0 .0 8 s e c s
S h o r t  Term D ynam ics 10.00 s e c s
L o n g er Term D ynam ics 6 0 .0 0 s e c s
l o .  o f  L in e  C o n t in g e n c ie s 8
Vo. o f  B u sb a r  C o n t in g e n c ie s 6
l o .  o f  Load C o n t in g e n c ie s 6
Vo. o f  G roup C o n t in g e n c ie s 6
T o ta l  Ko. o f  C o n t in g e n c ie s 26
C o n tin g e n c y  L i s t i n g  S ystem  S e c u r i t y  A ssessm en t C y c le  c o m p le te d  i n  6 :5 4  m ins
C o n tin g e n c y
L in e  DEES4-PEVT4:L1 
L in e  DEES4-PEIT4:L2 
(Rem ote End T r ip p e d )
L im it  V io la t io n s /A la r m s  
F re q u e n c y  5 0 .4 2  Hz
L in e  DEES4-FIDF2J:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  87.1%  
L in e  DEES4-TRAU4:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  107.6%  
L in e  D II04-PEV T4:L2 -  O v e r lo a d  88.9%  
L in e  I)RAX4J-KEAD4:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  88.2%  
L in e  LEGA4-TRAV4: L I -  O v e r lo a d  85.6%  
L in e  PEIT4-TRAW4:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  164.9%  
B u sb a r  ABTH2J _  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu  
B u sb a r  BLYT2J -  V o lta g e  0 .8 2  pu  
B u sb a r  BRF04 -  V o l ta g e  0 .7 7  pu
B u sb a r  BRLE4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .7 4  pu
B u sb a r  CAIT4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .8 0  pu
B u sb a r  CAPE2J -  V o lta g e  0 .4 0  pu 
B u sb a r  CELL4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .6 0  pu
B u sb a r CILF4 -  V o lta g e  0 .6 9  pu
B u sb a r  CLYM2 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 1  pu
B u sb a r  C0CK2 -  V o l ta g e  0 .8 9  pu
B u sb a r C0TT4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 8  pu
B u sb a r  C0VL4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 7  pu
B u sb a r  CREB4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .7 8  pu
B u sb a r  CRUA2Q 7 V o l ta g e  0 .9 4  pu 
B u sb a r  DAIV4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .5 1  pu
B u sb a r  DEES4 -  V o lta g e  0 .8 6  pu
B u sb a r  DIDC4 -  V o l ta g e  1 .0 7  pu
B u sb a r  D II0 4  -  V o l ta g e  0 .5 4  pu
B u sb a r  DRAK4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .6 2  pu
B u sb a r  DRAX4J -  V o l ta g e  0 .7 9  pu 
B u sb a r  DU1G4 -  V o l ta g e  1 .0 5  pu 
B u sb a r  ECCL2Q -  V o lta g e  0 .8 7  pu 
B u sb a r  ECLA4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .7 3  pu  
B u sb a r  EGGB4J -  V o lta g e  0 .7 7  pu
S y stem  S t a b i l i t y  
T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
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B u sb ar ELST2J -  V o lta g e  1 .0 S  pu 
B u sb a r EXET4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 7  pu 
B u sb a r FECK4 -  V o lta g e  0 .6 2  pu 
B u sb a r FERR2J -  V o lta g e  0 .7 9  pu 
B u sb a r FFES2 -  V o lta g e  0 .2 8  pu 
B u sb a r FID F2J -  V o lta g e  0 .4 9  pu
B u sb a r F0YE2 - V o lta g e 1 .0 5 pu
B u sb a r GALA1 - V o lta g e 1 .0 5 pu
B u sb ar GRAI4 - V o lta g e 0 .7 9 pu
B u sb a r HAHH4 - V o lta g e 0 .6 2 pu
B u sb ar HARK2 - V o lta g e 1 .0 5 pu
B u sb ar HATL2 - V o lta g e 0 .8 3 pu
B u sb ar HAVP2 - V o lta g e 0 .8 2 pu
B u sb ar HEYS4 - V o lta g e 1.10 pu
B u sb ar HIGM4 - V o lta g e 1 .0 8 pu
B u sb ar HIVP4 - V o lta g e 1 .0 8 pu
B u sb ar HUER4 - V o lta g e 0 .9 4 pu
B u sb ar IIDQ4 - V o lta g e 0 .7 5 pu
B u sb ar IR 0 I4 - V o lta g e 0 .5 1 pu
B u sb a r IVER2J -  V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu 
B u sb a r KEAD4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .7 7  pu 
B u sb a r KEAR4Q -  V o lta g e  1 .0 8  pu 
B u sb a r KEMS4J -  V o lta g e  0 .7 9  pu 
B u sb a r KIBY2 -  V o lta g e  0 .5 1  pu 
B u sb a r KILS2 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 1  pu 
B u sb a r KIVC2 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu 
B u sb a r K II0 4  -  V o lta g e  0 .7 9  pu  
B u sb a r K IIT2 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu 
B u sb a r LEGA4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .3 8  pu 
B u sb a r L1TT4 -  V o lta g e  0 .7 8  pu  
B u sb a r L0AI2 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 3  pu  
B u sb a r L0VE4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu  
B u sb a r  KAYT1T -  V o lta g e  0 .8 8  pu 
B u sb a r HELK4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
B u sb a r VEIL2 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu  
B u sb a r  VFLV4R -  V o l ta g e  0 .7 9  pu  
B u sb a r IFLV4S -  V o l ta g e  0 .7 8  pu 
B u sb a r I0RT2 -  V o lta g e  0 .8 2  pu 
B u sb a r V0RT4R * V o lta g e  0 .8 1  pu 
B u sb a r 0SBA4Q -  V o lta g e  0 .7 9  pu 
B u sb a r PEHE2 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu  
B u sb a r PELH4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 8  pu 
B u sb a r PEHB4 -  V o lta g e  0 .6 9  pu 
B u sb a r PEIH2 -  V o lta g e  0 .5 6  pu 
B u sb a r PEIT4 -  V o lta g e  0 .5 3  pu 
B u sb a r PEW04 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
B u sb a r RATS4J -  V o l ta g e  1 .0 7  pu 
B u sb a r RUGE4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .6 1  pu  
B u sb a r STAL4Q -  V o lta g e  1 .0 8  pu 
B u sb a r STEH2J -  V o lta g e  0 .8 3  pu 
B u sb a r STHA2 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 0  pu 
B u sb a r STSB4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 9  pu 
B u sb a r SUID4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu 
B u sb a r SWAI4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .6 9  pu  
B u sb a r TAUV4Q -  V o l ta g e  1 .0 8  pu
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B u sb ar TAUI4R -  V o lta g e  1 .0 8  pu 
B u sb a r TH0M2J -  V o lta g e  1 .0 9  pu 
B u sb a r TH0N4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 8  pu 
B u sb a r TILB4R -  V o lta g e  0 .7 9  pu 
B u sb a r TRAU2 -  V o lta g e  0 .2 8  pu 
B u sb a r TRAW4 -  V o lta g e  0 .2 1  pu 
B u sb a r UALH4 -  V o lta g e  0 .6 8  pu 
B u sb a r UALP4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 8  pu 
B u sb a r  VALX4Q -  V o lta g e  1 .0 8  pu 
B u sb a r  UALX4R -  V o lta g e  1 .0 8  pu 
B u sb a r UB0L2 -  V o lta g e  0 .8 2  pu 
B u sb a r VBUR4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 8  pu 
B u sb a r VHS02 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu 
B u sb a r UHS04Q -  V o l ta g e  0 .7 0  pu 
B u sb a r WILL4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 7  pu 
B u sb a r WISD2 -  V o lta g e  0 .7 7  pu 
B u sb a r UISH2 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 0  pu 
B u sb a r  WIYH2 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 S  pu 
B u sb a r WTHU2J -  V o lta g e  1 .0 8  pu 
B u sb a r UUEY2K -  V o lta g e  1 .0 S  pu 
B u sb a r UYLF4 -  V o lta g e  0 .5 3  pu 
G roup CRUACHAI -  on  HU L im its  
G roup DI10RUIG -  on  HU L im i ts  
G roup DIIORUIG -  on  MVAr L im i ts  
G roup F F E S T II. -  on  HVAr L im its  
G roup FIDDLERS -  on  HU L im i ts  
G roup RATCLIFFE -  on HU L im i ts  
G roup RUGELEY -  on  HU L im i ts  
G roup DIIORUIG ( p o l e - s l i p p e d )
L in e  D II0 4 -P E IT 4 :L 1  -  O v e r lo a d  126.7%  
G roup F F E S T II. -  on HU L im i ts  
G roup TRAUS. -  on  HU L im i ts  
G roup TRAUS. -  on  HVAr L im i ts  
G roup UYLFA -  on HU L im i ts
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B.3.2 Top Stable Contingency
F uzzy  L o g ic  C o n tin g e n c y  R a n k in g  and  A larm  P r o c e s s in g  Summary F i l e
Sum rank S c r e e n in g  I n t e r v a l 1.00 s e c s
F a u l t  D u r a t io n 0 .0 8 s e c s
S h o r t  Term D ynam ics 10.00 s e c s
L o n g er Term D ynam ics 6 0 .0 0 s e c s
Vo. o f  L in e  C o n t in g e n c ie s 8
■o. o f  B u s b a r  C o n t in g e n c ie s 6
Vo. o f  Load C o n t in g e n c ie s 6
Vo. o f  G roup C o n t in g e n c ie s 6
T o ta l  Vo. o f  C o n t in g e n c ie s 26
C o n tin g e n c y  L i s t i n g  S ystem  S e c u r i t y  A ssessm en t C y c le  c o m p le te d  i n  6 :5 4  m ins
C o n tin g e n c y L im it  V io la t io n s /A la r m s S y stem  S t a b i l i t y
L in e  I0RT4R-HAVP2: LI 
L in e  V0RT4R-0SBA4Q:L1 
(Rem ote End T r ip p e d )
B u s b a r  V0RT4R i s l a n d e d  
L in e  DIV04-PEVT4.-L2 -  O v e r lo a d  85.9%  
L in e  DRAX4J-KEAD4:Li -  O v e r lo a d  86.9%  
L in e  HARK2-STHA2: LI -  O v e r lo a d  85.2%  
B u s b a r  ABTH2J -  V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu
B u sb a r  BLYT2J -  V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu
B u sb a r  BRF04 -  V o l ta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
B u sb a r  BRLE4 -  V o lta g e  0 .7 1  pu 
B u s b a r  CAIT4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 6  'pu 
B u s b a r  CAPE2J -  V o lta g e  1 .0 7  pu 
B u s b a r  CELL4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
B u s b a r  CILF4 -  V o lta g e  0 .7 0  pu 
B u s b a r  CLTM2 -  V o lta g e  0 .7 4  pu 
B u s b a r  C0CK2 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
B u sb a r  C0TT4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .5 5  pu 
B u sb a r  C0UL4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
B u s b a r  CREB4 -  V o lta g e  0 .4 6  pu 
B u sb a r  CRUA2Q -  V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu 
B u sb a r  DAIV4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
B u sb a r  DEES4 -  V o lta g e  0 .7 1  pu 
B u sb a r  DIDC4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
B u s b a r  D II0 4  -  V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
B u sb a r  DRAK4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
B u sb a r  DRAX4J -  V o lta g e  0 .4 4  pu 
B u sb a r  DUVG4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .7 7  pu 
B u sb a r ECCL2Q -  V o l ta g e  0 .4 8  pu 
B u sb a r ECLA4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
B u sb a r  EGGB4J -  V o l ta g e  0 .4 7  pu
B u s b a r  ELST2J -  V o lta g e  0 .6 7  pu
B u sb a r  EXET4 -  V o l ta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
B u sb a r  FECK4 -  V o l ta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
B u sb a r  FERR2J -  V o l ta g e  0 .4 4  pu 
B u sb a r  FFES2 -  V o lta g e  0 .7 8  pu 
B u sb a r  FID F2J -  V o lta g e  1 .0 7  pu
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B u sb ar F0YE2 -
B u sb a r GALA1 -
B u sb a r GRAI4 •
B u sb a r HAMH4 -
B u sb a r HARK2 -
B u sb a r HATL2 -
B u sb a r HAWP2 •
B u sb a r HEYS4 -
B u sb a r HIGM4 -
B u sb a r H IIP 4  -
B u sb a r HUER4 -
B u sb a r IIDQ4 -
B u sb a r IR0S4 •
B u sb a r IVER2J
B u sb a r KEAD4 •
B u sb a r KEAR4Q
B u sb ar KEKS4J
B u sb a r K1BY2 -
B u sb a r KILS2 -
B u sb a r K IIC 2 -
B u sb a r K II0 4  -
B u sb a r I I I T 2  •
B u sb a r LEGA4 -
B u sb a r LITT4 -
B u sb a r L0AI2 -
B u sb a r L0VE4 -
B u sb a r HAYT1T
B u sb a r HELK4 -
B u sb a r IE IL 2  -
B u sb a r VFLV4R
B u sb ar IFLV4S
B u sb a r I0RT2 -
B u sb a r 0SBA4Q
B u sb a r PEHE2 -
B u sb a r PELH4 -
B u sb a r PEHB4 -
B u sb a r P E II2  -
B u sb a r PEVT4 -
B u sb a r PEV04 -
B u sb a r RATS4J
B u sb a r RUGE4 -
B u sb a r STAL4Q
B u sb ar STEW2J
B u sb a r STHA2 -
B u sb a r STSB4 ■
B u sb a r SUID4 -
B u sb a r SWAI4 -
B u sb a r TAUI4Q
B u sb a r TAUI4R
B u sb a r TH0H2J
B u sb a r TH0H4 ■
B u sb a r TILB4R
B u sb a r TRAV2 -
B u sb a r TRAV4 -
B u sb a r WALH4 -
V o lta g e 0.88 pu
V o lta g e 1 .0 6 pu
V o lta g e 0 .7 2 pu
V o lta g e 1 .0 6 pu
V o lta g e 1 .0 6 pu
V o lta g e 0 .1 3 pu
V o lta g e 0.86 pu
V o lta g e 1 .0 6 pu
V o lta g e 0 .5 6 pu
V o lta g e 1 .0 6 pu
V o lta g e 1 .0 6 pu
V o lta g e 0 .7 5 pu
V o lta g e 1 .0 6 pu
- V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
V o lta g e  0 .5 0  pu
- V o lta g e  0 .5 1  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .7 2  pu 
V o lta g e  0 .6 8  pu 
V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu 
V o lta g e  0 .7 3  pu 
V o lta g e  1 .0 7  pu 
V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu 
V o lta g e  0 .7 1  pu 
V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
V o lta g e  0 .7 3  pu
■ V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu 
V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu 
V o lta g e  0 ,7 7  pu
■ V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu
■ V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
V o lta g e  0 .1 4  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .8 4  pu 
V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu 
V o lta g e  0 .6 S  pu 
V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu  
V o lta g e  0 .6 9  pu 
V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
V o lta g e  0 .6 0  pu
- V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu
- V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu
- V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
V o lta g e  0 .7 3  pu 
V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu 
V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
V o lta g e  0 .7 0  pu
- V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu
- V o l ta g e  1 .0 6  pu
- V o l ta g e  0 .5 0  pu 
V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu
- V o lta g e  0 .7 1  pu 
V o lta g e  0 .7 7  pu 
V o lta g e  0 .7 5  pu 
V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu
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B u sb a r VALP4 -  V o lta g e  0 .6 2  pu 
B u sb a r  VALX4Q -  V o lta g e  0 .6 6  pu 
B u sb a r VALX4R -  V o l ta g e  0 .6 6  pu 
B u sb a r VB0L2 -  V o lta g e  0 .1 2  pu 
B u sb a r WBUR4 -  V o lta g e  0 .5 5  pu 
B u sb a r  VHS02 -  V o lta g e  0 .7 0  pu 
B u sb a r  VHS04Q -  V o lta g e  0 .7 1  pu 
B u sb a r  VILL4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
B u sb a r VISD2 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 6  pu 
B u sb a r  UISH2 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu 
B u sb a r VIYU2 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu 
B u sb a r  VTHU2J -  V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu 
B u sb a r VVEY2K -  V o lta g e  0 .6 9  pu 
B u sb a r VYLF4 -  V o lta g e  1 .0 5  pu 
G roup CRUACHAI -  on  HV L im i ts  
G roup DIVORVIG -  on  HV L im i ts  
G roup DIIORVIG -  on HVAr L im i ts  
G roup FERRYBR. -  on HV L im i ts  
G roup HARTLEPL. -  on HV L im i ts  
G roup RATCLIFFE -  on HV L im i ts  
G roup RUGELEY -  on HV L im i ts  
G roup TRAVS. -  on HV L im i ts  
G roup VYLFA -  on HV L im i ts
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A ppendix C 
20 M achine and 100 Busbar 
O utputs (Stressed Condition)
C .l G eneral A larm  Sum m ary Form at
F u zzy  L o g ic  C o n tin g e n c y  R a n k in g  and  A larm  P r o c e s s in g  Summary F i l e
Sum rank S c r e e n in g  I n t e r v a l  1 .0 0
F a u l t  D u r a t io n  0 .0 8
S h o r t  Term D ynam ics 1 0 .0 0
L o n g e r  Term  D ynam ics 6 0 .0 0
l o .  o f  L in e  C o n t in g e n c ie s  8
l o .  o f  B u sb a r  C o n t in g e n c ie s  6
J o .  o f  L oad C o n t in g e n c ie s  6
l o .  o f  G roup C o n t in g e n c ie s  1 6
T o ta l  J o .  o f  C o n t in g e n c ie s  26
s e c s
s e c s
s e c s
s e c s
C o n tin g e n c y  L i s t i n g  S y stem  S e c u r i t y  A ssessm en t C y c le  c o m p le te d  i n  9 :4 9  m ins
C o n tin g e n c y  
Group DRAX.B
B u sb ar SUKD4
L in e  C0CK2-STEW2J:L1 
L in e  STEW2J-ECCL2Q:L1 
(L o c a l End T r ip p e d )
L im it  V io la t io n s /A la r m s
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  
28  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
100 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  
13 G roup MW L im it  V i o l a t i o n s
8 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  
18 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
97  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s
1 S y stem  F re q u e n c y  V i o l a t i o n  
15 G roup MW L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  
5 G roup MVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s
2 G roups p o l e - s l i p p e d
10 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  
92  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s
9  G roup MW L im it  V i o l a t i o n s
S ystem  S t a b i l i t y  
T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
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B u sb a r  WBUR4
G roup RATCLIFFE
B u sb a r HELK4
L in e  BRLE4-WWEY2K: LI 
(L o c a l  End T r ip p e d )
B u sb a r EGGB4J
L in e  DEES4-PEIT4:L1 
L in e  DEES4-PEIT4:L2 
(R em ote End T r ip p e d )
B u sb a r DRAK4
L in e  J0RT4R-HAWP2:L1 
L in e  I0RT4R-0SBA4q:L1 
(R em ote End T r ip p e d )
2 G roup MVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
19 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s
100 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V io l a t i o n
15 G roup MW L im it  V io l a t i o n s
10 G roup MVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n s
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
23 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  
100 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s  
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V io l a t i o n  
12 G roup MW L im it  V io l a t i o n s  
6 G roup HVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n s
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
21 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
99 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s  
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V io l a t i o n  
14 G roup MW L im it  V io l a t i o n s  
5 G roup MVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
21 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
100 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V i o l a t i o n  
15 G roup MW L im it  V io l a t i o n s  
6 G roup HVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n s
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
21 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
99  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V io l a t i o n  
16 G roup MW L im it  V io l a t i o n s  
9 G roup MVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n s
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
9 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  
89  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V io l a t i o n  
7 G roup MW L im it  V io l a t i o n s  
5 G roup MVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n s
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
23 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
93  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V io l a t i o n  
15 G roup MW L im it  V io l a t i o n s  
7 G roup MVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
1 B u sb a r  i s l a n d e d  
16 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  
80 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s
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B u sb ar K IIC 2
L in e  CRUA2Q-UIYH2:L1 




L in e  FID F2J-H EY S4:Li 
L in e  KIBY2-HEYS4:L1 
(R em ote End T r ip p e d )
L in e  EGGB4J-PEU04:L1 
(R em ote End T r ip p e d )
L in e  IIDQ4-TAUI4Q:L1 




11 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s
9  G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  
20 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s
96 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s
I  S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V io l a t i o n
I I  G roup HV L im it  V i o l a t i o n s
5 G roup MVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n s
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  
1 B u sb a r  i s l a n d e d  
8 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  
81 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s  
4 G roup HU L im i t  V io l a t i o n s
15 G roups u i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  
8 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
94  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s
1 G roup HU L im i t  V i o l a t i o n
12 G roups u i t h  undamped o s c i l l a t i o n s  
8 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s
94 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s
4 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s
7  G roups u i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s
8 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s
95 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s
6 G roups u i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  
12 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s
97 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s
7  G roup HU L im i t  V io l a t i o n s
2 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s
2 G ro u p s u i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s
10 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
94  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s
9  G roup MU L im it  V io l a t i o n s
8 Group HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s
3  G roups u i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s
9 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s
96 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s
4 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s
:l
7 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
71 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s
7 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  
94  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s
5 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s
7  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s
T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
Dynam ic I n s t a b i l i t y
Dynamic I n s t a b i l i t y
Dynam ic I n s t a b i l i t y
Dynam ic I n s t a b i l i t y
Dynam ic I n s t a b i l i t y








66 V o l ta g e  V io l a t i o n s
7 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  
69  V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s
7 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  
86 V o l ta g e  V i o l a t i o n s
6 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  
57 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s
7 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  
71 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s
1 S y stem  F re q u e n c y  V i o l a t i o n
8 G roup MW L im it  V i o l a t i o n s
3 G roup MVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s
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C.2 G eographical Specific A larm  Sum m ary Form at
F uzzy  L o g ic  C o n tin g e n c y  R a n k in g  and  A larm  P r o c e s s in g  Summary F i l e
Sum rank : - S c r e e n in g  I n t e r v a l 1.00 s e c s
F a u l t  D u ra t io n 0 .0 8 s e c s
S h o r t  Term D ynam ics 10.00 s e c s
L o n g er Term D ynam ics 6 0 .0 0 s e c s
Vo. o f  L in e  C o n t in g e n c ie s 8
Vo. o f  B u sb a r  C o n t in g e n c ie s 6
l o .  o f  Load C o n t in g e n c ie s 6
Vo. o f  G roup C o n t in g e n c ie s 6
T o ta l  Vo. o f  C o n t in g e n c ie s 26
C o n tin g e n c y  L i s t i n g  S ystem  S e c u r i t y  A ssessm en t C y c le  c o m p le te d  i n ! 9 :4 9  m ins
C o n tin g e n c y  L im it  V io la t io n s /A la r m s  S ystem  S t a b i l i t y
G roup DRAX.B 1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  ( S c o t la n d )  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
7  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
19 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )  i
8 G roup HU L im i t  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3 G roup HU L im i t  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
1 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( S t  A lb a n s )
1 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( B r i s t o l )
3  G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
4 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
I  G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n  (B irm ingham )
B u sb a r  SUBD4 1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  (L e e d s )  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
3  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
I I  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3  L in e  O v e rlo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n '( S t  A lb a n s )
16 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
32 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
20 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V i o l a t i o n
2 G roup HU L im i t  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
10 G roup HU L im i t  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
4  G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
1 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n  (B irm ingham )
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L in e  C0CK2-STEU2J:L1 
L in e  STEW2J-ECCL2Q: LI 
( L o c a l  End T r ip p e d )
B u sb a r  UBUR4
G roup RATCL1FFE
B u sb a r  MELK4
2 G roups p o l e - s l i p p e d  ( S c o t la n d )  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
3  L in e  O v e rlo a d  V io l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
5 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e rlo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
15 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
27 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
6 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
2 G roup HVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
I  G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  (L e e d s )  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
4 L in e  O v e rlo a d  V io l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
I I  L in e  O v e rlo a d  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V io l a t i o n
2 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
10 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3  G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
6 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
1 G roup HVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n  ( S t  A lb a n s )
1 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( B r i s t o l )
1 C roup  p o l e - s l i p p e d  (L e e d s )  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
3 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
17 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb an s)
17 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V io l a t i o n
1 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
9 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
1 G roup HVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
4 G roup HVAr L im it  V ib l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
1 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n  (B irm ingham )
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  (L e e d s )  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
3  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
14 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  ( S t  A lb a n s )
16 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
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L in e  BRLE4-UUEY2K: LI 
(L o c a l  End T r ip p e d )
B u sb a r  EGGB4J
L in e  DEES4-PEIT4: LI 
L in e  DEES4-PEIT4: L2 
(R em ote End T r ip p e d )
33 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V i o l a t i o n
2 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
9  G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3  G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
5 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  (L e e d s )  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
3  L in e  O v e rlo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
12 L in e  O v e rlo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
3 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V i o l a t i o n
2 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
10 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
5 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
1 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n  (B irm ingham )
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  (L e e d s )  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
3  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
14 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g 6 V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
32 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 S y stem  F re q u e n c y  V i o l a t i o n
2 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
9 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
1 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( S t  A lb a n s )
1 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( B r i s t o l )
6 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  ( S c o t la n d )  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
6 L in e  O v e rlo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
14 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
26 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
20 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
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B u sb a r  DRAK4
L in e  M0RT4R-HAWP2:LI 
L in e  VORT4R-OSBA4Q: LI 
(R em ote End T r ip p e d )
B u sb a r K IfC 2
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V io l a t i o n
5 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
2 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  (L e e d s )  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
3 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
16 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
4 L in e  O v e rlo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
28 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
19 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V i o l a t i o n
2 G roup HU L im it V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
10 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
5 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
1 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( S t  A lb a n s )
1 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( B r i s t o l )
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  ( S c o t la n d )  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
1 B u sb a r i s l a n d e d  (L e e d s )
3  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
11 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
31 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
8 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
13 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
11 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
9  G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
3  G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
4  G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  (L e e d s )  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
14 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  (S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s ’ (B irm ingham )
20 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
14 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V i o l a t i o n
1 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
7  G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3  G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
2 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
3 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
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L in e  CRUA2Q-UIYH2:L1 




1 G roup p o l e - s l i p p e d  ( S c o t la n d )
1 B u sb a r i s l a n d e d  ( S c o t la n d )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
4  L in e  O v e rlo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham ) 
16 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
9 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
14 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
2 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
5 G roups v i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
5 G roups v i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3 G roups v i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham ) 
1 G roup v i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
1 G roup v i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
4 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e rlo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
11 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
5 G ro u p s v i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
4 G ro u p s v i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 G ro u p s v i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
1 G roup v i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
4  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
11 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  (L e e d s )
3  G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
5 G roups v i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
2 G roups v i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
4 L in e  O v e rlo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
13 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
32 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y
Dynamic I n s t a b i l i t y
Dynamic I n s t a b i l i t y
Dynamic I n s t a b i l i t y
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L in e  FIDF2J-HEYS4:L1 
L in e  KIBY2-HEYS4: LI 
(R em ote End T r ip p e d )
L in e  EGGB4J-PEW04: LI 
(R em ote End T r ip p e d )
L in e  IIDq4-TA UV4q:Ll 
(R em ote End T r ip p e d )
L oad WALH4
G roup DUVGEIESS
4 G roups u i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )  Dynamic I n s t a b i l i t y  
2 G roups u i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
8 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
14 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
6 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
1 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n  (B irm ingham )
2 G roup HVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 G roups u i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )  Dynamic I n s t a b i l i t y  
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
6 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
11 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
7 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 G roup HU L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
5 G roup HVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3 G roup HVAr L im it  V io l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
2 G roups u i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )  Dynamic I n s t a b i l i t y
1 G roup u i t h  undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
5 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
14 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
32 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
3 G roup HU L im i t  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
1 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  (B irm ingham )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
3  L in e  O v e rlo a d  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
8 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (S c o t la n d )
18 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
20 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
13 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
3 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V io l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
11 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
33 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
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12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
2 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
3  G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
3  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
€  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
15 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
20 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
13 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
2 L in e  O v e rlo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
3 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
7  V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
16 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
20 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
14 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
3  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
10 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
26 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )  i i
3  L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
1 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n  (B irm ingham )
6 V o l ta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
14 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
10 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
14 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
13 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
3 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 L in e  O v e r lo a d  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
8 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
13 V o lta g e  V io l a t i o n s ! ( L e e d s )
12 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
21 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S t  A lb a n s )
17 V o lta g e  V i o l a t i o n s  ( B r i s t o l )
1 S ystem  F re q u e n c y  V i o l a t i o n
1 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n  ( S c o t la n d )
5 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (L e e d s )
2 G roup HU L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  (B irm ingham )
3 G roup HVAr L im it  V i o l a t i o n s  ( S c o t la n d )
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C .3 Full A larm  List Form at
C.3.1 Top Transiently U nstable Contingency
F u zzy  L o g ic  C o n tin g e n c y  R a n k in g  and  A la r a  P r o c e s s in g  Summary F i l e
Sum rank S c r e e n in g  I n t e r v a l 1.00 s e c s
F a u l t  D u r a t io n 0 .0 8 s e c s
S h o r t  Term D ynam ics 10.00 s e c s
L o n g er Term D ynam ics 6 0 .0 0 s e c s
■o. o f  L in e  C o n t in g e n c ie s 8
Vo. o f  B u sb a r  C o n t in g e n c ie s 6
l o .  o f  Load C o n t in g e n c ie s 6
■o. o f  G roup  C o n t in g e n c ie s 6
T o ta l  l o .  o f  C o n t in g e n c ie s 26
C o n tin g e n c y  L i s t i n g  S ystem  S e c u r i t y  A ssessm en t C y c le  c o m p le te d  i n  9 :4 9  m ins
C o n tin g e n c y  L im it  V io la t io n s /A la r m s  S ystem  S t a b i l i t y
G roup DRAX.B L in e  CLYM2-STHA2:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  110.8%  T r a n s i e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y  
L in e  C0CK2-KIIC2:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  116.6%
L in e  CREB4-I0RT2:L1 -  O v e rlo a d  99.8%
L in e  DEES4-FIDF2J:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  93.3%
L in e  DRAX4J-XEAD4: L I -  O v e r lo a d  120.6%
L in e  FERR2J-fcGGB4J:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  92.5%  *
L in e  HARK2-STHA2: L I -  O v e r lo a d  163.6%
L in e  VBUR4-KEAD4:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  112.5%
L in e  VBUR4-WALP4:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  85.9%
B u s b a r  ABTH2J ~ V o lta g e  0 .9 1  pu 
B u s b a r  BLYT2J -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 3  pu 
B u sb a r  BRF04 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu 
B u s b a r  BRLE4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 3  pu 
B u s b a r  CAVT4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 5  pu  
B u sb a r  CAPE2J -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r  CELL4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu 
B u sb a r  CILF4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu 
B u sb a r  CLYN2 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu 
B u sb a r C0CK2 -  V o l ta g e  0 l9 3  pu 
B u sb a r C0TT4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 4  pu 
B u s b a r  C0VL4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 2  pu 
B u sb a r  CREB4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu 
B u sb a r  CRUA2Q -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 4  pu 
B u sb a r DAII4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r  DEES4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r  DIDC4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu  
B u sb a r  D II0 4  -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu 
B u sb a r  DRAK4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu  
B u sb a r DRAX4J -  V o lta g e  0 .9 3  pu 
B u sb a r DUVG4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r  ECCL2Q -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 2  pu
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B u sb ar ECLA4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 1  pu 
B u sb a r EGGB4J -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu 
B u sb a r ELST2J -  V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu 
B u sb a r EXET4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r FECK4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu 
B u sb a r FERR2J -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r FFES2 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r F I0 F 2 J  -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 5  pu
B u sb a r F0YE2 - V o lta g e 0 .9 5 pu
B u sb ar GALA1 - V o lta g e 0 .8 9 pu
B u sb ar GRAI4 - V o lta g e 0 .9 5 pu
B u sb ar HAMH4 - V o lta g e 0 .9 4 pu
B u sb ar HARK2 - V o lta g e 0 .9 0 pu
B u sb ar HATL2 - V o lta g e 0 .9 4 pu
B u sb ar HAVP2 - V o lta g e 0 .9 4 pu
B u sb a r HEYS4 - V o lta g e 0 .9 4 pu
B u sb ar HIGH4 - V o lta g e 0 .9 4 pu
B u sb a r HIVP4 - V o lta g e 0 .9 5 pu
B u sb ar HUER4 - V o lta g e 0 .9 5 pu
B u sb a r IIDq4 - V o lta g e 0 .9 4 pu
B u sb a r IR 0 I4 - V o lta g e 0 .9 5 pu
B u sb a r IVER2J -  V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu 
B u sb a r KEAD4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu 
B u sb a r KEAR4Q -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r KEHS4J -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r KIBY2 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
B u sb a r KILS2 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
B u sb a r KIVC2 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 3  pu
B u sb a r K II0 4  -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 5  pu
B u sb a r KIVT2 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 5  pu
B u sb a r LEGA4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 4  pu
B u sb a r LITT4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 4  pu
B u sb a r L0AX2 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
B u sb a r L0VE4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
B u sb a r MAYT1T -  V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu 
B u sb a r MELK4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 3  pu
B u sb a r IE IL 2  -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
B u sb a r  IFLW4R -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r VFLU4S -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu  
B u sb a r I0RT2 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 3  pu 
B u sb a r S0RT4R -  V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu 
B u sb a r 0SBA4Q -  V o lta g e  0 .9 3  pu 
B u sb a r PEHE2 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 4  pu
B u sb a r PELH4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 1  pu
B u sb a r PEMB4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 3  pu
B u sb a r PEVV2 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
B u sb a r PEIT4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
B u sb a r PEW04 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 4  pu
B u sb a r RATS4J -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu 
B u sb a r RUGE4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r STAL4Q -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r STEV2J -  V o lta g e  0 .9 3  pu 
B u sb a r STHA2 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 3  pu
B u sb a r STSB4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
B u sb a r SUVD4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 1  pu
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B u sb a r SWAI4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 2  pu 
B u sb a r TAUI4Q -  V o lta g e  0 .9 S  pu 
B u sb a r TAUI4R -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r TH0M2J -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 4  pu 
B u sb a r TH0M4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r TILB4R -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 4  pu 
B u sb a r TRAU2 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
B u sb a r TRAV4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
B u sb a r WALH4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 3  pu
B u sb a r VALP4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 1  pu
B u sb a r WALX4q -  V o lta g e  0 .9 1  pu 
B u sb a r WALX4R -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 1  pu 
B u sb a r VB0L2 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 3  pu
B u sb a r WBUR4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 3  pu
B u sb a r VHS02 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 1  pu
B u sb a r WHS04Q -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 2  pu 
B u sb a r WILL4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 4  pu
B u sb a r UISD2 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 3  pu
B u sb a r VISH2 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r  VIYH2 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r WTHU2J -  V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu 
B u sb a r WWEY2K -  V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu 
B u sb a r WYLF4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 4  pu 
G roup COTTAH -  on  MW L im i ts  
G roup COTTAM -  on  MVAr L im its  
G roup CRUACHAI -  on  MVAr L im its  
G roup DIIORVIG -  on  MU L im i ts  
G roup EGGBORO. -  on  MW L im i ts  
G roup EGGBORO. -  on  HVAr L im i ts  
G roup FERRYBR. -  on  MW L im i ts  
G roup FERRYBR. -  on  MVAr L im its  
G roup FIDDLERS -  on  MW L im its  
G roup HEYSHAN -  on  MW L im its  
G roup LOIGAVIET -  on  MVAr L im its  
G roup RATCLIFFE -  on  HU L im i ts  
G roup RUGELEY -  o n  MW L im i t s  •
G roup CRUACHAI ( p o l e - s l i p p e d )
L in e  BLYT2J-WB0L2:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  107.6%  
L in e  C0CK2-ECCL2Q:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  88.2%  
L in e  C0CK2-STEW2J:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  93.3%  
L in e  D II0 4 -P E IT 4 :L 1  -  O v e r lo a d  88.9%  
L in e  D II0 4 -P E IT 4 :L 2  -  O v e r lo a d  88.2%  
L in e  DRAX4J-EGGB4J:L1 -  O v e rlo a d  86.5%  
L in e  FID F2J-K IB Y 2:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  115.7%  
L in e  HATL2-HAWP2: LI -  O v e rlo a d  121.6%  
L in e  HATL2-I0RT2:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  115.5%  
L in e  HATL2-WB0L2: LI - O v e r l o a d  85.3%  
L in e  HEYS4-HARK2: LI -  O v e r lo a d  107.6%  
L in e  HEYS4-HARK2: L2 -  O v e r lo a d  107.6%  
L in e  HUER4-KILS2:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  92.1%  
L in e  HUER4-IEIL2:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  116.8%  
L in e  IEIL2-STHA2:L1 -  O v e rlo a d  89.1%  
L in e  I0RT2-STEW 2J:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  106.8%  
L in e  I0RT4R-HAWP2:L1 -  O v e rlo a d  114.6%  
L in e  PEV04-HARK2:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  114.7%
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L in e  STEW2J-ECCL2Q: LI -  O v e r lo a d  94.27 . 
G roup DIHORWIG -  on HVAr L im i ts  
G roup DUIGEHESS -  on HW L im i ts  
G roup F F E S T II. -  on HVAr L im i ts  
G roup HARTLEPL. -  on  HV L im i ts  
G roup HUXLEY -  on  HW L im i ts  
G roup HUITERSTI -  on HVAr L im i ts  
G roup TRAWS. -  on  HV L im i ts  
G roup WYLFA -  on  HW L im i ts
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C.3.2 Top D ynam ically U nstable Contingency
F uzzy  L o g ic  C o n tin g e n c y  R an k in g  and  A larm  P r o c e s s in g  Summary F i l e
Sum rank S c r e e n in g  I n t e r v a l  1 .0 0  s e c s
F a u l t  D u ra t io n  0 .0 8  s e c s
S h o r t  Term D ynam ics 1 0 .0 0  s e c s
L o n g er Term D ynam ics 6 0 .0 0  s e c s
Vo. o f  L in e  C o n t in g e n c ie s  8
l o .  o f  B u sb a r C o n t in g e n c ie s  6
Vo. o f  Load C o n t in g e n c ie s  6
Vo. o f  G roup C o n t in g e n c ie s  6
T o ta l  Vo. o f  C o n t in g e n c ie s  26
C o n tin g e n c y  L i s t i n g  S ystem  S e c u r i t y  A ssessm en t C y c le
C o n tin g e n c y  L im it  V io la t io n s /A la r m s
G roup VYLFA L in e  CLYH2-STHA2:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  110.8%  
L in e  C0CK2-KIVC2:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  105.1%  
L in e  DEES4-FIDF2J:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  93.3%  
L in e  DRAX4J-KEAD4: L I -  O v e r lo a d  120.6%  
L in e  HARK2-STHA2:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  163.6%  
L in e  KIBY2-HEYS4:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  85.5%  
L in e  VBUR4-KEAD4:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  112.5%  
L in e  VBUR4-VALP4:L1 -  O v e r lo a d  85.9%  
B u s b a r  ABTH2J -  V o lta g e  0 .9 1  pu 
B u s b a r  BLTT2J -  V o lta g e  0 .9 3  pu 
B u sb a r  BRF04 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 2  pu
B u sb a r  BRLE4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 3  pu
B u s b a r  CAVT4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 5  pu
B u s b a r  CAPE2J -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r  CELL4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
B u sb a r CILF4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu
B u sb a r  CLYN2 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
B u sb a r  C0CK2 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 3  pu
B u sb a r C0TT4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
B u sb a r  C0WL4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu
B u s b a r  CREB4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
B u sb a r  DAIV4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
B u sb a r DEES4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
B u sb a r  DIDC4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu
B u sb a r DIV04 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
B u sb a r  DRAK4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
B u sb a r DRAX4J -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r DUIG4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r ECCL2Q -  V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu 
B u s b a r  ECLA4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 1  pu  
B u s b a r  EGGB4J -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu 
B u sb a r  ELST2J -  V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu 
B u sb a r EXET4 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
B u s b a r  FECK4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 4  pu
c o m p le te d  i n  9 :4 9  m ins
S ystem  S t a b i l i t y  
Dynamic I n s t a b i l i t y
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B u sb ar FERR2J •
B u sb a r FFES2 -
B u sb a r FID F2J ■
B u sb a r GALA1 -
B u sb a r GRAI4 -
B u sb ar HAHH4 -
B u sb a r HARK2 -
B u sb a r HATL2 -
B u sb a r HAWP2 -
B u sb a r HEYS4 -
B u sb a r HIGH4 -
B u sb a r HIMP4 -
B u sb a r IVDQ4 -
B u sb a r IR 0 I4  -
B u sb a r IVER2J •
B u sb a r KEAD4 -
B u sb a r KEAR4Q ■
B u sb a r KEHS4J ■
B u sb a r KIBY2 -
B u sb a r KILS2 -
B u sb a r KIIC2 -
B u sb a r KIV04 -
B u sb a r LEGA4 -
B u sb a r LITT4 -
B u sb a r L0AI2 -
B u sb a r L0VE4 -
B u sb a r HAYT1T ■
B u sb a r HELK4 -
B u sb a r IE IL 2  -
B u sb a r IFLV4R ■
B u sb a r IFLW4S •
B u sb a r I0RT2 -
B u sb a r I0RT4R •
B u sb a r 0SBA4Q •
B u sb a r PELH4 -
B u sb a r PEHB4 -
B u sb a r P E II2  -
B u sb a r PEIT4 -
B u sb a r PEU04 -
B u sb a r RATS4J •
B u sb a r RUGE4 -
B u sb a r STAL4Q ■
B u sb a r STEV2J ■
B u sb a r STHA2 -
B u sb a r STSB4 -
B u sb a r SUID4 -
B u sb a r SUAI4 -
B u sb a r TAUI4Q ■
B u sb a r TAUI4R •
B u sb a r TH0H2J •
B u sb a r TH0H4 -
B u sb a r TILB4R ■
B u sb a r TRAW2 -
B u sb a r TRAW4 -
B u sb a r VALH4 -
-  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
• V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
-  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
• V o lta g e  0 .8 9  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
- V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
- V o lta g e  0 .9 0  pu
- V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
- V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
-  V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu
- V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
-  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
-  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
- V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
-  V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 3  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
-  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
-  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
- V o lta g e  0 .9 3  pu
-  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
-  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 1  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 3  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
- V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
-  V o l ta g e  0 .9 4  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
-  V o l ta g e  0 .9 5  pu
-  V o lta g e  0 .9 3  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
- V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 1  pu
- V o lta g e  0 .9 2  pu
-  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
-  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
-  V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
-  V o lta g e  0 .9 4  pu
- V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 5  pu
■ V o lta g e  0 .9 3  pu
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B u sb a r  UALP4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 1  pu 
B u sb a r  UALX4Q -  V o lta g e  0 .9 1  pu  
B u sb a r VALX4R -  V o lta g e  0 .9 1  pu  
B u sb a r  UB0L2 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 3  pu  
B u s b a r  UBUR4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 3  pu  
B u s b a r  UHS02 -  V o lta g e  0 .9 1  pu  
B u sb a r  UHS04Q -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 2  pu 
B u s b a r  VILL4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 4  pu  
B u sb a r  UISD2 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 3  pu  
B u sb a r  UISH2 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 5  pu  
B u s b a r  UTHU2J -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 2  pu  
B u sb a r  UUEY2K -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 2  pu 
B u sb a r  UYLF4 -  V o l ta g e  0 .9 5  pu  
G roup COTTAH (undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s )  
G roup CRUACHAI (undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s )  
G roup DIIORWIG (undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s )  
G roup DUVGEIESS (undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s )  
G roup EGGBORO. (undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s )  
G roup F F E S T II. (undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s )  
G roup FIDDLERS (undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s )  
G roup FOYERS (undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s )  
G roup HIIXLEY (undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s )  
G roup HUITERSTI (undam ped  o s c i l l a t i o n s )  
G roup LOIGAIIET (undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s )  
G roup PETERHEAD (undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s )  
G roup RATCLIFFS (undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s )  
G roup RUGELEY (undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s )  
G roup TRAUS. (undam ped o s c i l l a t i o n s )  
G roup FIDDLERS ( p a r a m e te r s  ra m p in g )  
G roup DIIORUIG -  on  HU L im i t s
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C.3.3 Top Stable Contingency
Fuzzy Logic Contingency Ranking and Alarm Processing Summary File
Screening Interval 1.00 secs
Fault Duration 0.08 secs
Short Term Dynamics 10.00 secs
Longer Term Dynamics 60.00 secs
No. of Line Contingencies 8
No. of Busbar Contingencies 6
No. of Load Contingencies 6
No. of Group Contingencies 6
Total No. of Contingencies 26
Contingency Listing System Security Assessment Cycle completed in 9:49 mins
Contingency Limit Violations/Alarms System Stability
Load WALH4 Line CLYM2-STHA2:L1 - Overload 111.0%
Line C0CK2-KINC2:L1 - Overload 104.2%
Line DEES4-FIDF2J:L1 - Overload 93.6%
Line DRAX4J-KEAD4:LI - Overload 121.3%
Line HARK2-STHA2:LI - Overload 163.9%
Line WBUR4-KEAD4:LI - Overload 113.1%
Line VBUR4-VALP4:LI - Overload 86.4%
Busbar ABTH2J ■- Voltage 0.92 pu
Busbar BLYT2J ■- Voltage 0.93 pu
Busbar BRF04 - Voltage 0.92 pu
Busbar BRLE4 - Voltage 0.93 pu
Busbar CANT4 - Voltage 0.95 pu
Busbar CELL4 - Voltage 0.95 pu
Busbar CILF4 - Voltage 0.93 pu
Busbar CQCK2 - Voltage 0.93 pu
Busbar C0TT4 - Voltage 0.34 pu
Busbar C0WL4 - Voltage 0.93 pu
Busbar CREB4 - Voltage 0.94 pu
Busbar DAIN4. - Voltage 0.95 pu
Busbar DIDC4 - Voltage 0.93 pu
Busbax DRAK4 - Voltage 0.95 pu
Busbar ECCL2Q ■- Voltage 0.92 pu
Busbar ECLA4 - Voltage 0.92 pu
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Busbar ELST2J - Voltage 0.92 pu
Busbar FECK4 - Voltage 0.94 pu
Busbar GALA1 - Voltage 0.89 pu
Busbar GRAI4 - Voltage 0.95 pu
Busbar HAHH4 - Voltage 0.94 pu
Busbar HARK2 - Voltage 0.90 pu
Busbar HATL2 - Voltage 0.94 pu
Busbar HAVP2 - Voltage 0.94 pu
Busbar HEYS4 - Voltage 0.94 pu
Busbar HIGM4 - Voltage 0.94 pu
Busbar INDQ4 - Voltage 0.94 pu
Busbar I R O M - Voltage 0.95 pu
Busbar IVER2J - Voltage 0.92 pu 
Busbar KEAD4 - Voltage 0.94 pu 
Busbar KEAR4Q - Voltage 0.9S pu
Busbar KEMS4J - Voltage 0.95 pu
Busbar KINC2 - Voltage 0.95 pu
Busbar KIN04 - Voltage 0.95 pu
Busbar LITT4 - Voltage 0.94 pu
Busbar L0VE4 - Voltage 0.94 pu
Busbar MAYT1T - Voltage 0.92 pu 
Busbar MELK4 - Voltage 0.94 pu 
Busbar NFLW4S - Voltage 0.94 pu 
Busbar N0RT2 - Voltage 0.93 pu 
Busbar N0RT4R - Voltage 0.95 pu 
Busbar PELH4 - Voltage 0.91 pu
Busbar PEMB4 - Voltage 0.93 pu
Busbar PENH2 - Voltage 0.95 pu
Busbar PEW04 - Voltage 0.94 pu
Busbar RATS4J - Voltage 0.95 pu
Busbar STAL4Q - Voltage 0.95 pu
Busbar STEW2J - Voltage 0.93 pu
Busbar STHA2 - Voltage 0.95 pu
Busbar SUND4 - Voltage 0.91 pu
Busbar SWAN4 - Voltage 0.93 pu
Busbar TH0M2J - Voltage 0.95 pu 
Busbar TH0M4 - Voltage 0.95 pu 
Busbar TILB4R - Voltage 0.94 pu 
Busbar VALH4 - Voltage 0.94 pu
Busbar WALP4 - Voltage 0.91 pu
Busbar WALX4Q - Voltage 0.91 pu
Busbar VALX4R - Voltage 0.91 pu
Busbar VB0L2 - Voltage 0.93 pu
Busbar VBUR4 - Voltage 0.93 pu
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Busbar WHS02 - Voltage 0.91 pu 
Busbar WHS04Q - Voltage 0.93 pu 
Busbar WILL4 - Voltage 0.94 pu
Busbar UISD2 - Voltage 0.94 pu
Busbar VISH2 - Voltage 0.95 pu
Busbar WTHU2J - Voltage 0.92 pu 
Busbar WWEY2K - Voltage 0.93 pu 
Busbar CLYM2 - Voltage 0.95 pu 
Busbar NFLW4R - Voltage 0.95 pu 
Busbar RUGE4 - Voltage 0.95 pu
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Abstract
This paper describes the use of fuzzy sets in the area of power 
system security assessment which includes identification of 
electromechanical modes of operation, contingency screening 
and evaluation and subsequent alarm processing. The applica­
tion of this technique as part of a complete real-time dynamic 
security assessment system written at the University of Bath is 
discussed and results are presented for an IEEE test network, 
together with a reduced UK National Grid system. Comparis­
ons will be made between this new method and more traditional 
numerical approaches, illustrating the improvements that can 
be made in the operation of complex power systems.
1 INTRODUCTION
Power system security can be defined as the ability of the 
system to continue normal operation despite the occurrence 
of any one of a pre-selected list of credible disturbances or 
“contingencies”. This concept has become increasingly of 
interest to power utilities since networks are being operated 
ever closer to their stability limits due to cost, efficiency and 
environmental constraints.
Many techniques have been developed over a number of dec­
ades to study system instability, contingency analysis and 
alarm processing which encompass a wide range of techniques. 
These are, principally, numerical- or algorithmical-based and 
artificial intelligence (such as expert systems and pattern recog­
nition) approaches which have been gradually enhanced over 
a number of years of research. Numerical methods are limited 
in that they rely heavily on a mathematical model of how the 
process behaves. Some systems (such as power networks) are 
not amenable to this type of treatment and hence mathematical 
theory cannot be successfully applied in all cases. Artificial 
intelligence techniques, differ since they try to model the skills 
of the operator and not the process itself.
In this paper, the expert system approach based on fuzzy  set 
theory will be discussed and how its application to deal with 
the analysis of a non-linear system such as a power network 
will be described.
2 METHODOLOGY
The principle behind fuzzy logic (1, 2, 3, 4] is to represent 
humanistic knowledge in a form recognisable to both man and 
machine. An operator may have a theory about what is the best 
thing to do whilst controlling a process and may express it using 
rules which contain vague terms such as “small”, “slightly”, 
etc ... This can be represented by fuzzy logic using set theory. 
Linguistic Variables are used in place of numerical quantities 
and are statements which have values described in some natural
language, such as the variable size may have values small, 
medium, large, etc ... These values can be further described 
by the use of Linguistic H edges such as very, not and likely. 
The linguistic variables can be equated by Fuzzy Conditional 
Statements in the form “If A Then B Else C \ which can 
subsequently be grouped together to form Fuzzy Algorithms 
or an ordered sequence of events containing fuzzy assignment 
and conditional statements.




Figure 1: Membership Function (p ) vs Linguistic Variable 
(Size)
Here, there will be a range of sizes which will definitely ap­
ply and will have a grade o f  membership p  in the set of I. 
Conversely, there will be a range over which the term does not 
apjply, with p  in the set of 0. Unlike more traditional set theory, 
fuzzy logic dictates that there is a region where the variable 
does not cover the full scale and will have a p  between 0 and 
1.
It is due to this overlap that fuzzy set theory can help in filling 
the gaps in the knowledge-base and dealing with the impreci­
sion of the operator, since there will be conditions where more 
than one rule can apply at a given time. It is this effect that 
can be exploited in security analysis of power systems.
3 APPLICATIONS TO POWER 
SYSTEM SECURITY
3.1 Contingency Analysis
Security Assessment has become a valuable tool in the ana­
lysis of power system operation under fault conditions and
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is probably the most time-consuming function in an Eneigy 
Management System or EMS. This is because on-line contin­
gency analysis is often performed automatically over typical 
time intervals of ten to twenty minutes.
For large power systems, hundreds, or in some cases, thou­
sands of contingencies would need to be fully analysed within 
very short time intervals which imposes a considerable com­
putational burden on EMS computers. Systematic approaches 
have been developed to automatically select the critical con­
tingencies [5, 6, 7] to reduce the full analysis time and rank 
them in their ascending order of severity. Performance indices 
(PI) of the form
are often used, where X i  is a transmission line power flow or 
change in busbar voltage magnitude, X - nax is the correspond­
ing thermal rating and maximum permissible voltage change, 
respectively and, wi is a non-negative weighting coefficient 
The PI is then calculated for all the lines and/or busbars in the 
system. With a value of the exponent n in Equation 1 equal 
to two, the performance index can be prone to masking errors, 
where a contingency with many small limit violations can be 
ranked equally with one with a few large limit violations.
A fuzzy set approach (based on [8]) presented in this paper 
has been modified and implemented for contingency screen­
ing, evaluation and ranking Busbar voltages, transmission line 
flows and real and reactive power injections during and after 
a contingency application are classified into one of five fuzzy 
linguistic variable sets, i.e. very small VS, small S, medium, 
M, large L and very large VL, which are characterised in tri­
angular form by a sigmoid function as in Figure 2.
To quantify these linguistic variables, a performance index (PI) 
is used to describe the relative severity of each variable, Lc. a 
higher PI indicates a greater chance of large limit violations. 
The membership function n for each variable is described by 
the triangle’s centre C  (the most likely value of the PI for the 
variable), width W  (the degree of uncertainty about the PI) 
and peak value P  (the strength of the variable). By using the 
sigmoid function in Figure 2, more emphasis has been placed 
on the variables medium to very large, i.e. the more severe 
cases, to avoid the masking problem.
If during a contingency, more than one violation from the 
system falls under a particular linguistic variable description, 
the membership function of that category is modified by fuzzy 
set notation. This means that the peak value P  increases by 
multiplying /x by the number of violations that have occurred 
in that category.
Once all the triangles have been modified at the end of the 
contingency application, it is necessary to “defuzzify” the 
membership functions to yield the overall system perform­
ance index for that particular contingent quantity. A centre o f  
gravity  algorithm or (product-sum) by binary search is used 
for greater accuracy rather than the less computationally de­
manding max-min method. These indices for each contingent 
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Figure 2: Membership Function (ji) vs Performance Index (PI) 
using the Sigmoid Function
primarily, the behaviour of synchronous generators during a 
large system disturbance or contingency. In these stability 
studies, both short-term as well as the longer-term dynamics 
of the system should be simulated and analysed. 
Conventionally, transient stability programs have been used 
to study the fast synchronising oscillations following a large 
disturbance, with a typical simulation of one to ten seconds. 
Dynamic stability algorithms ignore these fast machine os­
cillations and concentrate on the longer-term effects of slow 
power and voltage swings and frequency deviations resulting 
from energy imbalances over a simulation time interval of tens 
of minutes.
Traditionally, both transient and dynamic stability analyses 
have been carried out by numerical techniques such as the 
“transient energy function” [9, 10] and eigenvalue evaluation 
[11, 12] respectively. These can be time-consuming and not 
totally accurate for large systems. Hence an approach using 
fuzzy set classification, similar to that for contingency analysis, 
has been developed using generator machine rotor angle, rotor 
acceleration and kinetic energy for transient studies and power 
oscillation and ramping/interaction between neighbouring ma­
chine parameters for dynamic instability, which has shown to 
be accurate and adaptable for any size of power network.
. i
3.3 Alarm Handling
With any security analysis program and considering the size 
and complexity of a typical modem power system, an operator 
cannot be expected to process all the information available dur­
ing fault conditions. It is because of this that alarm processors 
have been developed [13, 14], which evaluate the importance 
of each message and help the operator to track the evolution 
of the power system state during a disturbance by providing a 
summary of the abnormal conditions. Here again fuzzy sets 
can help in the decision making of alarm handling and data 
processing using the methods outlined above.
3.2 Instability Detection 4 RESULTS
Power systems are examples of non-linear systems with a wide A time domain solution method has been used for this pa-
range of stability problems where the main areas of interest are, per based on a real-time simulator, PowSim, of a 10fh order
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power system model (including synchronous generators and 
their associated controllers) developed at the University of 
Bath [15, 16]. A single processor version of this running on 
an Intel i860-based PC was used to simulate both an IEEE 57 
bus [17] test network and a reduced 100 bus NGC system for 
both fuzzy and traditional approaches of security assessment.
4.1 Procedure
Time simulations using a time step of 40 ms were run for 
each contingency in a pre-determined database consisting of 
single or multiple transmission line outages, 3-phase to ground 
faults on busbars, busbar load losses and generator trips for a 
screening period of one second. Those cases that produce limit 
violations (from the alarm processor) were added to a memory 
stack list for a subsequent analysis, or evaluation period, of ten 
seconds. If transient instability occurred during the one second 
time interval, these contingencies were screened out and placed 
at the top of the final ranking order, since these are naturally the 
most severe cases. If after the evaluation interval, undamped 
or, at least, poorly damped power oscillations were still present, 
the time simulation was extended to determine the system state 
after a further sixty seconds for dynamic instability detection. 
Results for each test system are given below for both the fuzzy 
method and the more traditional numerical approach.
4.2 IEEE 57 Bus System
A database of 312 contingencies was used to test the algorithms 
for this network. A numerical method using an exponent value 
n = 20 from Equation 1 was used as the “benchmark”, since it 
has been proved that this will remove any masking errors at the 
expense of computational speed and, hence, result in greater 
ranking accuracy.
Table 1 shows the security assessment results for this case 
study. The number of misrankings for the n = 2 method com­
pared to that of the benchmark increase with the number of 
ranked contingencies which can be explained by the masking 
effect The fuzzy set approach has, in contrast, very few mis­
rankings, those that were present are not significantly different 
to those from the benchmark. It should also be noted that 
this technique has a considerable speed-up advantage over the 
latter, due to the absence of increased computation.
4.3 Reduced NGC 100 Bus System
The reduced NGC system used comprises of 100 busbars and 
20 synchronous generators. This gives a contingency database 
of 854 entries and again the same benchmark was used for 
comparison purposes.
The results in Table 2 show two entries for each method, the 
top is for a “summer night-time loading” condition and, the 
bottom, for an enhanced operating state with increased transfer 
from Scotland to England causing dynamic instability for some 
cases. Again the misrankings are prominent for the n = 2 
method, with very few errors between the fuzzy and benchmark 
approaches.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper a fuzzy set approach has been used to address the 
areas of stability detection, contingency analysis and alarm
processing. Although this miethodology has been tried in pre­
vious research, power systerm models of the size tested in this 
study have not been attempted and, in the case of contingency 
evaluation, a real-time power system simulator approach has 
not been used before.
The results that have been piresented have shown a favourable 
speed-up in execution time a:s compared to the more traditional 
numerical techniques. With the ever-increasing power of mod­
em processors and distributed system architectures, the fuzzy 
set approach is a practical amd adaptable technique for security 
analysis studies for any size of power system, without the errors 
and results interpretation often associated with mathematical 
methods.
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